When an American professor called to see Zhu Rongji recently, the Chinese prime minister, referring to a US journal which had compared him to Icarus, growled: "Tell Time magazine I still have my wings."
The notion is popular that China's leading reformer has flown too high, and that he has to trim his ambitions in the face of opposition from entrenched interests.
So what else is new? It is a mere 20 years since China opened up to the world after a long history of feudalism followed by a terrible war and three decades of inward-looking communism, and for reformers it has been uphill all the way.
After Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China in 1949, foreigners were expelled, landlords killed, and private property nationalised. In the 1950s agriculture was collectivised, resulting in a terrible famine. Mao enforced a great leap forward in 1958 to promote rapid development in industry and agriculture through such misguided notions as backyard steel furnaces. It was a disaster and worse was to come.
In 1966 the communist leader plunged the country into chaos with his Cultural Revolution, designed to drive out any lingering capitalist heresies. Only when the hardline Gang of Four were arrested after Mao's death in 1976, and the so-called capitalist-roader Deng Xiaoping came to power, did China open up to the world, embarking on an ambitious programme of economic reform.
Communes were dismantled, peasants allowed to sell their produce and special economic zones set up. But the first foreigner investors found a population heavily indoctrinated and out of touch with modern industrial psychology.
"There were all these people dressed anonymously in grey clothes with absolutely no idea of what an independent enterprise was," said a western ambassador of the time. With the new opportunities to turn state property into profit, corruption flourished. Inflation added to public anger.
The struggle between reformers and conservatives came to a bloody head in 1989, with a victory for the die-hards, who crushed a student-led pro-democracy movement. The economic reform programme slowed as the liberal wing of the Communist Party went into retreat.
Only in 1992 when the whole reform programme was stalling, did Deng revive it by stunning cadres with his cry that it was glorious to be rich. Next year Zhu Rongji took charge of the economy, brought inflation under control, and launched a new wave of reforms.
Investment poured in and China boomed. As the brakes came off, the skyline of Beijing and Shanghai was transformed by gleaming skyscrapers. Living standards rose quickly and a new middle class with access to cars and mobile phones came into its own.
Jiang Zemin, party chief since 1989, consolidated his power at the 15th Communist Party congress last year where reform took a great leap forward in the shape of plans to transform the ailing state sector through mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies.
But after 20 years of tumultuous change, much of the fabric of the Mao era remains, making far-reaching reforms difficult. There is still a massive state bureaucracy - Zhu wants to trim it by half to four million by the year 2000.
The distribution of resources largely remains in the hands of government departments. Information is government-controlled. Most people still live in subsidised government housing. Some 100 million people continue to rely on state-owned enterprises for a living. Party officials control most commercial and social life.
Another obstacle to reform is the fact that modernising China's industry means layoffs and higher social tensions. Protests against unemployment and corruption are common, and while unco-ordinated, worry a government which sees the avoidance of Russia-style chaos as paramount.
The urgency to reform the industrial behemoths is underlined however by their estimated losses in 1998 of the equivalent of £50 billion. Such large-scale outflow could trigger a financial crisis.
State-owned banks have invested huge amounts of capital, much of it from people's savings, in bad loans to enterprises, and a loss of confidence in the banking system could lead to a disastrous run on the banks. Zhu threatened to halt lending to loss-making enterprises, but has had to compromise in the face of surging unemployment.
He has concentrated instead on achieving a high growth rate to absorb laid-off workers. The government claims to have all but reached its target of 8 per cent growth for 1998, a major accomplishment in an Asia in recession (if the statistics are accurate, that is; sceptics say that electricity use, a reliable measure of growth, has not increased accordingly).
To maintain growth the government is spending heavily on badly-needed infrastructure, though some economists say that the massive new bank loans involved could make the crash bigger if and when it comes.
Keenly aware of recent history - the mass outpouring of anger in 1989 - the party has also launched a major war on corruption. The official People's Daily has lambasted corrupt cadres who damage the party's image, strain relations with the people and jeopardise reforms.
The end of 1998 was set as the deadline for the party, the People's Liberation Army and government bodies to cut their ties with business, an arrangement which fostered corruption. The PLA alone has invested in 15,000 concerns, including luxury hotels.
The move to separate companies from the ministries which regulate them is aimed also at ending favouritism in bank lending, share listing, investment and taxes. Zhu has targeted the army, joint ventures and established companies in a related struggle against smuggling.
Most foreign cars in China are smuggled and there is a big contraband trade in cigarettes, electrical appliances, motorcycles, refined oil, chemicals, raw materials and steel. Imported goods are regularly relabelled to avoid high duties.
Against this background the Communist Party plans, about now, to hold a special plenum to sum up the achievements of 20 years of reform and map out a blueprint for the future.
Zhu still has his wings and will likely be able to continue onwards and upwards on his reform path - but not as high as before, and not too close to the sun.