The officer in charge of Garda operations at Abbeylara, where Mr John Carty was shot dead three years ago, was not consulted on the deployment to the scene of the Emergency Response Unit.
Supt Joseph Shelly told the Barr tribunal yesterday he was informed about three hours after the siege began at Mr Carty's home that the heavily armed unit was en route.
Despite being responsible for "operational command", Supt Shelly said he had no input in the decision, which, he remarked, was one for his superiors, Chief Supt Patrick Tansey and Asst Commissioner Tony Hickey.
The former informed him of the decision by phone shortly after 8 p.m., and he was "glad to hear it". If the siege had gone on much longer he might have suggested it himself, he said.
Supt Shelly, who began his evidence yesterday, also told the tribunal he gave no specific instructions to armed gardaí at the scene on what to do if Mr Carty emerged armed. Rather, he said, "I relied on their training".
The tribunal is investigating the events surrounding the shooting dead of Mr Carty by gardaí outside his Co Longford home on April 20th, 2000, the day after the siege began.
Supt Shelly, who served as superintendent at Letterkenny and Athlone from September 1996, and Mullingar from February 2000, was asked to take control of the operation by his counterpart in Granard, who was on duty in Dublin at the time.
He said the priority initially was to get to the scene where he feared for the safety of two of the first gardaí to arrive, Det Garda James Campbell and Garda John Gibbons. He requested two to three armed gardaí from each district of Longford, Mullingar and Athlone, and informed Chief Supt Tansey of his belief that it was "a very dangerous situation".
Eight shots were fired by Mr Carty in the first two hours of the siege, and a further six between 7 p.m. and the time the ERU arrived, at 9.50 p.m.
When he arrived, Supt Shelly arranged for Det Garda Campbell and Garda Gibbons to withdraw from a position at the rear of the house, and for neighbouring homes to be evacuated. He then set up an "inner cordon", involving 10 armed gardaí.
Supt Shelly said he addressed the gardaí "more or less collectively", telling them that his strategy was to contain Mr Carty in the house so that the risk to anyone would be minimised, and that he then intended to start negotiations.
He told them there were two likely situations: a "controlled" or an "uncontrolled" exit. The former would involve Mr Carty emerging unarmed, in which case he should be arrested and searched.
The latter would involve Mr Carty emerging armed, in which case "our strategy was to confront him, try to disarm him in safety, and subject him to arrest and search".
Asked whether he gave any specific instructions, Supt Shelly replied: "No, I did not."
He said the likely reaction from gardaí would be to do "everything in their power", and in accordance with the regulations, to confront Mr Carty, disarm him and submit him to arrest. If that did not happen immediately they would try to contain him, stay with him, try to warn him in a peaceful manner and "that would continue for as long as it would continue".
Although he was in command of the operation, Supt Shelly said Chief Supt Tansey would have had an "overview" of what happened, and may have made suggestions.
Asked would he have accepted these, Supt Shelly replied: "If I agreed with them, yes." He stressed there was no question of them not agreeing, as there tended to be a consensus between the two.
