It was left to Russia's suave Foreign Minister, Mr Igor Ivanov, to sound the final bell in Slobodan Milosevic's death knell. His official message congratulating President-elect Vojislav Kostunica sent a clear message to the former Yugoslav president that the end had come.
Moscow, Mr Milosevic's last hope of support, had gone over to the opposition. The end came when Mr Ivanov uttered the historic sentence: "I have passed to Mr Kostunica regards from the President of Russia, Mr Putin, and congratulated him on his victory in the presidential election."
It was not, however, the Kremlin's finest hour. Right through the current period of crisis Moscow appeared incapable of recognising the groundswell of support for Dr Kostunica. It was wrong-footed by the swiftness of events and, not only did it seem incapable of assessing the situation in Belgrade, it was apparent that there was confusion in Moscow about its own role on the international stage.
In the past Mr Ivanov's line on Serbia had been consistent. His comments on the bombing campaign in Yugoslavia were withering in their anti-NATO intensity. His briefings at the Foreign Ministry press centre were punctuated with phrases reminiscent of the most acrimonious periods of the Cold War era.
To a large extent Moscow's views on NATO's bombing campaign are shared by Mr Kostunica, but its apparently pro-Milosevic stance risked antagonising the new president. The problem has been that the Yugoslav situation has been seen all too frequently by the Kremlin through the prism of a deepseated suspicion of Western intentions.
The views of the Communist Party leader, Mr Gennady Zyuganov, of the situation have been shared by many Russians. The revolt in Belgrade smelled, he said, "of marijuana, vodka and dollars". The speaker of the Duma, Mr Gennady Seleznyov, a more moderate communist than Mr Zyuganov, spoke of Yugoslav society being split by a "coup" which had been "accompanied by looting and destruction".
The views expressed by Mr Zyuganov and Mr Seleznyov are shared by many Russians. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has, like Mr Milosevic himself, become more nationalist than socialist in its search for electoral popularity and has gained support from right-wing elements including more extreme clergy in the Russian Orthodox Church.
President Putin's administration has been constantly forced to guard against accusations that it has become a "puppet of the West". For this and other reasons, Moscow's response to the Yugoslav crisis has appeared clumsy and ineffective up to now.
The first instinct of the diplomats in the huge Stalin-Skyscraper which houses the Foreign Ministry on Smolenskaya Square in Moscow was to try to broker a deal between Mr Milosevic and Dr Kostunica. When neither of them showed the slightest interest, the reaction in Russia, which regards itself historically and geographically as a major player in the region, was confused.
From the point of view of its own interests, however, Russia did manage to get itself into a position in which it kept its lines open to both Dr Kostunica and Mr Milosevic at a time when it was unsure which of them would be victorious. In one way therefore it has retained a greater degree of influence in Yugoslavia than its Western rivals.
Dealing with Mr Milosevic does not enter the political equation as far as the West is concerned, but its position regarding Dr Kostunica is far from influential. At the earliest possible opportunity Dr Kostunica reiterated that he would not hand over Mr Milosevic to the international war crimes tribunal which he regards as a "tool of NATO".
And to most of those who joined in the dramatic events which led to the overthrow of Mr Milosevic, NATO and its member-states are still the enemies that bombed their country.
Russia, therefore, has maintained strong emotional ties with Serbia which the West cannot hope to match. In the long term, however, Belgrade will need serious financial assistance in its attempts to reconstruct itself and join the European family. In this respect the West holds all the cards.