The return of war to Europe presents the EU and its member states with a set of challenges that it will struggle to meet. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz aptly used the German word Zeitenwende, a historical turning point, to capture the transformative moment that Europe faces. Germany, perhaps more than any other member state, is experiencing a tough internal discussion of its policy towards Russia over the past 20 years. In a recent interview, former chancellor Angela Merkel was unwilling to accept criticism of her Russian policy, conceding only that the response to the annexation of Crimea might have been more robust and that she had failed to create a security architecture that might have prevented the war. She was not entirely convincing.
Two aspects of Germany’s Russia policy stand out as weakening the EU and its ability to deal with Putin. First, the decision to phase out nuclear power in 2011 enhanced the attractiveness of cheap Russian gas. Nord Stream 2 was designed to increase Germany’s reliance on Russian gas, a major strategic mistake, and weaken Ukraine by bypassing it. The US, Russia’s neighbours and the countries of east central Europe had deep misgivings about the pipeline from the outset. The contract for Nord Stream 2 was signed in 2015 after the annexation of Crimea and it took the Russian military build-up to freeze the pipeline, which is already built.
Second, Germany’s political economy, dependent on export-driven growth, is at odds with its security dependence on the US and Nato. Germany’s economy and strategic policies must be brought back into alignment.
The party most likely to do this is the Green Party, which shifted from its pacifist roots before entering government. The war in Ukraine accelerated the change and transformed the foreign policy of the party. Green Party foreign minister Annalena Baerbock and economy minister Robert Habeck have put constant pressure on Chancellor Scholz to do more for Ukraine, including the supply of heavy weapons. Germany has made announcements but fewer actual deliveries of military support. The chancellor’s Social Democratic Party remains divided on the war, and letting go of Ostpolitik is painful. Germany as the largest EU state appears to follow the lead of its partners on Ukraine rather than leading.
An Irish businessman in Singapore: ‘You’ll get a year in jail if you are in a drunken brawl, so people don’t step out of line’
Protestants in Ireland: ‘We’ve gone after the young generations. We’ve listened and changed how we do things’
Is this the final chapter for Books at One as Dublin and Cork shops close?
In Dallas, X marks the mundane spot that became an inflection point of US history
A view has taken hold that the centre of gravity of the EU has shifted east because the countries of east central Europe and the Balts are making the running on the war in Ukraine. These are the frontline countries whose security is most affected by the war and Moscow’s attempt to unravel the post-cold war security architecture, but there will be no effective EU response without the large European states. Hence the significance of the visit this week of Chancellor Scholz, French president Emmanuel Macron and prime minister Mario Draghi of Italy to Kyiv to meet president Volodymyr Zelenskiy. They were joined by Romanian president Klaus Iohannis, a representative of the eastern half of the Continent. The visit was not a mere photo-op. The leaders emphasised their support for candidate status for Ukraine, which clearly signals to Putin that Ukraine is not in its sphere of influence but has the right to face west.
The visit comes at a crucial time in the war and when the European Council (June 23rd and 24th) addresses the issue of Ukraine’s membership of the EU. The military situation in the east is delicately poised following Russia’s ground offensive in the Donbas region. Ukraine will need a continuous flow of munitions to sustain its defensive effort and ward off further loss of territory. Although the US is the major donor of weapons, European states will be expected to do more. There is no way of knowing how the war evolves, how protracted it will be and when a ceasefire might be possible. For now, there is no end in sight and no possibility of a ceasefire.
Hardened language
The language from Paris and Berlin has hardened following criticism that there were making overtures towards Moscow. Speaking in Romania on June 15th, President Macron vowed to do everything to halt Russia’s war. Ultimately, Ukraine must be the one to negotiate its own future with its allies in a supportive role. Meanwhile, the war continues unabated.
Beyond the immediacy of the war, applications from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to join the EU brought enlargement policy back on the agenda following a long period of enlargement fatigue. The Commission announced its favourable opinion on granting candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. The European Council must endorse the opinion at its forthcoming meeting and a majority of the European Parliament must back the two countries. Given that the EU faces the prospect of becoming an EU of 36 over the next 20 years, the European Council should ask the presidents of the four institutions or a high-level group to review EU enlargement policy and process to address the Zeitenwende we find ourselves in.
It is time for fresh thinking. President Macron in a speech on May 9th at the European Parliament proposed a European Political Community that would complement the EU and facilitate the active engagement of Europe’s neighbours in an outer ring of integration. Another way of thinking about it is to dissect the current enlargement process – multiple negotiating chapters – and determine blocks of integration that could be accessed on a phased basis. This implies a multispeed process rather than a multi end and the end objective would remain full membership of the EU.
Rather than thinking of accession as a ladder to climb, it should be viewed as a set of building blocks that are deployed when conditions are fulfilled. One could, for example, envisage free-movement rights before other parts of the Single Market, or enhanced access to the market for goods before services depending on the level of preparedness. None of this is comfortable for the EU but the war in Ukraine is a transformative moment with implications across a whole swathe of EU policy.
Brigid Laffan is emeritus professor of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence.