After their defeat at Dunkirk in 1940, the Allies were determined that the D-Day invasion four years later would not fail, writes Dr Tom Clonan.
On the June 4th 1940 the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was driven into the sea at Dunkirk by a triumphant German army. Between the 26th of May and 04th of June 1940, over a half a million allied troops fled the continent from various ports in north-west France. In Britain's 'darkest hour', their army had been humiliated at the hands of a tactically and technologically superior German army. Defeat seemed final.
Four years later, on the 05th of June 1944, with the commencement of 'Operation Neptune', allied troops began their return to France. In technological terms and in terms of force projection and tactical doctrine the conventional battlefield had been transformed over the intervening four years. Despite the much-hyped strategy of 'Blitzkrieg', German forces in 1940 were primarily dependent on horse-drawn transport for deployment and manoeuvre. At that time few German units were fully mechanised and once disembarked from railheads, many troops reached the battlefield on foot.
For the infantry, the battle on the ground was fought with bolt action rifles - many of nineteenth century design. On the allied side, field communications were primitive, consisting of written orders delivered by runner, courier or pigeon, with many of the support weapons and field artillery unchanged since the static trench warfare of the First World War. In the air, many allied aircraft were of World war One design - strut and wire biplanes glued and tacked together on timber and fabric airframes.
By 1944, the prototypes of modern day automatic rifles had been developed for battlefield use. The German Sturmgewehr-44 would be re-engineered by Mikhail Kalashnikov to become the prototype of the now ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle. The German MG-42 machine gun would become the prototype for the US standard issue M-60 machine gun - now in use in Iraq. Multi launch rocket systems had been developed on both sides along with pilotless aircraft (V-1 flying bombs) and intermediate range missiles (V-2 or A-4 missile). At this stage in the war, a new generation of jet fighter aircraft was being developed by Germany which would eventually supercede piston engined aircraft such as British Spitfires and American P-38 Lightnings and P-51 Mustangs. The race to acquire weapons of mass destruction was also well underway with both allied and German scientists close to the development of the atomic bomb.
During the period 1940 to 1944, the allies had adapted to German tactics and had evolved their conduct of land operations from the rigid and inflexible models of the 1914-1918 war to a highly mobile and dynamic mode of combat.
Having harnessed the US economy for the purposes of total war, the allied armies of 1944 were now possessed of fully mechanised and airborne formations. The allies had also developed the concept of Strategic Air Command and by 1944 had worked steadily to decimate Germany's economic base along with the Luftwaffe. In the two months prior to D-Day alone, the allies lost more than two thousand aircraft and over 12,000 aircrew in the battle to ensure air supremacy over France for the Normandy invasion.
By June of 1944 the allies were in position to mount Operation Overlord - the invasion of Northwest Europe. Operation Neptune, the initial landing and consolidation phase would constitute the most perilous part of the invasion plan for the allies. The first 24 hours of Operation Neptune, the D-Day landings themselves, would see the allies at their most vulnerable and would represent for the German defenders their only opportunity to repel the invaders.
Conscious of their vulnerability on D-Day and conscious of the threat of failure posed by a German counterattack during the critical landing phase of operations the allies relied on a number of strategies to ensure victory.
One vital strategy involved the use of airborne forces to protect the allied beachheads from counterattack and to secure egress from the narrow coastal beaches to staging areas further inland. On D-1, the night of the 5th of June, a fleet of over 2,000 aircraft including 800 US C-47 Dakota troop transports along with 867 gliders flew approximately 25,000 allied paratroopers to Drop Zones behind the Normandy beaches.
In the early hours of June 06th, the British 6th Airborne Division, dropped behind 'Sword' beach along the eastern flank of the invasion front secured their objectives including several key exit routes and bridges forward of the beachhead. The Caen Canal Bridge was subsequently named 'Pegasus' in honour of the insignia of the 6th Division. The US 101st Airborne - recently deployed to Mosul and Kirkuk in northern Iraq - along with the US 82nd Airborne - recently deployed to Fallujah and Ramadi west of Baghdad - were dropped into the flooded Cotentin Peninsula to the west of 'Utah' beach.
