IRAQ: The person likely to emerge as the most influential after Sunday's election in Iraq is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Michael Jansen explains his role.
The election in Iraq could be called "Sistani's election". The consultation is being conducted at the insistence of the Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most powerful Shia figure in Iraq in the aftermath of the war. In July 2003, just three months after the fall of Baghdad, Ayatollah al-Sistani demanded an elected rather than an appointed body to draft Iraq's new constitution, the main task of the temporary 275-member parliament due to be chosen this weekend.
When the former US chief administrator, Mr Paul Bremer, balked at this, the ayatollah threatened to put tens of thousands of Shias on to the streets in protest. Since the ayatollah advised the Shias to tolerate the occupation until they could elect their own rulers, Mr Bremer capitulated.
Therefore, when Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law was drawn up last spring, January 30th 2005 was designated as the date for the election of the parliament-cum-constituent assembly. This body must finalise the constitution so that it can be approved in a referendum on October 15th, ahead of the December 15th vote for a sovereign parliament, completing the democratisation process laid down under the transition.
Ayatollah al-Sistani was also responsible for bringing together Shia parties under the umbrella of the United Iraqi Alliance. He calculated that the Shias would secure greater power by getting together instead of competing for seats. His nominee, Mr Hussein Shahristani, a former nuclear scientist, negotiated with diverse religious and secular factions, helped them choose candidates and decided where these would appear on the list. During the election campaign, the alliance has trumpeted its endorsement by the reclusive 75-year-old ayatollah and has used portraits of him in its election propaganda.
From their pulpits, Shia clerics have urged their flocks to cast their ballots and vote for the alliance. Shia seminarians studying in the holy city of Najaf have been dispatched to towns and villages in the south to rally voters. The expectation is that large numbers of Shias, who live in relatively quiet areas of the country, will cast their ballots, while many Sunnis, who dwell in the provinces affected most by the insurrection, will not participate. Consequently, the alliance is expected to dominate the assembly.
This means that Ayatollah al-Sistani's influence could be institutionalised and he could become the final arbiter of major political decisions in spite of the fact that he belongs to the "quietist school" of Iraqi clerics, opposing direct rule by mullahs.
"The religious leadership has repeatedly stated that it has no wish to involve itself in political work and prefers its clerics not to assume government positions," he said in a fatwa, or edict. But he does believe in clerical guidance and would like to see Islam gain a central role in the new polity.
He will certainly have a role in the drafting of the new constitution. There are two issues on which he has expressed his views. He wants to see Iraq remain united under firm central control, incurring the wrath of the Kurds, who are demanding that it should become a federation, granting them a large degree of autonomy. He also favours declaring Islam to be the state religion and a source of legislation.
He could, therefore, be exploited by the main parties in the alliance, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Dawa party, which have close ties with the Iranian regime and can be expected to advocate Islamist demands during the writing of the constitution.
When the Governing Council was drawing up the Transitional Administrative Law, these two parties tried and failed to impose a provision revoking Iraq's civil law regulating personal affairs and replacing it with Islamic law, depriving women of the rights they have enjoyed for half a century. Since the 275-member assembly will not be a commission of experts, the constitution will be a product of competing factions, with the largest - likely to be the alliance - dictating its provisions.
Although the alliance rejects accusations that it would transform Iraq into an Islamic state modelled on Iran, Sunnis and secular Iraqis remain unconvinced. Sunnis, who do not owe fealty to a structured clerical hierarchy, as do Shias, would object just as strongly as secularists to a regime run by Shia clerics.
The post-war rise of the Shias under the moderate ayatollah has marginalised and disenfranchised the Sunnis, who ruled for 1,400 years, and the secularists, who built the modern state. Since, under the TAL, three provinces can veto the constitution, Sunnis, who are a majority in more than three, are in a position to reject it. But secularists have no recourse. Consequently, they are emigrating by the tens of thousands, draining Iraq of its educated professionals and merchants.