In early June 1971 Hugh McCann, secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, received a letter from Donal O'Sullivan, ambassador in London, which must have given him some grounds for optimism. The letter concerned a conversation with Sir Stewart Crawford, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who had told O'Sullivan that Edward Heath was "nothing if not a realist and this long drawn out trouble in the North is not doing the reputation of either of our countries any good abroad". In consequence "the idea of a long-term solution is not altogether absent from the Prime Minister's mind".
O'Sullivan then pushed out what was by now the Iveagh House strategy: a "soft sell" on Irish unity as the ultimate solution. He suggested it would be "a tremendous step forward if the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister could talk about the long-term solution, even in an exploratory way, at their coming meeting". To this Crawford responded with "we'll see", adding, "There is no shortage of goodwill as between these two men."
However, there was little sign of that goodwill in the months between this exchange and the first Lynch-Heath summit in early September. In July Mr Lynch had taken the opportunity of the 50th anniversary of the Truce in the War of Independence to call on Britain to declare its interest in Irish reunification; and he criticised the 1949 Act guaranteeing support for the union with Northern Ireland for as long as Stormont supported it. Such a policy, complained Lynch, served to encourage "infamous conduct" on the streets of Northern Ireland. This drew a rebuke from Downing Street.
In the wake of internment, introduced on August 9th by the incoming prime minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, relations worsened. Heath had summoned Faulkner to London on August 12th. During these talks Lynch sent a telegram to Heath suggesting a political rather than a military response was what was needed. Lynch announced his availability "to come to a meeting of all the interested parties designed to find ways and means of promoting the economic, social and political well-being of all the Irish people, North and South, without prejudice to the aspiration of the great majority of the Irish people to the reunification of Ireland".
Faulkner stated that when this telegram was read out "a few unprintable comments were volunteered all round". Heath replied to Lynch that his telegram was unjustifiable and unacceptable. Both leaders were, by now, engaged in a bout of megaphone diplomacy - "brawling publicly" was the verdict of the British ambassador in Dublin, Sir John Peck.
Some measure of the deteriorating security situation can be gleaned from the fact that the death toll in the two years prior to internment was 70 and that twice as many again were killed in the rest of 1971, the total of dead rising to 210 by the end of that year.
Lynch's first summit meeting with Heath which had been scheduled for October was brought forward to early September. In preparing for this summit Lynch had no shortage of advice. His former ministerial colleague, Seβn MacEntee, wrote on September 2nd complaining of the "disgraceful" behaviour of the authorities at Dublin Airport when the IRA veteran Joe Cahill had enjoyed "a quasi-ambassadorial send-off" to the US. "I cannot think of anything more calculated to embarrass you in your talks with Heath."
The Irish account of the first Lynch-Heath summit was written by the Irish ambassador to London, Donal O'Sullivan. The coldness of the exchanges is manifest. This was not negotiation but the repetitive reiteration of what were by now the very well known views of both men. Heath emphasised the need for an internal short-term political initiative: Lynch insisted that it would be "enormously helpful" if some concession could be made to a long-term solution based on Irish unity.
Lynch stated that a situation had developed where the northern minority were "looking to the IRA rather than to their own elected representatives". And he warned of the possibility "of near civil war". He argued for a political breakthrough. He wanted the British "to reformulate its guarantee to the Northern majority". The current guarantee ensured permanent unionist power "and in that situation there will inevitably be a recurrence of trouble. The IRA is a by-product of the situation."
Mr Heath protested that the British army was trying to deal with "urban guerrilla warfare". Lynch insisted that "urban guerrilla warfare can only work if there is co-operation from the people. This co-operation certainly exists because the minority are looking to the Provisionals for protection." The thrust of Lynch's argument throughout was that he wanted the constitutional nationalists in the SDLP to win back ground lost to the Provisionals since the introduction of internment had "greatly worsened" the situation a month before.
Heath insisted internment had been introduced by Faulkner as a necessity; allegations of brutality by some internees "were quite excessive". Lynch said he was under strong pressure to refer complaints of brutality to the Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg.
