Only one thing is certain: abstention on Nice will be closer to 57 per cent than the 7 per cent in latest poll, writes Richard Sinnott
The main features of Irish attitudes to European integration have been well documented in Eurobarometer surveys.
These show that current Irish attitudes to the European Union are characterised by widespread approval of Irish membership of the EU, positive images of the Union, exceptionally low levels of opposition to enlargement and a perception of the benefits of EU membership, including personal benefits.
They also show majority support for a common defence and security policy and a widespread willingness to see a significant range of issues decided on jointly within the European Union.
However, Eurobarometer surveys also show that for many people, these positive attitudes are not accompanied by any strong sense of enthusiasm for or engagement with European issues.
Irish people, compared to other Europeans, are also below average in their assessment of their knowledge of EU institutions and issues. These aspects of the political culture of European integration in Ireland make attitudes to EU issues more volatile and make abstention in EU referendums more likely.
The Irish Times/MRBI poll shows that relative to a comparable point in the campaign before the first Nice referendum, people's confidence in their grasp of the issues is now significantly better.
Back then, 37 per cent felt they at least understood some of the issues involved in the Nice Treaty. With three weeks to go in the current campaign, this figure is now 53 per cent. The current campaign will be seeking to repeat or even improve on the modest success of the 2001 campaign in increasing people's knowledge of the issues.
If it succeeds in doing so, there will likely be some increase in turnout and an increase in the Yes vote. Given the greater level of effort, particularly from the Yes camp and given the switch in the role of the Referendum Commission from advocating both sides of the issue to simply providing information and encouraging people to vote, the prospects of a substantial improvement in people's understanding of the issues seem good.
From the point of view of the Yes side, the underlying attitudes to integration issues (whether voters prefer a policy of "protecting Ireland's independence from the European Union" or one of "uniting fully with the European Union") have improved somewhat since the first Nice campaign.
In the second Irish Times/MRBI poll of the June 2001 campaign, the "protect independence" option had inched ahead of the integrationist one. From this perspective, the current figures of 46 per cent for "uniting fully" as against 37 per cent for "protecting independence" will give some comfort to the Yes side.
It is also worth noting that the pro-integration sentiment has staged quite a comeback - up from 25 per cent last time to 46 per cent - and that this improvement had occurred by May of this year (see chart).
It may be that the low level of support for the full integration option in the late summer of 2001 was a temporary reaction to what was, after all, a surprise defeat in the referendum the previous June.
A comparison of voting intentions at various stages in the Nice referendum process suggests that the Yes side will need all the comfort it can get. On the basis of the three Irish Times/MRBI Nice campaign polls (two in Nice One and this one in Nice Two), the intention to vote Yes has declined from an initial 52 per cent to 45 per cent and then to 37 per cent. The figure for those intending to vote No has fluctuated (21, 28, 25).
The problem for the Yes side it that even with voting intentions in the final poll before the last referendum at 45 per cent to 28 per cent in their favour (and 27 per cent who didn't know), they still lost. They must now be looking with nervous determination at the figures of 37 to 25 (with 32 per cent "don't knows" and 7 per cent "would not votes").
Determination is probably a more appropriate response than nervousness. The key to success or failure in the referendum, for either side, will lie in the level of turnout - and, in particular, whether abstainers come more from the Yes side than the No camp.
The only certain statement one can make on the basis of the current voting intention evidence is that abstention will be closer to 57 per cent than to the 7 per cent figure in the current poll.
In short, the key to success in this referendum for the Yes side is to get out and mobilise the vote that the accumulation of evidence suggests is there.
In seeking to fully mobilise its potential support, the Yes campaign will be hoping to increase the salience of the issues of giving a fair chance to applicant countries and of Ireland's continued attractiveness to foreign investment.
These are the issues on which the balance of opinion clearly favours the Yes side.
The other main issues are more finely balanced, with more or less equal proportions on either side of the perceived probable effects on neutrality.
There is a slight leaning towards the negative regarding the effects of Nice on immigration issues.
The Yes campaign will also target the middle-classes, the middle-aged and older and the farmers.
These are the main socio-demographic groups in which Yes voting intentions are firmest.
However, they will also target women - not because women are saying they will vote Yes but because they are the group with the largest proportion of "don't knows". This situation gives rise to a remarkable 14 percentage-point difference in Yes-voting intentions between men and women. Women are also slightly less likely to vote No.
The result may well be that they will have a higher level of abstention as they had in Nice One. In the meantime, however, the women in doubt constitute a substantial block of winnable votes.
While these may be the specific targets, each side will no doubt go after any vote from any quarter. They certainly ought to do so, as the evidence indicates that there are a lot of uncommitted views and uncommitted votes out there - and that this contest is open for the winning by whichever side puts the most effort into persuading, reassuring and mobilising a hesitant electorate.
Prof Richard Sinnott is director of the Public Opinion and Political Behaviour research programme at the Institute for the Study of Social Change in UCD.