The inquiry heard that major questions were raised by documentary evidence that British cabinet committees, and even the Foreign Office, had gone to great pains to prepare public opinion at home and abroad for violent scenes on television following the planned Civil Rights march. Counsel for relatives of victims suggested there must have been discussions - records of which have not emerged - between Stormont and British ministers and army chiefs concerning the violence they anticipated.
Mr Arthur Harvey QC said military records indicated that several days before Bloody Sunday, January 30th, 1972, there was a build-up in the army's expectation that a "shooting war" was about to take place.
"It also appears that the government (went) to some lengths to ensure that the public to a degree are prepared for this, and prepared for it in the sense of being told that the army will use the minimum force necessary," said counsel.
"In other words, what they see on their television is the minimum that the army could have been involved in order to enforce the law."
Although the records acknowledge that it was primarily up to the Joint Security Committee in Northern Ireland to decide on the tactics, London wanted to be kept aware of and have an input into the line being taken.
The key meeting of this committee took place at Stormont on January 27th and was presided over by Mr John Taylor. The minutes showed there was an indication at the meeting that there could be a "shooting war" in Derry on the following Sunday, but, surprisingly, the statement was "just left hanging there without any discussion". At the meeting in London later that day of the Cabinet committee on Northern Ireland, known as GEN 47, the army's Chief of General Staff had merely confirmed their intention to stop the Derry march on the edge of nationalist areas.
On the same evening, January 27th, the Stormont Prime Minister, Mr Brian Faulkner, had met the British Prime Minister, Mr Heath, and his Home Secretary, Mr Reginald Maudling, and the Derry march had been raised "almost incidentally". Mr Harvey said that on that day, the British government and politicians had been anxious to ensure that there was co-ordination and consistency on the line to be taken concerning the Derry march. Why then, had the "shooting war" reference of that morning simply "evaporated" from the records?
The change of strategy suggested that there must have been previous discussions involving Mr Faulkner, the GOC Northern Ireland, Gen Tuzo, and the British government, turning on the expectation of very serious violence at the Derry march.
Mr Harvey added that, in employing the Parachute Regiment, Gen Robert Ford was employing a unit which was "primarily an attack force to interface with an enemy in the most difficult and harsh circumstances, but where there would be an identifiable enemy . . . It was a regiment designed for war (in which) the minimum force one can use against one's enemy is the force of shooting to kill."
The inquiry continues today.