The following is a summary of the response given yesterday byMr Ronnie Flanagan, Chief Constable of the Police Service of NorthernIreland, to the report by the Police Ombudsman, Mrs Nuala O'Lean, into the Omagh bomb investigation. There was no intelligence whatsoever prior to August 15ththat republican dissidents were planning a car bomb attack in Omagh
It is a matter of regret, and concern, to the PSNI that it was not given a reasonable period within which to comment on the Ombudsman's findings before they were made public. As will become clear, the PSNI has identified in the report serious errors of fact and omission, despite the investigators' unprecedented access to papers, IT systems and people.
The Ombudsman's statement implies that the Police Service had information available to it before the Omagh bomb which, if dealt with correctly, might have prevented the attack; and alleges that it mishandled the subsequent investigation. Those allegations are wrong...
The Ombudsman's statement places a heavy emphasis on information provided by a man referred to as Kevin Fulton. A newspaper report, in July 2001, claimed that Kevin Fulton gave the police information which, if acted on, could have prevented the Omagh atrocity.
The Ombudsman's statement alleges that this information was not given sufficient weight, was not properly handled by the police after being received, and was not adequately followed up during the Omagh bomb investigation. Nevertheless her "objective conclusion [is that\] even if reasonable action had been taken ... it is unlikely that the Omagh bomb could have been prevented".
The PSNI's unequivocal conclusions are that:
•Fulton's information could not have prevented the Omagh attack;
•Significant parts of his information, when set against other relevant material available to the police, were either erroneous or implausible; none of it related to Omagh;
The individuals denoted as A and B in the Ombudsman's statement and named by Fulton have never been treated as firm suspects for the bombing for very compelling reasons ... Fulton's CID handler, in line with standard practice, recorded the information supplied during these meetings on contact sheets and forwarded them to the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) for onward transmission to Special Branch as appropriate. Details of three of the five meetings were duly passed on. Details of the other two (for July 23rd and August 12th, 1998) were not. The PSNI conclusion is that, contrary to the Ombudsman's assertion, these never reached Special Branch - and as a result were not assessed by them - in all likelihood because of an administrative error in FIB. This represented an unacceptable breakdown in procedures. The PSNI agrees that the information on these sheets should have been considered and assessed by Special Branch in the context of other available relevant information. Systems have been changed to ensure that there can be no recurrence.
As with Fulton's information, the Ombudsman's statement leans heavily on an anonymous call made to Omagh CID office on August 4th, 1998. Rather than pass on potentially sensitive information by phone, the officer later drove to Enniskillen to brief first his Detective Chief Inspector and then the Special Branch officers on duty there.
The following actions and inquiries were initiated immediately:
•the officers contacted police colleagues in Omagh and Clogher to see if further information on those named was available. It was not;
•contact was made with An Garda Síochána with regard to E, allegedly resident in the Republic. Their immediate reaction, confirmed two days later, was that they had no knowledge of an individual with that nickname from the area mentioned by the caller;
•family F and their address were checked for subversive traces. There were none; and
•arrangements were made for a Special Branch officer to be present during the second call, which the caller had agreed to make the following evening, to ascertain further details and, if possible, arrange a meeting. In the event, no call was received, then or at any time since.
The Ombudsman's statement wrongly criticises the decision not to issue a threat warning.
In the five days prior to the Omagh bomb, Special Branch issued threat warnings to police colleagues across the province, including those in Omagh, relating to the possible use by dissidents of a 4x4 vehicle in an operation of some kind (the Omagh bomb car was a standard Vauxhall Cavalier), and to the risk of incendiary attacks. These threat messages were issued because they were assessed as potentially having substance: at least one clearly did, as incendiaries were discovered across Northern Ireland and in Dundalk shortly afterwards. As stated previously, there was no intelligence whatsoever prior to August 15th, 1998 that republican dissidents were planning a car bomb attack in Omagh.
In the case of the anonymous information of August 4th, 1998, the absence after assessment of any properly provenanced intelligence relating to a threat against police meant that no requirement arose to inform the Sub Divisional Commander in Omagh. The implication - that the issue of a threat warning might have led to steps which could have prevented the bombing - is not only incorrect and misleading, it is enormously distressing to all those caught up in the atrocity, families, general public and police officers alike.
