9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: There were "deep institutional failings", and both the Clinton and Bush administrations failed fully to understand the terrorist threat posed by the al-Qaeda organisation, the US 9/11 Commission reported yesterday.
The commission was set up by President Bush to examine the attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 in which nearly 3,000 people died.
"Terrorism was not the overriding national security concern for the US government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration," the 567-page report said.
The commission recommended the appointment of a national intelligence director and the creation of a national counterterrorism centre to better co-ordinate and share information about future terrorist threats.
"The national intelligence director should oversee national intelligence centres to provide all-source analysis and plan intelligence operations for the whole government on major problems," the report said.
Numerous other recommendations include declassifying intelligence spending, upgrading the computer technology used by US intelligence and reorganising congressional oversight.
The bulk of the report consists of a detailed narrative of the years and months leading up to the attacks. In the summer of 2001 many officials feared that "something terrible" was planned, the report said.
In the face of intelligence warnings that were numerous but not specific, the Attorney General, Mr John Ashcroft, assumed the FBI was taking necessary action and never asked the agency what it was doing or gave it specific instructions.
Domestic agencies did not have direction and did not have a plan to institute. "The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified . . . The public was not warned," the report said.
The report listed 10 missed opportunities by the CIA and the FBI, four in August 2001, to interpret or share information that could have helped them penetrate the September 11th plot.
As late as September 4th, 2001, the Bush administration had not decided whether Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda operation was a "big deal".
"The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise.
"Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers," the report said.
"The most important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of the threat.
"The terrorist danger from bin Laden and al-Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the public, the media or in the Congress. Indeed, it barely came up during the 2000 presidential campaign."
By criticising both the Bush and Clinton administrations, the five Republicans and five Democrats on the panel gave ammunition to both parties in the presidential race.
But President George Bush was seen as more vulnerable because he was in office when the attacks took place.
The White House, which initially tried to block the establishment of the commission, has been awaiting the report nervously, hoping it would not interfere with President Bush's campaign for re-election in November.
Mr Bush called it "solid and sound" but did not discuss its findings. He said he would study the recommendations, many of which he described as commonsense and constructive.
The report concluded that there had been no collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda, one of President Bush's central arguments for launching an invasion of Iraq last year and an assertion still repeated frequently by Vice-President Dick Cheney.
It did list numerous links between al-Qaeda and Iran but said there was no evidence that the Iranians were aware of the planning for the attack.
Iranian officials facilitated travel of al-Qaeda members, including several of the September 11th hijackers, through Iran on their way to and from their central bases in Afghanistan.
Iranian border officials were ordered not to stamp their passports.
The commission sharply criticised Congress for failing in its oversight role on terrorism and intelligence issues.
A former counterterrorism expert, Mr Richard Clarke, who served both Mr Bill Clinton and President Bush and who testified before the commission, said the report left many questions unanswered.
"The commission decided unanimity was more important than controversy. They did a very workmanlike Washington report," he said.