Eur80,000 'nervous shock' damages for porter

A hospital porter, who was on duty when his dead brother and seriously injured sister were among persons admitted to hospital…

A hospital porter, who was on duty when his dead brother and seriously injured sister were among persons admitted to hospital following a horrific road accident, has been awarded €80,000 damages for "nervous shock".

After making the award, Mr Justice Kearns gave leave to, and encouraged, two motor insurance companies to appeal his decision to the Supreme Court.

He indicated there were several questions to be addressed regarding the type of relationships which might entitle persons to secure damages for "nervous shock".

Five people, including Mr Declan Cuddy's brother Raymond, died in the accident on June 13th, 1998, and several others were injured. All the victims were admitted in ambulances to Portlaoise hospital on that date, where Mr Cuddy was on duty.

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Mr Cuddy, Donore, Kilbricken, Mountrath, Co Laois, later brought a High Court action against the owners of the other vehicles involved in the accident, claiming damages for nervous shock.

It was alleged that a motor car, owned by a friend, the late Matthew Peters, had collided with a trailer attached to a tractor. In turn, Mr Peters's car, which contained nine occupants, was "rear ended" by another car, it was claimed. Five people in Mr Peters's car were killed, including Mr Cuddy's brother. His sister Jackie, was also a passenger in Mr Peters's car and suffered life-threatening injuries.

All the other occupants in the car were well known to Mr Cuddy, either as cousins or lifelong family friends. All had lived and grown up together in the locality where the accident happened.

Giving his reserved judgment on Mr Cuddy's claim yesterday, Mr Justice Kearns said Mr Cuddy had the misfortune to be on duty on the night of the accident. He did not recognise one of the seriously injured persons in an ambulance as his cousin, Mr Feargal Hanlon, who died a few days later. A second ambulance brought another cousin, Ms Lorraine Bowe, who was strapped to a spinal board. She later died.

Mr Cuddy was asked by gardaí to help identify all nine persons. He was especially distressed by the condition in which he found his brother and Mr Peters, who had horrific facial injuries. The other person who died was Ms Aoife Carroll.

The scene at the hospital was one of devastation, the judge said.

Remarkably, Mr Cuddy appeared to have maintained his composure and professionalism throughout the event and went with his seriously injured sister to Beaumont hospital in Dublin the following morning.

Mr Justice Kearns said it was not surprising that Mr Cuddy thereafter was severely traumatised as were so many other people who were present, including an investigating garda, who was so traumatised that he was forced to take a year's leave of absence from work.

The judge said that he was deciding the matter in favour of Mr Cuddy based on a 1995 Supreme Court decision. That court has found that damages for nervous shock were recoverable where a person established they had suffered nervous shock and where their recognisable psychiatric illness was "shock induced" and was caused by an act or omission by a defendant who owed a duty of care.

During the case, it was argued policy considerations should persuade the court not to allow a recovery of damages beyond the level of relationships of husband and wife or parent and child.

Mr Justice Kearns said the case before him turned on the issue of proximity of relationships. It could not be said Mr Cuddy had failed to prove a "close proximate relationship" existed between himself and his dead brother and his seriously injured sister, both on the basis of close family relationship and on the basis of close ties of affection.

The court would support the proposition that policy considerations would dictate that the ambit of recoverability of damages and the category of relationships entitled to claim damages for nervous shock should be tightly restricted, the judge said. One could exclude certain categories of relationships by invoking policy grounds to do so.