IRAQ:Political boycotts and a US proposal to exclude Muqtada al-Sadr from power have strengthened the radical Shia cleric's hand, writes Michael Jansen
The US-led raid in Najaf on Wednesday, during which a senior figure in the Sadr movement was killed, will deepen the rift between radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the government which approved the operation.
Al-Sadr is a major player on the Iraqi political scene since his faction is the largest in both the ruling Shia coalition and parliament, and his al-Mahdi army militia, with as many as 60,000 members, is the largest of the paramilitary groups.
The army is well represented in the security bodies and is the driving force in the country's sectarian conflict.
Last month, 32 Sadrist members of parliament and the Sadrist ministers of health, transport, tourism, agriculture, civil society and provincial affairs began a boycott of both assembly and government because of the close association of the post-war order with the US.
The boycott highlighted the main difference between nationalist Sadrists, who want to see foreign forces withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible, and the rest of the parties in power, which rely on US military might to keep them there.
Negotiations on the return of the Sadrists failed due to their demand for a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces.
In response to the boycott, the Shia Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri) and the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party were urged by the US to form a new broad-based coalition - excluding Sadrists.
This grouping would also bring a major Sunni party into the circle of decision-making, thereby realising the US ambition to have a power- sharing government in Baghdad rather than the present Shia- dominated regime.
Although the new grouping would not have had a parliamentary majority, it could have counted on the backing of the Shia Dawa party of prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and others.
However when a Dawa delegation visited Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most senior Shia cleric, last weekend to secure his agreement, he rejected the proposal because it would split the Shia coalition, which holds 128 seats in the 275-seat assembly.
University of Michigan's Prof Juan Cole, an expert on Iraq, says that a coalition of Sunni Arab fundamentalists and Sunni Kurds with Sciri would essentially "reduce the Shias to junior partners in the government" and allow the Sunni Kurds and Arabs "to dictate policy".
As Shias are said to comprise 60 per cent of Iraqis, the ayatollah insists "that their majoritarian position be recognised and they receive the consequent power and influence".
While the ayatollah's rejection empowers the Sadrists, it could also contain Sciri-Sadrist tensions and violence. The ayatollah's veto has, however, undermined the position of Sciri chief Abdel Aziz Hakim who, like Mr Maliki, recently met President George Bush.
Mr Hakim, a medium-level cleric whose Iranian-founded and Iranian-funded party has no real domestic constituency, cannot afford to go against the ayatollah who, over the past two years, has fallen below al-Sadr in the Shia popularity stakes.
It is likely, therefore, that the untouchable al-Sadr's star will continue to rise and, as it ascends, the Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict will rage on, threatening the existence of Iraq.
Since al-Qaeda's attack last February on the Shia shrine at Samarra, the Sadrists have launched communal warfare by invading, occupying and cleansing Sunni neighbourhoods in the capital and other cities, as well as slaughtering hundreds of hapless Sunni civilians.
Sunni insurgents have responded by stepping up attacks on US forces and Shias.
Unless the proposed "surge" of US forces into Baghdad targets Sadrist militiamen as well as the Sunni resistance, Washington's bid to stabilise Baghdad will either fail or result in the wholesale sectarian cleansing of Sunnis from the city and other mixed towns.