UN/IRAQ: Dr Gary Samore edited a dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction for the British government. He tells Tom Clonan why it is inevitable that UN inspectors will discover some
Gary Samore is a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. In this capacity, he edited its report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes published on September 9th last.
Like Hans Blix and Dr El Baradei, leaders of the UN weapons inspection team now in Iraq, he believes that their work will be of vital importance to the outcome of the current stand-off between the UN and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.
Dr Samore is confident that the weapons inspectors will succeed in their mission. This likelihood, he believes, has been enhanced by UN Security Council Resolution 1441 which gives a number of unprecedented powers to the inspectors.
According to Dr Samore, two crucial advantages are offered by resolution 1441. Of major importance is the ability of the inspectors to insist on a programme of random and unannounced inspections of suspect facilities.
This would include surprise visits to seemingly innocuous facilities where the dual-use of chemical and biological agents are suspected. The new resolution also allows for the cultivation and development of human intelligence sources.
Dr Samore observes that intelligence gathered via "national technical means", in other words, electronic intelligence gained from satellites and over-flights, would need to be complemented by "human sources". This, he claims, would be vital for the success of the current mission.
A detailed database of Iraqi weapon-production programmes was built up by Unscom, the United Nations Special Commission, in the 1990s through a process of investigation and detection work. This database will greatly assist the inspectors in the identification of key personnel associated with the weaponisation of nuclear, biological and chemical materials in Iraq today.
The new resolution allows the inspectors to take such personnel and if necessary, their families, out of Iraq for questioning. This technique was used with spectacular success when Gen Hassan Kamal, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, defected to the west in 1995. Once out of Iraqi jurisdiction, Kamal provided a wealth of information on Saddam's biological weapons programme, the extent and sophistication of which shocked experts at the time.
Kamal revealed that the Iraqis had weaponised bacteria, viruses and fungi as lethal agents, incapacitating agents and crop-attack agents. Among these were 10,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 6,500 litres of anthrax and 1,500 litres of the incapacitating agent aflatoxin.
According to Gen Kamal, these agents were developed successfully as liquid filling for 122 mm rockets, 155 mm artillery shells and Al Hussein missiles. It was estimated by Unscom weapons inspectors in 1998 that Saddam had at his disposal some 30,000 such rockets and shells and up to 20 towed Al Hussein missiles.
With a range of 650 km, they gave the Iraqis the capability of delivering a biological payload to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Jordan or Syria.
It is this biological weapons programme which will be of the utmost concern to the inspectors. Of particular concern to the weapons inspectors is evidence of Iraqi attempts to develop a viable smallpox weapon.
The evidence to support such a weapons programme was uncovered by a former inspector, Richard Sperzel. During the 1990s, Sperzel and other weapons inspectors discovered that the Iraqis were experimenting with the weaponisation of camel pox.
It is believed by Sperzel and other weapons inspectors that camel pox, though harmless to humans, was chosen for development as a weapon in that it matched almost perfectly the characteristics of the smallpox virus.
The belief among Sperzel and his colleagues is that the logic being employed by the Iraqis in this instance was that the development of a viable camel pox weapon payload would facilitate the development of a viable smallpox weapon payload.
Experts such as Sperzel and Dr Samore believe that these programmes began in the 1970s following Arab-Israeli conflict in the region. This timing, immediately following a natural outbreak of smallpox in Iraq in 1971, leads many such experts to believe that the Iraqis may have had viable samples of smallpox for such a biological weapon programme.
The prospect of a viable smallpox weapon, deliverable by artillery shell, rocket or missile to Iraq's neighbours, would be of grave concern to the inspectors and the international security community.
Dr Samore believes that the December 8th deadline imposed by the UN on Iraq for a full and complete inventory of their programmes for weapons of mass destruction will prove to be a very significant date.
"At the very least, the Iraqis will have to pass the laugh test in relation to their declaration," he says. Implied in this statement is the certain knowledge that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction.
Experts such as Dr Samore believe in the inevitability of the discovery by weapons inspectors of breaches of UN resolution 1441. It would seem to be a case of when and not if in relation to military action against Iraq.
With the apparent certainty that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, all that remains uncertain is the exact set of circumstances that will trigger military action against Iraq.