Heath complained of IRA training south of the Border. Lynch insisted that his government was "as intent" as Heath "to bring the IRA to heel" and pressed for a fresh political initiative which would "de-escalate" the situation. If nothing were to come out of his meeting with Heath, the position could be "disastrous". Later he added that "the fact that charges were brought against two of his senior colleagues for alleged gun-running was the strongest proof of his bona fides and of those of the government".
Lynch remained dissatisfied with the scale of Heath's plans and wondered "whether he should have come for talks in these circumstances". O'Sullivan's note of the meeting on which this analysis depends then reports Heath as replying "somewhat forcefully that, if the minority want a major voice, then they want dictatorship and added that this type of approach would have no sympathy either in Britain or anywhere in the world". O'Sullivan also quotes Heath's verdict on the nationalist MPs - "grotesquely irresponsible politicians" - for their withdrawal from Stormont.
And he clearly saw it as heresy to contemplate the inclusion in a Northern Irish cabinet of a nationalist politician who favoured Irish unity. Lynch stressed that the Irish situation was "a very unusual one" which demanded an unusual solution. Lynch admitted that he was "deeply disappointed" at Heath's insistence that Lynch was without "constitutional status" on discussions on the future of the North. Lynch "now regarded the talks as being virtually at breaking point".
Both men concluded the first day of talks locked into this quarrel on Lynch's status in any initiative. Heath told Lynch that "not one of the people in the North who have so far been consulted has said that the people in the South should be involved in the discussions".
The second day of talks opened with Heath confirming his overnight reflections left him still committed to an initiative leading to a conference under a UK chairman. He still saw "the constitutional difficulty" of Dublin inclusion. He insisted he had to "to take account of the facts of life" in the North. What Lynch was suggesting "could only inflame the position". O'Sullivan's record of the meeting continues - and here one would like to have a verbatim record rather than a summary note: "Mr Heath added, with considerable force, that if it is the Taoiseach's intention to seize the minority and to seize the North, then he would meet with very strong resistance."
Lynch remained adamant that he could not acquiesce in being excluded from the British initiative; he regarded "the talks which had taken place as wide-ranging and in a way useful but he doubted if the proposal which Heath had put forward would get off the ground. In saying this, he wished to make it clear that he did not want to take over the minority in the North but they look to him to speak for them." There was little here to contradict Peck's retrospective verdict that the meeting was close to "a dialogue of the deaf".
During the talks Heath had mooted tripartite talks between himself, Lynch and Brian Faulkner. Dublin's response was determined to ensure that Faulkner was not accorded the same status as Lynch. Eamonn Gallagher advised that on balance the Taoiseach was "now in good shape to agree to a tripartite meeting which in any event amounts to a formal and exceedingly important breach of the British thesis that Northern Ireland is none of his business".
The tripartite talks took place in Chequers on September 27th and 28th. Again there was little meeting of minds. Old arguments were revisited. Impatiently, Faulkner said he wanted " 'to get something out of the talks' and asked if there would be any chance of having a working party to consider the question of gelignite". Lynch thought "this would be difficult for him". Even in a constructive phase when North-South co-operation in tourism was being commended by Faulkner who thought such co-operation could be extended to other economic spheres, Lynch commented: "Yes, with unification in mind" and Faulkner interjected: "You have your ideals and I have mine." On internment, Lynch thought it had proved "a disastrous mistake" while Faulkner reckoned it was working. "All the intelligence available to him indicates that the IRA are losing steam."
Lynch emphasised again that the elected representatives of the minority in the North "want to get into government in Stormont as of right". Brian Faulkner's response was that this was "out of the question". Heath supported Faulkner's line asking at one point how could there be "a compulsory coalition".
Three decades later such a compulsory coalition is precisely what is provided for under the Belfast Agreement. Nor is this the only topic on which history has proved Lynch right. At one stage he warns Heath that the "time could come when Mr Faulkner and the British government may have to talk to the IRA instead of the Irish government."
Dr John Bowman is a broadcaster and historian