THE GENERAL elections of President Suharto's "new order state" have never been known as radical turning points.
With the government-backed party, Golkar, regularly winning about 70 per cent of the popular vote, and two tame opposition parties - the Muslim United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) splitting the rest, one can hardly expect a political landslide of New Labour proportions from Indonesia's 125 million voters.
Besides, the Peoples Consultative Assembly, the 500-seat Indonesian parliament, is almost completely powerless, with no ability to initiate legislation or effect significant political changes under Indonesia's authoritarian constitution, dominated by the presidency. So why should the 1997 elections be any different?
Certainly, the results are almost a foregone conclusion, with Golkar likely to improve its vote, thanks to a government-inspired split in the ranks of the PDI following the July 1996 ousting of its political leader, Ms Megawati Sukarnoputri.
However, the 1997 election may well be remembered for three developments which could mark it out as a turning point in the fortunes of the ailing New Order regime of Gen Suharto, almost 77.
First, the elections themselves have been marked by unprecedented violence: more than 300 people have died in election-related incidents, according to official reports. Never has the sense of frustration been so evident against the system which appears so impervious to change and so unfair in its promotion of the affluent few, many of them Chinese. This group constitutes 3 per cent of the 200 million strong population yet controls at least 70 per cent of corporate wealth.
One can only fear for the future of a country in which so many of its citizens - especially the young - are so deeply alienated from the official political process and the 30-year-old Suharto regime.
Second, for the first time, there has been a significant movement towards a complete election boycott. This movement has been especially evident amongst the supporters of the pro-Megawati PDI who feel themselves disenfranchised.
If a significant number of opposition voters heeds the call of the boycott campaign - say 20 million - it could invalidate the whole electoral process, internationally and domestically.
Certainly, President Suharto himself would feel personally undermined and there are indications that huge pressures are being brought to bear by government officials on voters, especially at the village level, to cast their ballots and to vote "correctly" (i.e. for the government's party).
Finally, the split in the PDI means voters who wish to register an opposition vote will either turn to the PPP, which is likely to improve significantly on its previous 17 per cent share, or look outside the official parties in terms of future political activity.
Government victimisation of the tiny Popular Democracy Party, including the imprisonment of its young leader for 13 years, has given such parties a heroic status in the eyes of many disillusioned younger voters. Since fully a fifth of the Indonesian electorate is under 23 and is casting a ballot for the first time, this adds up to a powerful constituency for change.
If the election is followed by significant in-fighting amongst the Indonesian political elite in the run-up to the presidential election in March 1998, such a constituency could well be cultivated by elements especially within the army - looking to a post-Suharto era. It is known, for example, that there is a large group of officers who see their primary loyalty lying within the state, rather than the person of the president.
At the dawn of Suharto's New Order, in the mid 1960s, a somewhat similar alliance was forged between disgruntled officers and students looking for a change from the hyper-inflation and political turmoil under Sukarno.
Today, the Indonesian economy is buoyant but many of the same political frustrations which spelt the end of the Sukarno regime are already evident. It could be that the wheel of Indonesian history is about to turn full circle.