Pointing to flaws in arguments against treaty

It is not easy to summarise the Treaty of Nice in a short article

It is not easy to summarise the Treaty of Nice in a short article. After all it was negotiated over 10 months by 15 countries and it sets out arrangements for a union of 27 member-states.

I worked in the negotiations last year under direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Taoiseach. Does this make me biased? Perhaps. But I hope I can still look objectively at arguments against the treaty. In so far as they reflect a real unease, they deserve a considered response.

First, it is said we do not need a new treaty. The Amsterdam Protocol agreed in 1997 provided for one Commissioner per member-state when the first new members join and a "comprehensive review of the institutions" a year before membership exceeds 20. Could we not implement the first point without triggering the second by admitting only five?

The answer is no. The protocol is clear - the provision about the Commission depends on prior agreement to compensate large member-states which give up a second Commissioner through greater voting weight in the Council. It was not decided how this was to be done. And a difficult negotiation it was: argued over 10 months at working level and finally settled by heads of Government at Nice, at a fraught session ending at 4.30 a.m. Now it has to be put into effect.

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Furthermore a new treaty was needed to make other changes: to reform the European Court and to ensure that all the EU institutions will work in a union of 27. The EU had to agree also on how to make room for new members in bodies such as the European Parliament. There is another point. The EU is negotiating with 12 countries, not five. We must do so in good faith and prepare to receive them. Could we really say: "Sorry - we will take only five because we are not ready for the rest?"

A second argument is that "Ireland is not guaranteed a Commissioner". We argued vigorously about the Commission over 10 months last year. The Commission has 20 members: two from each of the five large, and one from each of the 10 smaller, member-states. This rule would give a Commission of 32 in a union of 27. Large member-states, supported by the Commission itself, said such a Commission would be ineffectual: a debating chamber not an effective executive; and there would not be enough portfolios to go around. They argued, rightly, that Commissioners, sworn to independence, do not represent states. They pressed for either a Commission of 20, or a hierarchy of "senior" and "junior" Commissioners. Small member-states like Ireland accepted that a very large Commission would lose some effectiveness. But citizens would feel a "stake" in the Commission if each state nominated a Commissioner. We rejected a hierarchy which would, inevitably, "earmark" senior posts for larger states. Instead, we proposed greater authority for the President of the Commission.

The outcome is a compromise - as it had to be - but one which, outside Ireland, is thought to favour smaller member-states who will have absolute equality in the Commission for the first time.

It strengthens the position of the Commission President and provides for one Commissioner per member-state from 2005 until the EU grows to 27.

At that point, a unanimous decision will fix a Commission size of less than 27. Places will be filled by an equal rotation which must ensure that every state "shall be treated on a strictly equal footing". Suppose at that point - perhaps a decade or more away - there is a unanimous decision to reduce the Commission to 24. Then thereafter there should be an Irish Commissioner for 40 out of every 45 years. Would this compromise justify a vote against the Nice Treaty? A third argument: the treaty will shift voting power to the larger states. Remember first, that, under the Amsterdam Protocol, large member-states which lose a second Commissioner, must be compensated by greater "voting weights" in the Council. They pressed for more, arguing that democracy should mean voting weights more in line with population size. Small states responded that population is not the only criterion: the EU is a union of states as well as peoples.

What was agreed? Somewhat more voting weights for larger states. But two new rules: every decision must be supported by half (on some issues two-thirds) of the member-states; and backed by at least 62 per cent of the EU population.

Ireland's voting weight drops a bit but will still be 2-1/2 times what our population would justify. This too, seems a reasonable compromise. A fourth argument is that new rules for "enhanced co-operation" create a two-tier Europe and facilitate German proposals for an "inner federation".

These are rules which allow the Council to authorise a group of states to use the institutions for closer co-operation on certain issues. Others may join in discussions but not decisions. An example is the Schengen system of passport-free travel which the UK and Ireland opted not to join. Most member-states agreed that the present rules are too rigid because any one state could veto a proposal to use them.

Ireland accepted the need for greater flexibility. But we were cautious about changing the rules because we did not want a "two-tier EU".

The new treaty does change the rules but the safeguards are strong.

Three key points made it acceptable: any area of "enhanced co-operation" must be open to all - at the start and later; it must not undermine the single market; and it must respect the single institutional framework. This last point means that the rules could not be used to construct an inner federation - if Germany wants that, it must negotiate a new treaty.

A fifth argument: the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) to new areas reduces Ireland's ability to protect its interests.

QMV was always a feature of the EC and successive treaties have extended its use. It already applies to some 80 per cent of Council decisions although issues are often not pressed to a formal vote. We live happily with it on matters such as agriculture.

The Nice Treaty will extend it to some 30 additional areas where unanimity - the so-called "veto" - now applies. This is desirable: decision-making in an EU of 27 would soon seize up if any one state could block decisions over a wide range of areas. It sounds good to say "Ireland retains the veto" but where we have a veto so does everyone else. Would we have wanted a veto rule for the CAP?

That said, each member-state in the negotiations wanted to protect its own areas of sensitivity. For Ireland, this was taxation. The treaty leaves that unchanged: it remains an issue to be decided by unanimity.

A sixth argument: the Nice Treaty will militarise the EU and erode Irish neutrality. Even if it does not, a vote against will express concern about the Rapid Reaction Force.

This issue is the most difficult to deal with in a short article because it goes far beyond the actual provisions of the Nice Treaty. Those who press the argument do not feel it an adequate response to say, as is the case, that the treaty does nothing to prejudice Ireland's position - though it does allow the EU to act directly to carry out "Petersberg tasks".

I hope that concerned people will keep four points in mind:

(1) the decision to establish a Rapid Reaction Force is not part of the treaty - if there is no treaty it will still stand;

(2) use of the force at any time would require a unanimous Council decision;

(3) if such a decision were taken each member-state must still decide on each occasion whether to take part in any operation;

(4) Irish law stipulates that Ireland could not send a contingent without a UN mandate and a decision of the Dail.

The continuing unease on the wider issues seems, to me, to show that we need more thorough public debate in Ireland.

That could be part of the "deeper and wider debate" about the future of the EU which heads of government called for at Nice.

We need to debate our values and our commitments. It would be good if the outcome were a national consensus about what we are prepared - and not prepared - to do in the new Europe. We could also consider John Rogers's point about the need for closer monitoring at home of what happens in the EU.

A vote for Nice will not preempt that debate.

Finally, a reflection on what is really at stake on Thursday - something more than whether there will be an Irish Commissioner in 2030. For all its achievements, Europe was always a troubled continent and, over the last century, a cause of turmoil to the world.

Two world wars started here; so did colonialism; so did the major ideologies - Nazi, fascist and communist; and for half a century the continent was divided with both sides armed for nuclear war.

Now the shadows are lifting and most of the continent, voluntarily and by its own democratic choice, is negotiating to join a union, "founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law".

Those words were written and proposed by Ireland in 1996. They now form Article 6.1 of the EU Treaty. The Irish people must decide on Thursday whether we are ready to extend them to the rest of Europe.