Meeting between two Irish leaders: Unionists saw a Council of Ireland as a halfway house to unity, and it could only be sold on a positive assurance about status, writes Eamon Phoenix.
At their first face-to-face meeting following the establishment of the power-sharing Executive in January 1974, the Northern Ireland chief minister, Brian Faulkner, warned the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave of his political difficulties over the question of the South's recognition of the status of Northern Ireland, the proposed Council of Ireland and security.
Mr Faulkner said the value of the Taoiseach's declaration on the status of the North at Sunningdale a month earlier had been "devalued" by subsequent events.
This is revealed in the minutes of the meeting between the two heads of government at Baldonnell aerodrome on January 16th, 1974, released today in Belfast.
Mr Faulkner welcomed this early meeting. His only reluctance to bring forward such a meeting was because of the difficult political situation in the North.
"It was very important that both of them should be able to take their own people along with them in implementing the Sunningdale agreement."
Mr Faulkner then outlined his position within his party.
Following the Sunningdale conference, his opponents in the Unionist Party had insisted in calling an early meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council. The council had a very obsolete constitution, including a sizeable block vote from the delegates nominated by the Orange Order. It was, of course, ridiculous to have had such a meeting within three weeks of the Sunningdale conference and four days of the appointment of the Executive.
Nevertheless, it had gone forward on this basis, and the resolution negating the concept of the Council of Ireland had been carried by 53 votes. Had the meeting taken place even a month later the result may well have been different.
Under the UUP constitution it was not for the council itself to determine policy, but the outcome of the vote was such that Mr Faulkner felt he had to resign to avoid a totally anomalous situation. If he had remained his position could have become increasingly weak and humiliating.
As it was, he was able to maintain very substantial party support...Of 20 members of his Assembly party, 18 were solid in support, and the Assembly majority as such was safe.
Immediately after the Sunningdale conference, there was reason to feel things were going well. His own estimate would be at that time that 80 per cent of the Catholic community and about 60 per cent of the Protestant community were in support of the Sunningdale agreement.
Unfortunately, that situation had been progressively eroded over two weeks for two reasons. The most important reason was the development about the status of Northern Ireland.
On his return from Sunningdale, he had been able to persuade his supporters to accept with some reluctance that the declaration by the two governments really meant an acceptance of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Mr Faulkner went on to say that this had been damaged by a newspaper interview by Mr Cosgrave, followed by the Kevin Boland case before the Dublin High Court.
"It had to be said that the publication of the defence (by Dublin) had robbed him of all credibility on the question of status."
It had to be accepted that in unionist circles there was very little enthusiasm for the idea of a Council of Ireland as such, but more reasonable people were prepared to accept it if it could be the means of allowing the minority community to identify with the institutions of government. It was on this basis that he had been attempting to sell the Sunningdale package.
Unionists saw a Council of Ireland as a halfway house to unity, or a form of all-Ireland parliament. Therefore, the proposal could only be sold on the basis of a positive assurance about status.
The other reason for the erosion of support was the fiasco of picking up 15 suspected terrorists and releasing 14 of them virtually at once. This had created a very bad impression. (This referred to the arrest in Dundalk and Monaghan on January 3rd, 1974, of 16 IRA suspects by the Garda. All but one of them were released within two days, creating much criticism in the Northern unionist press.)
"The major question, however, was that of status.He must make it clear that there was no hope of proceeding to the formal conference and ratifying the Sunningdale agreement, including the Council of Ireland, unless the status issue could be cleared up. It could also be necessary to see real action on the anti-terrorist front."
Mr Faulkner said he was well aware of the political and other difficulties which faced Mr Cosgrave. They must equally appreciate the gravity of the difficulties he faced. The future of the Executive was dependent upon their ability to carry people along with them. He was in no doubt that his Assembly party would not agree to go forward to the formal stage of a conference until the status issue had been cleared up.
On security, Faulkner welcomed the statement by the Irish justice minister, Paddy Cooney. "He had always made it clear that he believed in the determination of Mr Cosgrave and his colleagues to grapple with this problem."
In reply, Mr Cosgrave said he had stated in his Sunday Press interview that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until the people there desired such a change.
Regarding the Boland case, his attorney-general (Declan Costello) was confident of winning the case. They had been "overtaken by the court action (by Mr Boland) which was deliberately designed to embarrass them".
Mr Faulkner said there could be no question of proceeding to ratification while the issue of status was "in the air".
Turning to security, Mr Cosgrave said he and his colleagues had been looking intensively at the problem. All the chief superintendents of Border areas had been called in for discussion, and they had identified a number of "blackspots" - Crossmaglen, Belcoo-Blacklion and Belleek-Garrison. His government had decided to put more police into these very difficult Border areas.