FRANCE:In wooing Britain and the US the French president is abandoning 50 years of French foreign policy, writes LARA MARLOWEin Paris
DURING HIS state visit to London last week, President Nicolas Sarkozy denied he had cast Berlin aside like a tiresome wife. But Sarkozy's coolness towards Germany contrasts sharply with his ardour for Britain.
Even the Sarko-phantic Le Figaronewspaper reported that he'd "indulged in a little Angela Merkel bashing by declaring: 'The Paris-Berlin axis is fundamental but not sufficient.'"
Sarkozy never hid his fascination for George W Bush and Tony Blair. His speech to the US Congress last November was every bit as effusive as the panegyric before the British parliament. When France was "on the verge of annihilation (we know by whom!), it was England who stood beside France," he said.
"English grandeur often fed the dreams of my youth," Sarkozy concluded.
Franco-German friendship "was the basis of European reconciliation", Sarkozy said, relegating the relationship to the past. But Britain is an example for France; the wave of the future.
Sarkozy wants France to become part of the Anglo-Saxon world; say goodbye to the last half-century of French foreign policy, based on fiercely defended independence.
The shift also means exchanging the German model of a social market economy which preserves public services and a social "safety net" for what used to be known here as le capitalisme sauvage.
Sarkozy may find the "Anglo-Saxon model" is not so easily grafted onto Latin France. He seems to think he can reconcile the irreconcilable, telling the British parliament he supports globalisation and greater protection for workers.
Sarkozy raised hackles at home by announcing before a foreign parliament his intention to increase French forces in Afghanistan. To mollify the socialist opposition who accused him of dragging France into an Afghan quagmire, the president called a debate on the question in the National Assembly tomorrow.
But nothing will prevent Sarkozy from making a formal announcement at the Nato summit in Bucharest this week that he's sending another 1,000 French soldiers to Afghanistan. (There are already 1,800 in theatre.) They are likely to be ground combat troops deployed in the east, where fighting with al-Qaeda is intense.
Referring to Afghanistan in an opinion piece published by this newspaper last week, the French defence minister Hervé Morin noted: "As soon as our forces pull out, the situation returns to what it was, or almost, like the tide uncovering and recovering the sand." It was an admission of the failure of Nato's strategy.
Sarkozy's rationale for dramatically increasing the French presence sounds like Bush speaking. "Can the Allies afford to lose in Afghanistan?" the French president asked on the BBC. "The answer is no. Because part of the world struggle against terrorism is being played out there, we must win... It's a long term commitment."
The US has put intense pressure on allies to contribute more troops to Afghanistan. French commentators like Bernard Guetta have concluded that "sending 1,000 men more... means one thing: rushing to help the US without affecting their policy, shedding blood in the sand without hope of results."
The Afghan deployment is a sort of initiation rite prior to France's return to Nato's integrated command. The long-awaited move will coincide with festivities marking the 60th anniversary of the alliance in the spring of 2009. France's rejoining the command - on which Charles de Gaulle slammed the door in 1966 - seems to mean more to Sarkozy than the allies.
For decades, Washington distrusted the French "two-pillar" concept of Nato and European defence.
But the Bush administration has relented, because it is bogged down in Iraq, trusts Sarkozy and realises that Europeans will not increase defence spending unless they're forced to assume some responsibility for their own security.
Renewed promises of closer defence co-operation between France and Britain could go the way of the December 1998 St Malo declaration - that is to say, nowhere. But this time, it's different.
Contrary to Jacques Chirac, Sarkozy is in harmony with the Anglo-Saxon world view. He doesn't expect Britain to give up its attachment to the US, because he shares that attachment. He is comfortable with British euroscepticism; after all, there are eurosceptics in France, he said repeatedly in London.
Sarkozy often gives the impression of adopting policies out of an oedipal desire to dismantle what was done by Chirac. On March 21st, the French leader delivered his first major address on defence policy, at the launch of France's latest nuclear submarine, Le Terrible, in Cherbourg.
In January 2006, Chirac raised controversy by implying that France could use nuclear weapons to ensure its energy supplies, or against terrorists.
Sarkozy said he wanted to return to the "fundamentals" of French defence policy by leaving vague the definition of France's "vital interests".
Though the defence budget will remain the second largest (after education), at about 2 per cent of GDP, Sarkozy is reducing the airborne arm of France's Force de Frappe by a third, from 60 to 40 aircraft. "After this reduction," he said, "our arsenal will include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half the maximum number we had during the cold war."
The language used by Sarkozy on March 21st was pure Gaullist orthodoxy, a throwback to another era, when de Gaulle fought British EU accession, just as Sarkozy now blocks Turkey.
It was the rhetoric of nuclear deterrence, strangely disconnected from Sarkozy's political realignment with London and Washington.
"All those who would threaten our vital interests would expose themselves to a severe riposte from France, wreaking unacceptable damage on themselves, out of proportion with their objectives," Sarkozy warned.
"Sarkozy's coolness towards Germany is a sharp contrast to his ardour for Britain