In determining whether the mother's decision was good in law, the question for consideration is whether it was a real consent to the giving of custody of Baby A to the first and second named respondents . . .
In the light of the facts which I have outlined, in my view the mother's decision to give Baby A to the first and second named respondents, which was given effect to on the day she left hospital and continued until the applicant intervened, was neither informed nor free and was not a real consent.
The decision was made at a time when the mother had received no independent counselling or advice and, indeed, no proper advice at all in relation to the rights of Baby A, her own rights, the rights of the natural father, the law governing the care, welfare and custody and adoption of children and, most importantly, the restrictions imposed under the Act of 1998 in relation to private placements for adoption.
Aside from the influence of the first named respondent, the circumstances of this case strongly suggest that the mother's decision not to retain custody of Baby A after the birth was not a free decision. Baby A was the product of a crisis pregnancy which, on the evidence, the mother had extreme difficulty in coping with. It would appear in her perception, her circumstances were so dire that she contemplated the drastic step of undertaking elective surgery to avoid seeing and bonding with her baby. Both before and after the birth, when she was planning her own and her baby's future, she was extremely upset and distraught and the evidence suggests that her distress was of an order of magnitude which robbed her of her ability to think rationally.
It was in such circumstances and in such distressed condition that she sought advice and support from the Agency which, through its advertisement in the telephone directory, held itself out as giving counselling and support to girls in her predicament and as an organisation she could have trust and confidence in. Instead of giving her appropriate counselling and support, the Agency's representative sowed the seed of an adoption in her mind, an adoption involving the proprietor of the Agency and put her in contact with the proprietor. Instead of referring her to an adoption agency, which on his own evidence, was the usual practice of the Agency, the first named Respondent proposed himself and his wife as prospective adoptive parents for her baby. It is hard to imagine a more glaring situation of conflict of interest than one in which a person who assumes the role of counsellor and adviser to a young girl in the later stages of a crisis pregnancy proposes himself and his wife as prospective adoptive parents of the baby and proposes taking custody of the baby within days of the baby's birth. In my view, the first named respondent acted in a totally inappropriate manner in relation to the mother at all times.
There are additional factors, however, which render the first named respondent's actions more reprehensible than inappropriateness connotes. Since April 1999, the first named respondent has been aware that a "private" adoption to a non-relative is contrary to law. On his own evidence, he misled the mother by suggesting to her that she could choose to go the "private" adoption route and was entitled to leave her baby with a couple of her choice. Moreover, the Agency and the first named respondent involved professionals such as the GP and the Barrister, in the mother's affairs. On the evidence, it is reasonable to infer that he did so with the intention of bolstering his influence over the mother. The fact that a similar involvement has been established in the case of Miss B and Baby B strongly suggests that the mother was the victim of the deliberate design to "ring fence" her and her baby; to remove Baby A as far as possible from the supervision of the applicant and other regulatory authorities; and to isolate the mother from independent legal advice and from counselling, so as to overbear her will.
The onus is on the first named respondent to show that the decision of the mother was a free decision unimpaired by her awful circumstances or by any pressure or influence on his part. He has singularly failed to do so.