WITHOUT in any way questioning Government policy, our serving military personnel must, over the last few years, have felt excluded from practical and doctrinal developments in which they have considerable experience and interest.
The contribution of military police to Sfor, the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia, authorised by the Government, is a modest and low profile one. It will enable familiarisation with new techniques. One can believe it is welcomed at all levels.
Our military police have performed well. The UN Commander in South Lebanon requested more Irish military police (especially senior NCOs) after the good work of those sent with the first infantry battalions. They had a delicate assignment on the Iran Iraq border after the first Gulf War. In the volatile Beirut of the early 1980s, their ability to "read the streets" was useful to many nationalities.
The posting of a staff officer to Brussels has been questioned. It is normal for all troop contingents to have representation on the staffs of peacekeeping operations. Staff officers in a HQ can help their contingents, formally and infomally, as changes occur. Troops in the field would be uneasy without such representation.
NATO's involvement arose because the UN lacks the staff (and staff system) to control major military efforts like Desert Storm - the US led expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The then UN secretary general accepted that.
The UN Security Council authorised "member states co operating with the government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means . . . to restore peace and security in the area". We know the results.
Subsequently, the Implementation Force (Ifor) for the Dayton Agreement and this year's Stabilisation Force (Sfor) were similarly authorised by Security Council resolutions.
To military personnel it seems likely that enforcement actions will be necessary from time to time, if slaughters like Srebrenica and Zepa in Bosnia are to be averted or halted. Such operations need integrated, experienced staffs, adequate and compatible communications and the deployment of heavy weapons, if only for deterrent purposes. Different types and standards of training are necessary.
Clearly the "consent" type peacekeeping to which we are accustomed is inappropriate for Bosnia; all sides may take ad vantage of the constraints on UN soldiers to kill their enemies. Enforcement has worked, albeit with some failures. The media would have been less kind if UN forces were involved.
The big armies have produced peacekeeping manuals. Staff work and operational procedures are being standardised. The problem of inexperienced troop contributors needed attention. Almost all European countries (except Ireland) are now members of the Partnership For Peace (PFP); it was the obvious vehicle for training and exercising troops of differing nationalities and experience levels. In 1995/96 over 21 international exercises involving many countries were run.
Participation in Sfor is a positive step. Some people have had to modify long held ideas; it is creditable that they were able to do so. The soldiers know their own peacekeeping expertise can be improved and that they have something to contribute. Ultimately, peacekeepers are trying to provide an alternative to the old cry, too often answered, of blood for blood.
The soldiers won't talk in those terms. They are professionals, used to doing what their government requires.