The problem with international nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and specifically efforts to persuade states to enhance the security of and to relinquish their stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, is that those likely to comply and to lead by example are most unlikely to include those about whom one might be most worried.
So it may sound impressive to report that the number of countries with nuclear weapons-usable material has fallen from 39 to 25 since President Obama launched his nuclear security initiative in 2009. But the truth is that the leaders of 53 countries possessing such materials (Ireland does not) who gathered in The Hague over the past few days to strengthen controls will have had little reason to feel the world is a much safer place for their efforts.
Neither North Korea, which on Tuesday illegally test-fired two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles, or Iran were present, but Belgium and Italy were able to announce that they had shipped out HEU and plutonium to the US for down-blending or disposal. Japan has said it will do so too. Yet, still around 2,000 tonnes of highly-radioactive materials remain spread across hundreds of sites worldwide, many of them vulnerable to possible terrorist theft and the subsequent use of such materials to manufacture nuclear weapons.
The third nuclear security summit, was somewhat overshadowed by the events in Ukraine, but as the US president pointed out at his press conference, the latter's willingness to give up its nuclear materials four years ago meant that at least one potential dimension to that crisis was not an issue.
His initiative has seen limited but welcome progress despite the refuseniks of non-proliferation, but the unwillingness of a third of the states present at The Hague – all of them among supporters of proliferation curbs – to incorporate international guidelines on nuclear security in a binding way into domestic laws suggests a half-heartedness that does not bode well.