US: Last week's Vienna talks, after which Iran was given a stark choice, owe much to the US secretary of state, writes Glenn Kessler in Washington.
At the end of March, US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice flew to Europe and had unusual one- on-one conversations with German chancellor Angela Merkel, French president Jacques Chirac and British prime minister Tony Blair. She also attended a meeting in Berlin on Iran, at which the Russian and Chinese representatives denounced the idea of sanctions to halt Tehran's drive toward a nuclear weapon.
Dr Rice returned to Washington with a sobering message: the international effort to derail Iran's programmes was falling apart. Her conclusion spurred a secret discussion with President George Bush, vice-president Dick Cheney and national security adviser Stephen J Hadley: should the US finally agree to join the Europeans at the negotiations with Iran?
Though Bush administration officials had publicly always dismissed that possibility, officials at the highest levels - including Mr Cheney, frequently but inaccurately portrayed as an adamant foe of joining the talks - realised that soon the administration would be forced to grapple with the question, five US officials said in interviews last week.
Otherwise, the options seemed to either be that Iran would get the bomb or the US would be drawn into another war.
"We knew it was a card we had to play at some point," one senior official said, adding the issue was at what time and under what conditions.
Last Wednesday, Dr Rice made the announcement. The next day, in Vienna, she used the US offer to secure an accord with Russia, China and the Europeans to present Iran with a choice of either inducements to return to negotiations or face action in the Security Council.
Iran has reacted warily, so the impact of the decision will not be clear for some time, but the administration's about-face, as recounted by US officials, shows the dominant influence of Dr Rice on the policymaking process. A year ago, she persuaded Mr Bush to back the European talks with Iran. Conservatives were concerned but went along, thinking the European effort would fail. Now, Dr Rice has moved the administration to a point unimaginable at the start of the second term.
"Condi felt the need to jump-start the talks and take control of the situation," a second official said.
The troubled Iraq war also hangs over Iran diplomacy. Administration officials have little confidence in the intelligence on Iran's programmes, while allies overseas view US actions through the prism of Iraq. That concern has forced the administration to emphasise diplomacy to avoid the breach with its allies that characterises the Iraq war.
On May 8th, as Dr Rice flew to New York to meet foreign ministers from Europe, China and Russia on Iran, she started to bring her closest aides, such as undersecretary of state R Nicholas Burns, into the discussion.
She pulled out a calendar marked up in multicoloured pens to note key dates, such as a G8 meeting in Russia in July. She also focused on Iran's claim that by year's end, it hoped to have a 3,000-centrifuge cascade for enriching uranium.
The meeting with the foreign ministers was acrimonious and lasted well into the night.
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov lashed out at Mr Burns because, at Dr Rice's instruction, Mr Burns had called repeatedly for Russia to stop selling arms to Iran. Despite the heated words, the meeting set in motion the talks that led to the Vienna announcement.
The foreign ministers agreed to set aside any Security Council resolution against Iran and instead come up with a list of proposals that would sharpen the choice for Iran. "We needed to test the Iranians," a third official said.
Others maintained there was essentially no dissent among Mr Bush's top advisers on joining the talks. The Pentagon raised no objections and the only cautionary tone came from Mr Cheney, who said the shift should not lead the administration down a "slippery slope", in which they end up retreating from their bottom line: an end to enrichment and reprocessing, the two paths toward fissile material. Mr Bush made it clear he did not want the US to be seen as weak in making this move, officials added.
During the week of May 13th, under strict secrecy, Dr Rice assembled a small group of her closest aides to work out how to structure and package the announcement. They were told to inform none of their aides nor to make photocopies of documents.
Meetings of the group in Dr Rice's office were obscured on her calendar by listings under "security issues".
Officials wanted the Iranians to understand that this was a genuine offer, so it was decided that Dr Rice would speak in the state department's ornate Benjamin Franklin Room, giving the event a presidential aura.
The weekend before the announcement, Dr Rice went to Camp David to make the final pitch to Mr Bush. Her team had worked up answers for Dr Rice to address questions from Mr Bush about the wisdom of the move. Mr Bush ultimately gave his final approval after speaking with key foreign leaders.
On Tuesday, the day before the announcement, Dr Rice let UN ambassador John R Bolton - long sceptical about dealing with Iran - in on the secret. Mr Bolton then joined Dr Rice, Mr Hadley and undersecretary for arms control Robert Joseph over dinner - and was asked to call conservative commentators the next day to explain the decision.