The outcome of the Amsterdam referendum is certain - the treaty will be ratified. The question is: what degree of enthusiasm, of informed participation, of voter satisfaction and, ultimately, of popular legitimacy for European integration will accompany this formal ratification?
This question is made all the more important by the various judicial decisions that have fundamentally altered the referendum process in the Republic and by the fact that informed participation and voter satisfaction look much less likely in the referendum on Amsterdam than in that on the Belfast Agreement.
At the outset of this referendum campaign, the vast majority of voters indicated that they did not know how they would vote on the Amsterdam Treaty. This finding from the RTE/Lansdowne poll confirmed a variety of polling evidence that the treaty had, up to that time, failed to make an impact on the public.
The current Irish Times/MRBI poll, which was taken with 10 days to go to polling day, indicates a somewhat firmer picture. By then 46 per cent were voting Yes and 11 per cent No.
However, this somewhat more committed response on the part of the voters was elicited by changing the choice of response from a simple Yes or No to include a "probably Yes" and a "probably No" category. This way of putting the question shows that only one-third were definite about their voting intentions, that a quarter knew how they would probably vote and that no less than 43 per cent either still had no opinion or would probably not vote.
More importantly, half the voters still felt they did not have "quite enough" information to make a decision, and a further 10 per cent did not know whether they had enough information or not.
This contrasts strongly with the situation in relation to the Belfast Agreement: 75 per cent said they had enough or more than enough information to make up their minds on that issue; only 20 per cent had not "quite enough" information; and a mere 4 per cent gave a "don't know" response (see table).
In short, voter involvement in the Amsterdam referendum lags far behind that in the Belfast Agreement referendum and has improved only marginally during the campaign. The decision to hold both referendums on the same day has undoubtedly contributed to the low level of voter involvement, but it is not the whole story.
The problem is that the treaty is widely seen as irrelevant. Asked the fairly general question of whether the treaty would be good for the European Union as a whole, 58 per cent were willing to give an opinion and the vast majority of them said the treaty would be good for the EU.
However, this leaves 42 per cent either saying that it makes no difference or that they have no view on the matter. Asking whether it will be good for Ireland produces a very slightly less favourable balance of opinion, but the same proportions of "no difference" and "no opinion" responses. In other words, both questions identify a very sizeable proportion of the public (two in five) that is entirely unmoved by Amsterdam. The real problem, however, is that when respondents are asked whether the treaty will be good or bad or will make no difference "to yourself", the proportion saying "no difference" or "no opinion" climbs to 61 per cent.
This is in relation to a treaty that has the following statement in its opening lines: "This treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizens".
One of the main reasons for this is that politicians don't debate the issues. One of the reasons for this is neutrality. It is usually assumed that neutrality is the great obstacle that, as far as Ireland is concerned, EU treaty changes must surmount or circumvent. This assumption results in much tiptoeing around, both by diplomats in the negotiation process and by politicians in the ratification debates.
However, in regard to what is probably the most important aspect of potential EU military co-operation, the current Irish Times/MRBI poll shows that the Irish public would support some definite steps forward.
The Amsterdam Treaty envisages the possibility of the European Union sending military forces on peacekeeping/peacemaking tasks. Faced with such a proposal, an individual memberstate could, under the terms of the treaty, block the decision, allow the decision to be made but not participate, or support the decision and participate in the military force.
In view of all the noise about neutrality, one might have expected Irish people to opt in the main for either the first or second of these choices. In fact, a clear majority (62 per cent) goes for the third option: to "support such decisions and participate in the peacekeeping/peace-making tasks".
Only 8 per cent support the extreme neutralist response and 24 per cent favour the variable geometry approach of letting the others get on with it.
This is not a wayward or a once-off finding. It is entirely consistent with the evidence of the Irish Times/MRBI poll of September 1996 which showed 77 per cent in favour of joining in "the NATOled Partnership for Peace programme for the purpose of engaging in joint peacekeeping exercises" and 71 per cent in favour of "serving in such places as Bosnia in a NATO-led peace enforcement effort".
None of this indicates that the Irish public has abandoned its commitment to neutrality (as it sees it). In fact, the September 1996 poll showed quite clearly that an equally large majority was in favour of maintaining Ireland's policy of neutrality, and there is no reason to think that this has changed in the meantime.
What the juxtaposition of these various views shows is not, as some would have it, a contradiction or an ambivalence in public opinion but rather the general symbolic nature of the commitment to neutrality and the willingness of the public to support extensive involvement in military operations under a variety of institutional umbrellas for particular purposes.
These findings suggest that it is the political class rather than the public that is being pusillanimous in regard to European security co-operation.
Meanwhile, the failure to foster genuine debate about the issues in the Amsterdam Treaty leaves a largely apathetic public to make up its mind as best it can. All the indications are that it will do so positively, although there may be some differential abstention, some of which will presumably show up as spoiled votes.
But there are equally strong indications that this, the fourth popular vote on the European issue, will leave the public with the same or an even greater sense of the remoteness of this ever closer union.
Richard Sinnott is a lecturer in politics and director of the Centre for European Economic and Public Affairs in UCD. He is co-author of People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation, Democracy and Legitimacy, which will be published by Oxford University Press next month