THE evacuation of more than 100 British, Irish, Canadian, Dutch and other citizens from the Albanian capital, Tirana on Thursday and Friday last came perilously close to disaster.
Yesterday morning the BBC World Service featured evacuees accusing the Italian armed forces of inefficiency and of being afraid to defend those left to fend for themselves on a dock in the town of Durres. The truth is somewhat, different and it raises serious questions for both the British and Italians involved in the operation.
Some questions for the British:
. How did they manage to lose half their convoy of vehicles before it had even left the centre of Tirana?
. Why were organisers sent from London without any means of communication with the outside world?
. Why were evacuees taken on the hazardous journey to Durres when the Americans managed to rescue their people by helicopter from Tirana?
The senior British official had told us that he would be "front end Charlie" (FEC) in the first mini-bus of the convoy and have radio contact with "back end Charlie" in the final car. He would drive ahead to see we were not in danger and radio contact would ensure the convoy would remain intact.
Within minutes the plan was a shambles. Those of us in the "lost convoy" of six mini-buses and almost 50 people had to re-form and get to Durres without any official assistance. We got our own convoy together at the British compound - and were told FEC would be contacted by radio and asked to slow down the official convoy to allow us to catch up. He didn't.
This meant we had to run the gauntlet of armed looters at a grain store on the outskirts of Tirana. We got through after one driver paid the leading bandit cash and another handed over his gold wedding ring.
We caught up with FEC at the docks at Durres. He addressed his charges to tell them he wanted no complaints. "We got you here before nightfall which was our mission." It was now 6 p.m. We did not complain although we knew we had got ourselves there without - and even despite - his "help".
There was also another important matter. We appeared to have arrived at the wrong dock. About 200 people, mainly Italians and Americans who had been in Durres for eight hours, were waiting at another dock where Albanians were looting from warehouses. FEC decided the Italian forces should rescue us instead. He was told, it would appear, to go to the other dock and wait his turn.
In order to communicate, FEC had to borrow mobile phones from evacuees and use them until the batteries ran down. He relied finally on a car phone from a Croatian oil company.
A link was set up as follows: FEC would call the British compound in Tirana with a question; they would call the Foreign Office in London; they in turn would call the Foreign Ministry in Rome; the Italian's would call the warship San Giorgio which was conducting the operation. The ship would then call Rome; Rome would call London; London would call Tirana; and Tirana would call FEC with the answer.
The more links in a chain of communications the more likely it is to break down and this is precisely what appears to have happened. FEC told us the Italians would arrive in "seven minutes". Their landing vehicles appeared on the horizon 5 1/2 hours later. We knew we would not be taken off in the first batch, so we waited patiently. Then came the most dangerous part.
Groups of Albanians tried to force their way on to the landing craft. Shots were fired and all hell broke loose. The night air was filled with gunfire and thunder-flashes. Three Albanians were killed as we lay on the ground with our baggage over our heads. The deaths were probably caused by uncontrolled Albanian gunfire. ,When I dared look up, I could see Italian soldiers firing directly into the air.
The Albanians ran off and only a small number of them returned. Then the Italians made their major error: they set out for the San Giorgio as though their mission had been accomplished. We were given the impression we had just been left to our own devices once again.
Some questions for the Italians:
. Why were no Italian soldiers left on the dockside at Durres?
. Why were we left unprotected for a further six hours?
. Why did both sets of evacuees have to wait 12 hours to be rescued?
Some plaudits for the British: their consular staff in Tirana behaved exceptionally well; they were calm and courteous under extreme pressure and helpful at all times.
Some praise for the Italians: with great panache they finally defused a potentially disastrous situation by taking Albanian refugees on board; they successfully completed the gigantic task of rescuing almost 1,000 people in a single night.
But the calmest and most heroic of all were my fellow evacuees. Not one child, woman or man gave in to the panic beating in their hearts. That was, above all, why we survived.
