British and French insistence on having the right to supply weapons to Syrian opposition forces has prevented a renewal of the European Union's consensus arms embargo, part of a wider set of sanctions against the Syrian regime. This is a regrettable outcome of the intense talks. It may jeopardise the forthcoming peace conference in Geneva convened by the United States and Russia, notwithstanding the British and French intention to weaken the regime in those negotiations by threatening to arm its mainstream opponents. Most EU states including Ireland argue against such a further militarisation of the already highly internationalised conflict.
The EU decision does not mean an immediate increased flow of arms, b ut it signals disarray among the 27 member states and an inability to act together in this severe neighbourhood conflict. A compromise postponing the arms decision until August 1st, after the Geneva conference, failed to secure British and French support. They fear prolonged delay and further debate would prevent a channel opening to arm the principal military leader of the Syrian opposition forces, General Selim Idriss, a moderate who defected from the regime and who has been outflanked by supplies to Islamists from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Should he remain incapable of controlling these supplies the balance of power within the opposition would tip decisively in that direction and away from Western influence, the argument goes.
This is a risky strategy given the fragmented opposition, the fluidity of fighting on the ground and the proxy nature of the Syrian conflict. It cannot be described as a rebellion because the extent of disagreement among those opposed to the regime and the remaining level of support for President Bashiar al-Assad have many hallmarks of a civil war. The 70-80,000 people killed, the 160,000 prisoners held by the regime, the 1.5 million refugees in surrounding states and the 3.5 million people displaced internally demonstrate the awful scale of the fighting and the urgency of bringing it to an end. Diplomacy and internal political negotiation have a definite role to play, all the more so given the intensified international involvement. Some alliances cut across sectarian lines, as with Russian and Iranian support for Assad, while the US and Britain have an influence on Saudi Arabia they must use to prevent a regional war.
Fears among the EU majority that military intervention could provoke just such an outcome justify their opposition to lifting the arms embargo. But having made this position clear they should redouble their efforts to encourage the Geneva talks. The formula underlying them of a ceasefire, negotiations for a transitional government and then elections makes political sense and could, with a more universal commitment, be an alternative to war.