The High Court has granted a Co Galway teacher a declaration that a section of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 is unconstitutional. The judgment has significant implications for the operation of the Act.
That section prevents people challenging acts done under the legislation unless the High Court decides there are substantial grounds to support a claim that acts were done in bad faith or without reasonable cause.
The challenge to the section was brought by Mr Louis Blehein (63), from Portumna, who has represented himself in the various court hearings. He is separated from his wife and was involuntarily admitted to a Dublin psychiatric hospital for periods in 1984, 1987 and 1991.
He has claimed he was held against his will and that there was a conspiracy involving the doctors who certified him, gardaí and the hospital, to secure his admission. In 1984 he was diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia and as suffering from paranoid delusions about his wife's fidelity. Two general practitioners also reached a similar diagnosis.
The Supreme Court in previous hearings had held that none of the grounds put forward by Mr Blehein in challenging his admission to hospital was "substantial".
The courts have also held that under Section 260 of the 1945 Act he was restricted to making claims that the hospital had acted "in bad faith" and without "reasonable care" in relation to his admission.
These two claims have been rejected by the Supreme Court. But yesterday, Mr Blehein won his argument that provisions of Section 260 were unconstitutional. Miss Justice Carroll, in her judgment, said Section 260 required that a person could not bring civil proceedings "in respect of an act purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act" unless the High Court was satisfied that there "are substantial grounds" for contending that the person against whom proceedings are to be brought acted "in bad faith or without reasonable care".
Mr Blehein had argued that Section 260 was an unwarranted interference by the Oireachtas in the judicial domain of the courts. No criteria had been laid down by the courts whereby "bad faith" could be established.
One could not look into a person's mind to see what their motives were, he argued. He added that the two conditions were impossible and negated his rights.
Miss Justice Carroll said the State had argued Section 260 was a curtailment of access to the courts confined to civil proceedings and did not apply to judicial review or habeas corpus.
In her opinion, there was a real difference between the provisions of legislation which provided for leave to apply for judicial review and Section 260.
In judicial review proceedings the court was free to decide what grounds would justify an application provided they were substantial. Under Section 260, the court was confined to considering two grounds (acting in bad faith or without reasonable care) and the only discretion was in deciding whether either was substantial.
Ms Justice Carroll said the limitation of access to the courts on two specified grounds constituted an impermissible interference by the legislature in the judicial domain, contrary to Article 6 of the Constitution which provided for the separation of powers. This was also contrary to Article 34 which provided for the administration of justice in the courts.