ANALYSIS:A British intelligence report claimed the Provisional IRA were a 'declining force', writes JOHN BEW
THE LEADERSHIP of the Provisional IRA was deeply uncomfortable about the hunger strike of 1980 and felt it risked undermining its attempts to revive its flagging campaign, according to recently released documents at the National Archives in London.
The hunger strike “comes from PIRA’s weakness, not its strength”, claimed an intelligence report, from a “sensitive source” and shown to Margaret Thatcher on November 7th. “All the signs throughout the year have been that they were a declining force,” claimed the report. “Operations have been thwarted, key figures arrested; they have made no progress to any of their objectives, short or long term; and have become increasingly alienated from the community. The leadership clearly regarded it as essential this winter to re-establish their credentials by stepping up the level of terrorist activity.”
It was claimed the Belfast leadership of the Provisionals had come to the conclusion that the adoption of “tight” active service units, around which the IRA had been reorganised after 1976, was “no longer working” and they were considering “reverting to their earlier pattern of brigades and battalions”.
But their capacity to mount a sustained campaign was still severely limited by a combination of improved security measures and their growing unpopularity. “1980 is not 1969 or 1972. The population as a whole is deeply weary of violence and unconvinced that it can achieve anything: the security forces are much better equipped and able to cope with street or sectarian violence.”
Far from being initiated by the leadership, the announcement of the hunger strike had “interfered seriously with their plans and is deeply disliked by the leadership for it confuses the issue, gives scope for division of views, and damaging disagreement, and is outside their control”.
It was, of course, still “possible to see the situation work to their advantage”. The first death would “clearly be highly emotive and is bound to lead to large-scale demonstrations which, if it got out of hand, could in turn spark off sectarian violence”.
Nonetheless, government calculated that the Provisional leadership wanted “off the hook” on the issue and would be willing to settle for concessions stopping short of full political status for prisoners.
“One reason the Provisional leadership do not like the hunger strike is that they are doubtful it will achieve its objective. They appear to believe that HMG will not make concessions . . . The campaign could fizzle out, to the shame of the movement. It could turn out also, to the movement’s shame, that no effective way is found to reinforce the prisoners’ efforts.”
The intelligence report, shown directly to Thatcher, described their tactical dilemma. “Can they cajole and bludgeon at the same time? Most recent reports suggest that cajolery is at least the temporary order of the day.” Thus, it was claimed that Gerry Adams had insisted on a “disclaimer” following the shooting of a UDR woman in Strabane on October 24th and that attacks on off-duty UDR and RUC members were to be momentarily suspended, despite the previous desire of the leadership to escalate the campaign into the winter. One consequence of this, even if terrorism in Northern Ireland was “kept to a low pitch”, was that the IRA might turn their attentions to mainland Britain.
Inside the Maze, it was also reported that “the resolve of the strikers was being stiffened by the PIRA leader within the Maze named [Bobby] Sands who seemed a very determined character”. Significantly though, it was felt that Sands “did not appear to be acting in accordance with the directions of the IRA leadership outside the prison”.
This made it harder to find a “face-saving formula which would offer the hunger strikers an escape route”.
Previously unseen documents also describe a visit by Danny Morrison, Sinn Féin’s publicity director, on Saturday December 13th, permission for which had been specially granted by the authorities.
It was reported that hunger strikers felt that Morrison and the other intermediaries, such as John Hume, were “being taken for a ride by the Brits” and had wrung nothing out of the government. Bobby Sands reportedly told Morrison the prison was “about to explode”.
Morrison also tried to plead with Brendan Hughes, leader of the current hunger strike, to “be patient for a little longer”. In response, Hughes “lost his temper and threw Morrison out, throwing a food tray at him in the process”. After the meeting, Morrison confided in John Hume that “he thought his role as a carrier of messages was now at an end”, though he later became Bobby Sands’s spokesman in 1981.
Following the meeting, Sands asked for a meeting the next day with Bernadette McAliskey, a leading figure in the Smash H Block Campaign, and another senior republican figure whose name has been redacted on the documents released at the National Archives in London.
Northern secretary Humphrey Atkins refused the meeting “on the basis of public reaction if such a terrorist ‘Council of War’ were permitted”.
It was also claimed that John Hume warned the government that such a meeting would draw it further into negotiations with leadership figures from the Provisionals, thereby according the prisoners political status by default.
The name of the individual whose identity is redacted appears a number of times in the document but it is clear that he or she is a top-level figure in the republican movement, with a leadership position. Dermot Nally, the secretary to the Irish government believed that this individual “could be useful” in the search for a solution, particularly as the leadership of the Provisionals was “opposed to the strike”.