Whatever we're having ourselves of the PfP?

IRELAND to consider part in force run by NATO read the front page headline in this newspaper three weeks ago

IRELAND to consider part in force run by NATO read the front page headline in this newspaper three weeks ago. The story quoted the Tanaiste, Mr Spring, as saying that the Government would have to give serious consideration to participation in the NATO commanded international military force likely to succeed IFOR in former Yugoslavia.

And if this was not enough to alarm defenders of traditional, Irish neutrality, Mr Spring revealed that the Government is now involved in preliminary discussions with NATO about possible participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP is a NATO sponsored programme through which Ireland could engage in joint training with NATO and, other forces for peacekeeping and other military missions.

There was no storm of protest, and hardly a peep from the defenders of neutrality. Nor was there any reaction three days later when an Irish Times/MRBI opinion poll showed that the Irish public agreed substantially with Mr Spring.

Seventy one per cent believed Ireland should be prepared to serve in Bosnia, while 77 per cent believed Ireland should become involved in PfP. Some saw a contradiction in the fact that 69 per cent also agreed that Ireland's policy of neutrality should be maintained.

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But this finding appears in fact to reveal that the Irish public's notion of what neutrality is different from the traditional view. The public appears to have no hang up about our troops training and even serving with NATO forces, so long as the state can choose which conflicts to be involved in, and which to keep out of.

Is this the correct interpretation? If there was a public debate on these issues might views change and crystallise? Well we don't know, because there isn't a public debate. The Government's White Paper on Foreign Policy promised such a debate on neutrality, but you can't have a debate if one side of the argument remains silent.

So if our troops joined up with IFOR's successor - known jokingly in Sarajevo as IFIVE - what would this involve? It appears that (it would involve whatever Ireland wanted it to involve. On a recent (visit to Bosnia I came across a (Hungarian engineer corps whose sole task was the rebuilding of bridges blown up during the war. (Germans and Austrian troops confined themselves to logistical work.

Conversely the Poles, a non NATO state, were involved in the more dangerous front line work in the unstable region around Doboj.

There appears to be no demarcation between NATO and non NATO countries about what particular jobs they do.

"Contributing states are free to place whatever restrictions they like on how their troops are used," according to the NATO spokesman, Mr Jamie Shea. "They remain ultimately under national command within the day to day command of IFOR. The states have the prerogative to object to anything their troops are asked to do or to pull them out if they wish."

The US (17,000), the UK (11,000) and France (9,000) form the backbone of the 55,000 member force. Thirty four other states contribute troops Albania just recently sent 50 to serve in Croatia, while New Zealand provides one planning officer.

Other large contributors are (Germany (4,000), Russia (1,600), Spain (1,500) Italy (1,100), Canada (900), Poland (650). There is a Nordic brigade of over 3,000 under Danish command made up of Norweigans, Swedes, Finns and Danes.

A country doesn't just sign up and arrive, however. "IFOR lays down standards, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, (SACR) and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe) have to certify that countries wanting to participate can do so." This decision depends on the level of training of the armed forces wishing to participate.

For this operation, the first of its kind, there was very little prior training. Many non NATO countries only signed up after the operation began.

It is here that PfP comes in. The present Secretary General of the UN, Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali has stated regularly that he believes more UN peacekeeping operations should be carried out by regional organisations or powers. In Europe, that means NATO and for NATO operations, the training will be carried out more and more through PfP.

Without training, participation may not be possible. For Ireland, therefore, staying out of PfP may severely limit the state's capacity to participate in international peacekeeping operations.

"Partnership for Peace is one of the reasons IFOR meshed together well" according to Mr Shea. "For two years PfP had been doing joint exercises for peace, keeping, even though they didn't know IFOR was going to happen. The work they did on language, inter operability, training, doctrine, standards and communications all made it immeasurably easier."

The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General George Joolwan, has often said that IFOR could not have happened without the PfP exercises. Nevertheless PfP involvement is not a sine qua non for involvement in future peacekeeping operations at this stage.

According to Mr Shea: "If Ireland wanted to interact with NATO then involvement in PfP would help. But practical experience is worth a thousand PfP exercises. Ireland has a long tradition of peacekeeping, so non participation in PfP wouldn't be a bar to involvement in a force such as IFOR. PfP would make it easier, but Ireland is not a new country when it comes to peacekeeping.

PfP, according to Mr Shea, is "like a Chinese menu there are dozens of choices and you need only take the bits you want". Each country writes its own deal with NATO regarding PfP. Ireland could sign up for some training operations but not others, as it saw fit. Finland, for example, another neutral, participates in training for peacekeeping, but not defence planning activities.

This state may now be heading in this direction if not immediately into IFOR then towards some future intervention force headed by NATO, trained through PfP, mandated by the UN. This would mark a significant change in the interpretation of Irish neutrality. The ease for such a change appears persuasive. It is up to those who think otherwise to state their ease.