Lebanon has long been torn between two camps, but the one led by Hizbullah is now in a stronger position to press for political changes, wri tes Michael Jansen.
Since Israel began bombing Lebanon in July in response to the capture by Hizbullah of two Israeli soldiers, the Lebanese government has been criticised for failing to secure a ceasefire or deal with the humanitarian crisis created by Israel's offensive.
In theory, the government headed by Fouad Siniora and dominated by the March 14th movement, a pro-American clutch of sectarian groups formed after the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, should have persuaded its powerful allies, the US and France, to exert pressure on Israel to halt its offensive within days, averting the massive destruction Israel's war machine inflicted.
But Mr Siniora's pleas were ignored in Washington and Paris, which only put forward a ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council more than two weeks after the conflict began and adopted a version, adapted to meet some of Lebanon's concerns, a week later.
By the time the ceasefire came into effect seven days ago, Mr Siniora's government had lost most of its credibility. The absence from Lebanon of Saad Hariri, head of the largest faction in the March 14th movement and son of the assassinated prime minister, until shortly before the ceasefire took effect undermined popular confidence in the government.
Furthermore, the government committee handling relief did little to aid displaced civilians, whose needs were met instead by local councils, Hizbullah and non-governmental bodies with foreign humanitarian agency partners. Instead of launching a broad effort, the committee channelled supplies to March 14th factions which looked after people who took refuge in their constituencies.
Al-Fadl Shalaq, head of the Council for Development and Reconstruction, said divisions in the country were delaying reconstruction and he accused the Lebanese of "bickering among themselves" while Hizbullah, which is accused of acting as a "state-within-a-state", has been clearing away the rubble of blasted buildings and handing out $8,000-$12,000 (€6,200- €9,300) to relocate families until their homes are rebuilt.
Israel, the US and some western powers are calling for an end to Hizbullah's "state-within-a-state". This is unlikely to happen until Lebanon assumes the attributes of statehood. Ever since it became independent in 1943, Lebanon has been torn between two camps: the pro-western laissez-faire establishment and the independent nationalist opposition, which has a pan-Arab orientation. This division caused both of Lebanon's civil wars (1958 and 1975-91) and could again destabilise the country.
The ruling laissez-faire or "riviera" camp favours a weak state and preservation of the power and privileges of the Christian-Sunni bourgeoisie. Since this camp clings to consensus decision-making, none of Lebanon's major problems have ever been tackled and the Lebanese army has never been used to defend the country.
The nationalist camp prefers a strong Lebanese polity and seeks major reform, an end to sectarianism, the creation of an administration that will serve the people rather than sectarian interests and the establishment of an army that will deal with internal unrest and defend against external attack.
The nationalist camp, once represented by secular pan-Arab nationalists, is now led by Shia fundamentalist Hizbullah. It is ironic that the policies of its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, are now seen as "presidential" or "prime ministerial" by many Lebanese although, as a Shia, he cannot hold either post as long as the sectarian constitution remains in force. So far, he has played the Lebanese political game by the old rules and refrained from imposing his will on March 14th. But he is certain to press for change now that Hizbullah has, in the view of most Lebanese, won a famous victory.