THE SDLP welcomed the Joint Communique of November 28th and committed itself to the "twin track process", including discussion in the political track about "whether and how an elected body could play a part".
In honour of that commitment and in good faith, we have been discussing with other parties their proposals or demands for an assembly, convention or elected body. We have been exploring their considerations and explaining our concerns. We have also discussed other issues and ideas relevant to the peace process and possible political development.
It should be noted that we have done this even though the DUP and UUP (the main proponents of the elected body plan) have stipulated they were standing out side the twin track process per se.
Any suggestions that the SDLP are engaging in knee jerk rejection, unreasonableness or refusal to even talk about others' ideas are therefore unfounded. We now have a situation where unionists are either levelling such allegations against us or, in contrast, blatantly misrepresenting our good faith dialogue as an implicit acceptance of their proposal.
Neither attitude does anything to encourage any degree of trust. When a party's representatives betray the spirit and terms of such dialogue, it is hard to place any credence on any purported reassurances they offer in respect of their own propositions.
Having been somewhat encouraged by the dialogue in which I have participated, I deeply regret having to address matters in such a tone, but the fact that I need to is a measure of the damage done by John Major's stroke pronouncement in the House of Commons. So much for his "viable alternative direct route to confidence building".
It is not just in terms of the trust poisoning fallout from his Commons statement that both the "viability" and the "directness" of Mr Major's "alternative route" must be called into question.
How would an elected body create confidence or provide for negotiations? Both the DUP and UUP, who advocate this approach, have stressed that this body would not be in the business of negotiation and would not be a forum for all party talks. Representatives of both parties have made it clear that it would be "preconditions as usual" as far as actual inter party negotiations are concerned. Indeed, they will use the election to secure mandates which handcuff themselves to such preconditions and other delaying tactics.
We would witness old preconditions being recycled and new ones manufactured. The whole enterprise would be governed by the premise that the two governments will not move to convene all party talks until unionists say they can. In effect, the elected body would install the unionists as the "lock keepers" for the whole process.
THESE are the parties who are ruling the Framework Documents out of discussion. The British government seems to have binned its own Framework Documents in its rush to canvass the unionist plan.
The unionists have stayed out of the twin track process and appear to be rewarded by the Prime minister's gazumping tactics.
How can anyone seriously expect the SDLP to respond to this with the kind demeanour of an airline cabin crew? Honesty about our own judgment, well conditioned political reading and simple self respect demand that we voice our profound misgiving.
One prominent concern about the elected body scenario is that it would frustrate the proper and proportionate exploration of all three strands, while posturing as a prototype for arrangements for one strand. The fear that an internalist, incrementalist unionist agenda is being put into pole position is not an idle suspicion.
In our discussions with the convention advocates we have been told that it would cover the other two strands. How? In the manner of a select committee which could send for and question the British and Irish governments.
That "assurance" from more than one party gives no encouragement for believing that the elected body would yield meaningful interaction rather than competitive grandstanding. Add to this the caveat that such Strand Two or Three theatre could be contingent on satisfaction in Strand One.
This body would be a "non talking shop", a form of occupational therapy for some local politicians, many of whom would simply indulge in salaried intransigence.
There is no reason to believe that a body of this nature and with its likely membership could produce meaningful negotiations even if its proponents were not ruling them out. In apparent response to SDLP concerns about the creation of a negotiation free zone in the peace process, another party did indicate that the body could be allowed to arrive at agreements. They had discussed this with another pro convention party and they had agreed that there should be a weighted majority, but they had not agreed whether it should be 60, 65 or 70 per cent.
Such indications reinforce our concern as well as advertising the confusion of the elected body's proponents. The latter formula would not induce mutual engagement, mutual adjustment or sufficient consensus. It would engender tension, disillusionment and gridlock; not even the scenic route to confidence building.
Parties envisage different processes, which is a more fundamental problem than having different proposals, for an outcome to the process. To hold elections which would give "mandates" to different processes can only compound the political impasse. Remember in South Africa and Palestine, elections were only called after a certain amount of prior agreement had been established, resulting in more constructive and convergent mandates than could emerge in Northern Ireland in current conditions.