John Bewdiscovers that London's attitude was one of requiring acquiescence from the Irish government but not consulting it, and giving little in return.
The British were happy to "discuss" Northern Ireland with the Irish government but rather less willing "to consult them" in the formation of policy in 1977, reveal newly released state papers at the National Archives in London.
Since 1973, the Irish and British governments had generally agreed to act as partners in trying to establish a devolved power-sharing administration in Northern Ireland. However, with no prospect of such a deal on the horizon, the prime minister, James Callaghan, and secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, increasingly prioritised security and economic revival above any major new political initiatives.
The British approach was summarised in a telegram sent to the British embassy in Dublin shortly after the Irish general election in June 1977, offering advice to diplomats on how to deal with the new Fianna Fáil government. Direct rule was "not the government's preferred form of policy" but they would continue "to administer it wholeheartedly for as long as necessary". The past 12 months had seen "steady progress" in combating the IRA. "The defeat of terrorism", it was explained, "agreement on durable and acceptable constitutional arrangements and the improvement of the economy are interdependent, and lie at the heart of the government's policy".
For the immediate future, this position was non-negotiable. British foreign office officials were therefore warned that they "should not (repeat not) say that we shall work with the Irish government in finding a political settlement: of course we recognise that their acquiescence is essential but we must not admit this to them or make any promises of consultation".
At the start of the year, a cloud of tension still hung over the Anglo-Irish relationship due to the prosecution of eight SAS men who had been involved in an illegal Border incursion into the territory of the Republic.
Although the incident had occurred in May 1976, the issue was still high on the diplomatic agenda in the first few months of the following year. Callaghan telephoned the coalition taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, to lobby on behalf of the soldiers.
However, the Irish government claimed it was unable to intervene in order to bring a swift conclusion to the matter as it was in the control of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
By early 1977, British officials believed that a prison sentence for the soldiers was a very real possibility. Irish suspicions had been heightened by the fact that only two of the eight men arrested had been in uniform and that a number of them were carrying "unconventional weapons", including daggers and a sawn-off shotgun. In turn, the British insisted emphatically that this was not a "cloak and dagger" exercise and drew attention to the quiet way in which they had dealt with a number of Border incursions by Irish security forces.
Preparing themselves for the event that the SAS men were imprisoned, some British officials had even mooted a press campaign directed at the Irish government's "failures" in dealing with terrorism. Another suggestion had been to discourage British tourists from visiting Ireland, although this was generally thought to be an unworkable idea.
A major diplomatic incident was avoided when the soldiers were acquitted of a more serious offence of intent to endanger lives and simply fined for having unlicensed firearms on Irish soil.
In fact, cross-Border security co-operation was one area of growth in the Anglo-Irish relationship in 1977, although British officials would still have preferred "to see further in each other's pockets". The fact that the IRA could still boast safe havens in Dundalk, Monaghan and Donegal suggested that security co-operation had still "not yet reached its full potential".
Although June 1977 saw the defeat of the Cosgrave-led coalition government and the arrival of Jack Lynch's new Fianna Fáil administration, the British government did not foresee any major change in their relationship with the Irish State in the second half of the year. British foreign office analysis of the Irish election suggested that Northern Ireland had not been a decisive issue.
The British embassy reassured London that the North remained a "comparatively low priority" for the new government, compared to more pressing concerns such as "job creation". Reassuringly, there was no immediate sign that Lynch's government was likely to attempt to renege on the security commitments made by previous governments, even in sensitive areas such as "photo reconnaissance overflights" along the Border.
If anything, it seemed that Fianna Fáil was vulnerable on Northern Ireland because of its hardline policy statement of October 1975, which demanded Britain's "commitment to implement an ordered withdrawal". In the run-up to the election, Fianna Fáil's press adviser Frank Dunlop had told British officials that the party was eager to avoid a debate on the issue because it could lead it into taking a position which was hard to deliver on. To this end, the intention was to keep Charles Haughey, seen as a hardline nationalist, away from any job in which he could "play with fire". Fianna Fáil was particularly concerned about Conor Cruise O'Brien's "instinct for the jugular vein" on this matter. According to his memoirs, Yes Taoiseach, Dunlop was later criticised by a senior Irish government official for maintaining contacts with "Sir Spy", the British ambassador.
In the aftermath of the election, however, Lynch's "tendency to amnesia" soon became "a source of satirical comment" in Dublin. As long as he publicly maintained his party's aspiration to unity, there was "a fair chance that he will have a free hand to operate pragmatically in the immediate short term". In fact, after meeting Lynch, the British ambassador in Dublin, Robin Haydon, reported that the new taoiseach was "out of touch with trends and personalities in Northern Ireland" and that this "could be advantageous in that we should be able to feed our own thoughts and ideas into the new government".
Both Irish governments of 1977 were concerned that the British were diluting their previous commitments to powersharing and devolution in Northern Ireland. Before the election, Garret Fitz-Gerald, the minister for foreign affairs, had regularly reminded British officials of Irish government fears that the SDLP would "disintegrate or go republican" and that this would "undermine" the long-term strategy of "achieving devolution based on partnership". In the same way, a key aim of the new Fianna Fáil government was to "seek reaffirmation of the British commitment to 'powersharing'." But, in anticipation of Lynch's visit to Downing Street in September, Callaghan was advised in an official briefing that the only "nuggets" he should give the taoiseach were on improving economic co-operation.
British officials were not oblivious to the fact that the SDLP was "in danger of moving towards a more intensely nationalistic position". This fact was demonstrated by Paddy Devlin's resignation on August 25th following the party's decision to put greater emphasis on the Irish dimension. At the same time, the British warned their Irish counterparts that a deal on devolved government "will be difficult and we do not expect early progress". In May 1977, Mason had succeeded in facing down Ian Paisley's attempt to replicate the Ulster Workers' Council strike of three years before but it had been a "close-run thing". "Paisleyism" was still "in the wings" and they must "take care not to unite the unionists in an intransigent demand for political change that would favour them".
At the same time, the British Labour Party was sensitive to the suggestion, made by the SDLP, that they had done a "deal" with the Official Unionist Party in order to strengthen the party's "paper-thin" parliamentary majority at Westminster. SDLP leader Gerry Fitt warned the prime minister that Mason "was now appearing as the enemy of the Catholics". In reply, the government insisted that any talk of a deal was simply a rumour encouraged by Enoch Powell and Jim Molyneaux "to bolster their own position".
While the British government did agree to consider the possibility of increasing Northern Ireland's parliamentary representation - a unionist demand - officials argued that this had been on the horizon for some time. At his first meeting with Callaghan, on September 23rd, 1977, the new taoiseach was reassured that there was no question of the British leaning towards a policy of "creeping integration". In his forthcoming Downing Street Diary: Number 10 Under Callaghan, senior policy adviser Bernard Donoughue reveals how he was advising Callaghan that Mason was taking a position which was excessively hostile to the republican side and also to the Republic itself. In the Northern Ireland committee, Callaghan urged Mason to take a more balanced view.
Nonetheless, by autumn, it was beyond question that the British approach to the North was hardening towards a sustained period of direct rule. Devolved powersharing remained the long-term aim, but it was seen as pointless to take any initiative "until the parties show that they are in a mood to be receptive and willing to work together". Until that point, "the most effective government and fairest treatment for all sections of the community can be achieved by direct rule". This was also the "best guarantee presently available for the welfare of the Catholic minority".