The Ombudsman's statement makes a number of criticisms of the Police Service's handling of the Omagh bomb investigation. These can be grouped under four broad headings: errors in the conduct of the investigation; failure to afford the investigation sufficient priority in terms of resources and senior management attention; failure to follow up all the recommendations of the review of the Omagh bomb investigation with sufficient urgency; and failure to provide adequate intelligence support to the investigation.
The Chief Constable's statement then describes the police investigation, which it divides into four phases: August 15th, 1998 - June 30th, 1999; June 30th, 1999 - March 24th, 2000; March 24th, 2000 - September 3rd, 2001; and to the present day.
Among the specific investigation-related issues mentioned in the Ombudsman's two statements, and not already covered, are the following:
•linked investigations: possible links between the Omagh bomb and other attacks have been carefully considered and continue to be so.
•delays of a year in following up actions: 89 per cent of all actions raised during the investigation (totalling almost 6,000) were completed within 3 months, and 99 per cent within a year.
•"bomb car" rusting: the condition of the remains of the car were not due primarily to the storage conditions, but to the fact that the rusting process had been accelerated by the corrosive effects of the explosives. Nevertheless 2½ years after the bombing, scientists were still able to conduct further tests, using new techniques. The Ombudsman's statement also claims that "significant intelligence" available to Special Branch, which would have had the potential to make a difference to the outcome of the investigation, was not made available to either the Senior Investigation Officer or the Reviewing Officer. The PSNI rejects this claim. The full resources of Special Branch were thrown behind the investigation from the start. It has recently been reported in the media that the review of the Omagh bomb investigation found that certain documents were missing from the original papers relating to the investigation. This is correct. The PSNI accepts that such forms should not have been mislaid, but would stress their non-evidential nature, and also the fact that prompt action was taken to address the issue.
The act of recreating these forms ... was done in an entirely open way, and there was never any question of the replacement forms being portrayed as originals.
The Ombudsman's statement makes a number of complaints about alleged lack of co-operation by police officers. These includethe suggestions that at senior management level the response to the inquiry was "defensive and at times unco-operative"; that some police witnesses "inexplicably" altered their accounts, sought to avoid talking to the investigators, or tried either to avoid making or to make only limited statements; and that access to Special Branch material was granted reluctantly, with investigators not being told of a computer system containing intelligence vital to the investigation. The PSNI is surprised by these allegations, which it rejects completely.
From the outset the Chief Constable publicly welcomed the Ombudsman's decision to carry out the investigation, and directed that full assistance be provided to the investigators. Between August 21st, 2001 and the end of November, 2001 there were at least 45 separate planned meetings, together with a large number arranged on an ad hoc basis, between police and the Ombudsman's staff. In addition to these meetings there was an extensive flow of correspondence, as well as telephone and e-mail contacts.
The Ombudsman's staff were provided with access to the most sensitive computer-held and hard-copy intelligence files. More than 2,600 sensitive documents were accessed within Special Branch headquarters. Additional material was made available from local Special Branch records. The Force Intelligence Bureau provided crime intelligence and charts. The Ombudsman's statement claims "that the judgment and leadership of the Chief Constable and ACC Crime have been seriously flawed" and that this in turn "seriously reduced" the chances of apprehending those who perpetrated the Omagh bombing. The PSNI completely rejects this accusation.
The Omagh investigation has been driven forward with energy, professionalism and determination, under the overall guidance and direction of the Chief Constable. The scale of the investigation - all sense of which is absent from the Ombudsman's statement - has been accompanied by the use of a whole range of techniques and procedures which represent "firsts" in Northern Ireland policing. The Ombudsman's charge of "failure of leadership" is unsustainable. This particular accusation was at no time raised or even hinted at by the Ombudsman or her staff, during the course of their investigation. It was at no time put to the Chief Constable or any other senior police officer. As a result, the Chief Constable and the senior officers concerned were denied the elementary requirements of natural justice and were deprived of their fundamental legal rights (a) to be told what was alleged against them and (b) to have a reasonable opportunity to make a considered response.
In her statement the Ombudsman says that she "must be able to have confidence that the Police Service of Northern Ireland and its leaders have integrity and will honestly, openly and willingly deal with requests made of the organisation by the Police Ombudsman in the exercise of her statutory powers". The PSNI agrees without reservation. The Police Service in its turn is entitled to expect from the Ombudsman's office the same high standards of professionalism, rigour, openness and fairness that are, rightly, expected of the police. The Ombudsman's Omagh report has left the PSNI with genuine concerns, and a real sense of disappointment about the procedures and processes used in compiling it.