While many human rights lawyers will be disappointed at the Supreme Court finding the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act constitutional, the judgment itself gives plenty of scope for future challenges to decisions made under the Act.
However, at the outset it makes a very clear distinction between the rights of asylum-seekers and those of Irish citizens.
It states: "The non-national or alien constitutes a discrete category of persons whose entry, presence and expulsion from the State may be the subject of legislative and administrative measures which would not, and in many of its aspects could not, be applied to its citizens . . .
"The rights, including fundamental rights, to which non-nationals may be entitled under the Constitution do not always coincide with the rights protected as regards citizens of the State, the right not to be deported from the State being an obvious and relevant example."
This marks a difference in emphasis from the thrust of many recent judgments, when there has been a tendency to afford non-citizens the same rights as citizens once they are actually in the State and appealing to its courts. This has drawn on the concept that human rights derive from people's innate rights as human beings, rather than from specific constitutional entitlements.
The drawing of such a clear distinction between citizens and "aliens" (a term now removed from legislation) may reflect the fact that there is a drive for the harmonisation of immigration law across the EU, and the fact that EU citizens enjoy equal rights within the member-states (with a few exceptions).
The ruling then goes on to say: "It may be that in certain circumstances a right to access to the courts of non-nationals may be subject to conditions or limitations which would not apply to citizens," provided, of course, that this was in accordance with the law and the Constitution.
A number of amendments to the Act had been questioned on precisely this ground, that non-nationals would have restricted access to the courts, specifically because those threatened with deportation would have only two weeks in which to take judicial review proceedings.
While the court found this to be constitutional, it offered lawyers for asylum-seekers a number of avenues for challenging decisions taken under the new legislation.
The ruling dealt in great detail with objections raised to the Act, like the difficulty asylum-seekers might face in getting legal advice, having all relevant material translated or communication difficulties. It stated that all of these could form the basis for seeking an extension of time. This could affect a large number of cases.
The review suggests that the High Court should view sympathetically the cases of people who have difficulties with the time limit.
"The discretion of the High Court to extend the 14-day period is sufficiently wide to enable persons, who having regard to all the circumstances of the case including language difficulties, communications difficulties, difficulties with regard to legal advice or otherwise, have shown reasonable diligence, to have sufficient access to the courts."
Other problems, like difficulty in obtaining access to relevant documents, could also be dealt with through the courts, it said. That again could provide a sufficient reason for seeking an extension of the time limit for judicial proceedings.
Indeed, the court suggested that habeas corpus proceedings could be taken concurrently with judicial review proceedings.
The powers of detention given to the Garda in this piece of legislation had also caused concern, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court. It did acknowledge that "there would be nothing wrong in the Oireachtas in its wisdom expressly providing for periodic review of the detention by a court . . ." but adds that not doing so did not make it unconstitutional.
There were sufficient safeguards against arbitrary detention, it said, including an obligation on the executive not to exercise the right to detain unnecessarily, and, again, the right to challenge the detention by way of judicial review.
All these avenues of challenge make it likely that, when this law becomes a reality, the courts will face an even greater volume of litigation around the whole area of asylum than at present.