Iran Analysis: A clerical clique has thwarted popular will in Iran, making current protests inevitable, writes Michael Jansen
The mass protests against Iran's clerical regime sparked a week ago by a small student demonstration in Tehran were inevitable.
Iranians have been waiting impatiently for reform since 1997 when they gave the liberal cleric Muhammad Khatami a massive presidential mandate.
Then - as now - they wanted freedom of thought, speech, dress, and social interaction.
The voters believed Khatami would reinvigorate the Islamic revolution which overthrew the Shah in 1979 and meet these demands.
The Iranians who made the revolution expected democracy, freedom, a more just economic order, and independence from the US.
The conservative clerics who hijacked the revolution met popular expectations on only one issue. They freed Iran from Washington by alienating the US and the West.
The clerics did not grant Iranians true participatory democracy and personal freedom or restructure Iran's economy.
Instead, the clerics installed the Vilayet-e-Faqih, or Rule of the Theologians, which, they claimed, had a divine mandate.
They ruled - and continue to rule - through supra-governmental bodies designed to monitor the policies of the elected branches and exercise direct control over the armed forces, the judiciary and the wealthy charitable foundations which dominate 40 per cent of the country's economic activity.
Iranians could only select an executive and legislature from among candidates approved by the conservative Council of Guardians which has excluded a whole range of parties and candidates from appointed and elective posts.
The council has vetted all laws, political freedom has been curtailed, and social behaviour is closely regulated.
Thus, the revolution stalled before it attained the aspirations of the Iranian people, half of whom were born after it.
The smiling, charming, worldly Khatami seemed to be just the mullah to initiate the reforms.
He promised personal freedom, economic restructuring, the rule of law and the creation of a civil society. But for three years the conservatives, who had a majority in parliament, blocked Khatami's reforms.
Even after the reformists gained control of the majlis (parliament) in 2000, nothing changed.
The conservatives, led by the Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and former president Hashemi Rafsanjani stepped up efforts to block reforms.
Scores of reformists have been jailed, 90 reform newspapers have been closed and popular protests have been put down violently by the Ansar Hizbollah and Basij youth militia loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei.
The re-election of Khatami in 2001 did nothing to stem this campaign of attrition.
Khatami's failure to challenge the conservatives has turned Iranians against the reformists.
Some of the current protesters, emboldened by the US overthrow of the Iraqi regime, have adopted the slogans, "Kill all mullahs," and, "Throw out the turbans," indicating that they want to end the Islamic republic.
On Sunday a group of 248 reformist intellectuals, journalists, and progressive clerics issued a scathing denunciation of the conservatives.
"The people have the right to fully supervise the action of their rulers and to advise and criticise them, as well as to dismiss or oust them if they are not satisfied with them.
"Sitting or making individuals sit in the position of divine or absolute power is a clear heresy towards God and an clear affront to human dignity," the declaration said. Amongst its signatories were close allies of President Khatami and members of the banned Iran Freedom Movement.
The declaration reflects the thinking of the Islamic Association, a national student organisation which has been discussing how to dismantle the theocracy.
In spite of the unrest, the conservatives consider themselves to be in a strong position.
The demonstrators have no organisational structures, no charismatic leader other than the compromised Khatami, and no mechanism for translating their demands into policies.
The conservatives can use the judiciary to remove critics from circulation and deploy Ansar Hizbollah and the Basij to intimidate and punish opponents.
They can also rely on the democratic structure of the Islamic republic, however imperfect, which accommodates a diversity of forces, opinions and interests, to provide flexibility and resilience.
The reformists, a loyal opposition, still represent the best chance for the democratisation of Iran. They are rooted in the revolutionary political culture and system established in 1979. Khatami belongs to the mainstream of the Islamic movement. Before running for the presidency he served as minister of culture and Islamic guidance and deputy head of the joint command of the armed forces.
The progressive speaker of parliament, Mehdi Karrubi, was a radical mullah and Saeed Hajjarian, the founder of the reformist Islamic Participation Front, was a senior intelligence official.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that conservative and reformist stalwarts have rejected US interference in Iran's internal affairs and called upon protesters to act with restraint.
Iranian commentators at home and abroad believe intervention by the Bush administration would be unwelcome and counterproductive.
Reformists believe the clerics will use Washington's support for the demonstrations to smear the protesters as "agents" and "traitors", while conservatives fear the US, encouraged by the protests, might involve itself in a military "adventure" in Iran to overthrow the Islamic republic.
Since both camps need each other to ensure the survival of the Islamic regime, they will, sooner rather than later, have to reach an accommodation.