IRAQ:FIRST LIEUT Justin John, six foot four and built like a tank, plopped down on a sofa in front of Ibrahim Suleiman al-Zoubaidi, one of the leaders of the mainly Sunni armed groups that have helped the US military quell violence in Iraq since last year.
Al-Zoubaidi, a small man armed with a revolver, had one thing on his mind: this week officials of Iraq's Shia-led government will assume authority over the groups, which have been backed by the US. "They will kill us," he declared. "One by one."
Across Baghdad, leaders of the groups speak about the transition in similarly apocalyptic terms. Some have left Baghdad, saying they fear that the Iraqi government will conduct mass arrests after the handover. Others are obtaining passports and say they will flee to Syria.
John (24), a platoon leader, tried to reassure the Iraqis. "It's a new thing," he said. "It's going to take some time to get used to."
Recognising that the government has been wary from the outset about the creation of armed, mainly Sunni groups under US control, American military officials are taking several steps to prevent their sudden disintegration.
US officials see the Sons of Iraq (SOI) as a central factor in the reduction in violence, along with the temporary increase in US forces, a year-long ceasefire imposed by a Shia militia leader, and the stepped-up assassinations of key insurgents.
John's unit - second battalion of the fourth infantry regiment, attached to the first brigade combat team, fourth infantry division - has set aside funds to pay SOI guards for 90 days in case the Iraqi government does not. US soldiers say they will sit in as Iraqi officials hand out salary payments during the first few months. And the Americans have demanded that the Iraqi government refrain from arresting any of the Sunni fighters, many of whom are former insurgents, unless authorities have arrest warrants issued within the past six months.
That will make it harder for the Shia government to arrest SOI leaders for acts committed before they joined forces with the Americans. In recent weeks, US military officials began shrinking the ranks of the SOI by offering members micro-grants that amount to early retirement packages. This month alone John's company has handed out more than 30 grants totalling more than $60,000 (€42,800).
"The big issue that concerns us is what happens if the government drops the ball and stops paying these guys," said Capt Parsana Deoki (32) of New York. "You'd have up to 400 SOI without jobs, without an income. That presents a problem. They have military training and access to weapons - unemployed, with weapons, young men with an established chain of command. You can fill in the blanks."
Dora, a southern Baghdad district roughly 75 per cent Sunni, was one of the most tattered and dangerous places in the capital in early 2007. Heaps of garbage collected on the sides of streets, making it hard to detect roadside bombs. People stopped going to work, fearing kidnapping, an explosion or a sectarian killing.
The SOI, also known as "awakening councils", began in Anbar province in western Iraq in 2006 when tribal leaders joined forces with US troops to fight the growing influence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, a largely homegrown insurgent group that imposed a dogmatic brand of Islam.
Desperate for solutions to curtail the endemic violence that gripped Baghdad and several Iraqi provinces in early 2007, the US military sought to replicate the Anbar model across the country. Awakening councils sometimes formed overnight, especially in places where networks of insurgents had weapons and a chain of command.
Mohamed Abdul Hussein al-Kurtani, an SOI leader in Dora, had been running a local cell of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, an insurgent group that opposed the presence of US troops in Iraq and had been duelling with the local cell of al-Qaeda in Iraq. He decided to join up with the SOI.
Most SOI are assigned to the neighbourhoods where they live and earn $300 to $500 a month.
"At first, the SOI were just guys on street corners," said Lieut Col Bryan Mullins (39) of Bristol, Virginia, a brigade operations officer. "We started integrating them into the security programme. They knew the bad guys and they knew who was in the community."
As violence declined this year and Iraqis began demanding more control over security matters, US officials began exploring ways of shrinking the SOI. But getting Iraqi army and police units to work with SOI groups was initially impossible and remains difficult, US military officials say. The Iraqi government has pledged to hire at least 20 per cent of the guards as soldiers or policemen and has agreed to keep the rest on the payroll until they find other jobs.
SOI leaders say their relationships with police commanders have been forged under heavy US pressure and remain beset by mutual distrust.
"I feel sorry to say this," said Zaied Subhi, an SOI leader."There is no trust between us."
Of more than 54,000 SOI guards in the Baghdad area, 3,400 have secured jobs in the Iraqi security forces, according to the US military. The vast majority have registered to continue getting paid by the government.
US soldiers see SOI leaders as extraordinary sources of intelligence, but what makes them so attractive as allies - their connections to the insurgency - is also what makes the prospect of their dissolution so alarming. - (LA Times-Washington Post service)