Despite heavy losses due to ground fire and drowning, the 101st and 82nd Divisions secured their objectives and liberated St. Mere Eglise - the first French town to be freed from German occupation.
The securing of these objectives was crucial to the success of the beach landings in that they prevented the Germans from reinforcing their coastal defences and provided the invaders with force protection from counterattack.
They also facilitated the breakout of allied troops from the beaches - many of which were heavily defended killing zones. At 6.30 a.m. on the morning of the 06th of June approximately 75,500 British, French and Canadian troops began to come ashore on 'Gold', 'Juno' and 'Sword' beaches. Suffering approximately 2,500 casualties, these combined forces managed to consolidate their positions but fell short of seizing the strategically important town of Caen.
Over 20,000 troops of the US 4th Infantry Division came ashore at 'Utah'.
Suffering relatively light casualties the 4th Division - recently deployed to Tikrit and Kirkuk in Northern Iraq - successfully linked up with the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions forward of their positions. The US 1st Infantry Division came ashore on Omaha beach. In a harrowing battle the 1st Division suffered almost 2,500 casualties under sustained attack from the German 352nd Infantry Division. Eventually, the Americans managed to overcome the German Widerstandsnester (defensive strong points) to land 34,000 troops on 'Omaha'.
During the duration of the D-Day landings the Germans attempted only one major armoured counterattack. Mounted by the 21st Panzer Division, the attack forced a wedge between British and Canadian forces south of 'Sword' and 'Juno' beaches. By 8 p.m. on D-Day German tanks had almost reached the beachheads where they would undoubtedly have dealt a severe blow to the allied invasion effort and might have allowed for further armoured reinforcement from Fieldmarshal Von Runstedt's forces in the Pas de Calais.
The German attack was halted however by close air support and anti-tank gunners - both phenomena of the new allied war machine - at Periers sur le Dan just south of 'Sword' beach.
By the close of D-Day, the allies had managed to land approximately 156,000 troops in Normandy. Supported by almost 7,000 naval and merchant vessels and over 12,000 aircraft, the lodgement phase of 'Operation Neptune' had overcome German coastal defences. By the 12th of June, the allies had killed or injured approximately 40,000 German troops and had landed a force on French soil that would eventually break out of Normandy and ultimately link up with Soviet Forces in Berlin.
A further strategy which proved vital to allied success on D-Day was the creative and timely use of deception and intelligence. The German High Command had been hoodwinked into believing that the allied army was concentrating in Britain to invade France to the north of Normandy at Calais and Cherbourg. The activities of the double agent 'Garbo' copperfastened German belief in this fallacy. In parallel with Garbo's activities, the allies mounted Operation 'Fortitude' consisting of a deception plan involving false radio transmissions and 'ghost' army groups in England - one 'commanded' by General George Patton. This ensured that the Germans placed the bulk of their defenders and armoured units in the Pas de Calais far from the actual invasion site.
The deception plan ensured that Fieldmarshal Erwin Rommel was not present to command his forces on D-Day. Lulled into a false sense of security, he travelled to Germany to celebrate his wife's birthday. Von Runstedt, believing the D-Day landings to be a diversionary tactic from the 'real' invasion he believed to be imminent in the Pas de Calais, did nothing to halt the allied incursion. Political interference in military matters also proved a fatal element in the German response. In Rommel's absence, senior members of the German general staff, unable to act on their own initiative, were forced to consult Hitler on what action to take. By the time they managed to wake him - nearly four hours after the invasion had begun - and by the time Hitler had given permission for the military to counterattack the 'beginning of the end' of the Third Reich had begun.
Students of military history regard the D-Day landings as a classic case study in military leadership and the conduct of combined joint operations.
It seems ironic therefore that Hitler's meddling in military matters in 1944 - with disastrous results - should so closely resemble the actions of members of the US administration in the invasion of Iraq today. Donald Rumsfeld's political interference and demand for the 'Invasion Lite' option for Iraq despite the strongly stated reservations of the US General Staff is a disturbing echo of Hitler's inept interference in the military campaign in France in 1944 - especially so for members of US units in Iraq whose forbears fought in Normandy on D-Day.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired army officer. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society