IRAQ: A school in Iraq is finally teaching US soldiers how to counter insurgency through contact with ordinary people, writes Thomas E Ricks in Taji
If the US effort in Iraq is ultimately successful, one reason may be the small school started recently on a military base here by Gen George W Casey, the US commander in Iraq.
Called the Coin Academy - using military shorthand for "counterinsurgency" - the newest educational institution in the US military establishment seeks, as a course summary puts it, to "stress the need for US forces to shift from a conventional warfare mindset" to one that understands how to win in a guerrilla-style conflict.
Or, as a sign on the wall of one administrator's office put it less politely: "Insanity is doing the same thing the same way and expecting a different outcome."
The purpose of the school north of Baghdad is to try to bring about a different outcome than the US military achieved in 2003-2004, when army commanders committed mistakes typical of a conventional military facing an insurgency.
"When the insurgency started, we came in very conventional," said Col Chris Short, who is the new school's commandant.
Back then, US forces rounded up tens of thousands of Iraqis, mixing innocent people in detention with hard-core Islamic extremists. Commanders permitted troops to shoot at anything mildly threatening.
And they failed to give their troops the basic conceptual and cultural tools needed to operate in the complex environment of Iraq, from how to deal with a sheikh to understanding why killing insurgents is usually the least desirable outcome in dealing with them. (It is more effective, they are now taught, to persuade them to desert or join the political process.)
Last year an internal study by army experts of US commanders found that some understood the principles of counterinsurgency and applied them well, while others faltered.
Even now, some conventional unit commanders baulk at the idea of leaving their troops for the five-day course, which covers subjects from counter-
insurgency theory and interrogations to detainee operations and how to dine with a sheikh.
Casey, the school's builder, found an easy way to encourage students: he made attendance compulsory for any officer heading to a combat command in Iraq. He also meets each class, offering the captains and lieutenant colonels a rare chance to quiz a four-star general.
Some members of the faculty, which draws heavily on special forces officers, were not eager to teach American infantry, artillery, aviation and armour officers. Short recalled that some said: "That's not our mission. We don't teach US forces." Such qualms have been eliminated, he said with a chuckle.
Again and again, the intense immersion course, which 30 to 50 officers attend at a time, emphasises that the right answer is probably the counterintuitive one, rather than something that the army has taught officers in their 10 or 20 years of service.
The school's textbook, a huge binder, offers the example of a mission that bursts into a house and captures someone who mortared a US base.
"On the surface, a raid that captures a known insurgent or terrorist may seem like a sure victory for the coalition," it observes in red block letters. It continues: "The potential second- and third-order effects, however, can turn it into a long-term defeat if our actions humiliate the family, needlessly destroy property, or alienate the local population from our goals."
At points, the school's leaders seem to go out of their way to challenge current US military practices. Short says that he has issues with "this big-base mentality" that keeps tens of thousands of troops inside facilities called forwarding operating bases, or FOBs, which they leave for patrols and raids.
Classic counterinsurgency theory holds that troops should live out among the people as much as possible, to develop a sense of how the society works and to gather intelligence.
"The course opened my eyes to some of the bigger picture," said Lieut Col Nathan Nastase, operations officer for the 5th Marine Regiment, based near Fallujah.
He said he especially liked hearing about the role of Special Operations Forces in Iraq, as well as the tactics used by successful commanders.
The school's greatest effect seems to be on younger officers. "My initial impression of it was it was a waste of time," said Capt Klaudius Robinson, commander of a cavalry troop in the 4th Infantry Division.
"But after going through it, it really changed my thinking about how to fight this insurgency. I came to realise that the centre of gravity is the people, and you have to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the people."
Before the course, he said, he expected to spend his time here combating insurgents, but instead he is focused on training and operating with Iraqi troops.
"We're never going to catch every bad guy," he tells his troops. "That's not a ticket home. But what I can do is help Iraqi security forces and get them to take the lead."
The major criticism offered by students is that it would have been better to have the education six months earlier, when they were training their troops to deploy to Iraq, not after the units have arrived.
Short had a tart response. It's not a bad idea, he said, but the army back home wasn't stepping up to the job. "They didn't do it for three years," the length of the war so far, he noted. "That's why the boss said, 'Screw it, I'm doing it here'."
And the school isn't just about operating in Iraq, Short said, but about preparing officers for the rest of their careers. - (LA Times-Washington Post service)