INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: In taking us chronologically through 14 chapter's of Saddam Hussein's life, journalist Con Coughlin draws a disturbing picture of the man and his ugly regime, and adds to the store of fact and rumour already known about the Iraqi president, writes Bill McSweeney.
Saddam: The Secret Life. By Con Coughlin. Macmillan, 350pp, £20
Saddam Hussein got off to a bad start. Born outside wedlock, he never knew his father, worshipped his mother, was bullied at school and sexually abused by his stepfather; he grew up in poverty until he escaped in 1946 to live with his Nazi-loving uncle at seven years of age (or maybe eleven: a few years were added when he married his older cousin in 1963). Singularly backward in intellectual development, and resentful of his failure even by the provincial standards of his clansmen, he found his vocation in apprenticeship with his uncle, who nurtured his nephew's outstanding talent as a street thug.
After joining the newly formed Arab Baath Party in 1955, he began his race up the political ladder as an enthusiastic assassin for the nationalist cause, unencumbered by the normal restraints of truth or moral sensitivity. By 1979, he was president of Iraq and committed the resources of his country to a disastrous 10-year war with rival Islamists in Iran. It ended in humiliation for Hussein and devastation for his country. Ever the slow learner, Hussein sought to remedy his plight by invading Kuwait in 1990, thus inviting Western punishment and the horror of international sanctions on his people. The rest is history still in the making.
Con Coughlin is executive editor of the Sunday Telegraph and a specialist reporter and writer on the Middle East. His book promises a lively and intimate account of the Baghdad monster, taking us to the centre of power and behind the palace gates to see the man and his private life. In this regard, this timely book adds to the store of fact and rumour already known about the Iraqi president. (It is not common knowledge that Hussein is author of two novels, both written, one presumes, after his reckless adventure into Kuwait left him with time to pare his fingernails in artistic pursuits in Baghdad.)
Taking us chronologically through 14 chapters of his subject's life, Coughlin draws a disturbing picture of the man and his ugly regime. However, it is not clear how better informed we are on the wider and more important question which gives relevance and topicality to Coughlin's biography. For one thing, too many of the sources cited in support of his insider knowledge of Hussein and his court are listed as "private". One would not expect Iraqi informants to go public, but equally we cannot assume that the confidences entrusted by Iraqi dissidents to foreigners are trustworthy.
The story of the dissenting minister at a cabinet meeting, invited by Hussein to step into the adjoining room for private discussion, only to be shot, is well-known and probably true. That his body was later chopped into pieces for dispatch to his wife is unfamiliar. It would not be out of character for Hussein, but is just as likely the embellishment of a credulous journalist, for all we - or Coughlin - can know.
Even where sources are credible, the dearth of political analysis situating the sordid life history of the Iraqi president in the context of the threat to international peace and security posed by his regime is another problem. In his concluding remarks, and in the overall tone of the book, Coughlin clearly wants to make the case for regime change by international intervention. No one reading this book will have any doubt that the world would be a better place without Hussein. It does not follow that it would also be better to remove him by force.
From the time Hussein assumed power in 1979, he became a pawn of Western economic interests and a useful idiot to manoeuvre into battle with Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. He became a gangster without help from anyone. He became a political danger to his neighbours only with the encouragement of major powers in the West. The same powers imposed the harshest sanctions on Iraq in 1992 and effectively ended his threat to peace and security.
The fact that he remains personally monstrous and a blight on the lives of his own people, as Coughlin eloquently demonstrates, does not make him unique among the gangsters who are still useful idiots in the region. It certainly does not tell us what we ought to do about him.
Bill McSweeney teaches international politics at the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin