Northern Ireland is again governed by its civil servants. No Executive has been formed since last May’s elections. Since its establishment in 1998, the Northern Assembly has been suspended — whether formally or informally — for more than 40 per cent of the time.
The latest hiatus stems from unionist opposition to the Northern Ireland protocol, suggesting that maintenance of the Belfast Agreement institutions is not a DUP priority. However, the invaluable series of Irish Times–Arins opinion polls suggests greater unionist attachment to the devolved institutions when a united Ireland is contemplated. There was strong support among northern Protestants for retention of the Stormont Executive and Assembly in any unified state.
In contrast, respondents in the Republic, and to a lesser extent northern Catholics, preferred a fully integrated Ireland with one set of governing institutions, presumably an adaptation and extension of those operating in Dublin.
Insufficient attention has been paid, however, to the implications of devolution — as favoured by northern protestants according to the polls — when it comes to governing a united Ireland
The accompanying focus group research suggests the desire to minimise change is a significant driver of attitudes among northern Protestants, while national identity and symbolism drive the contrary attitudes in the Republic.
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Insufficient attention has been paid, however, to the implications of devolution — as favoured by northern protestants according to the polls — when it comes to governing a united Ireland.
Devolution has posed challenges in the UK but these would be accentuated in a united Ireland because TDs from Northern Ireland alone would make up roughly 30 per cent of the membership of the Dáil, in contrast to the 18 per cent of MPs at Westminster who represent Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, assuming a similar model is implemented
There would be a democratic concern if deputies from Northern Ireland could vote on education and health policy affecting the South while deputies from the South could not vote on those subjects if they are devolved to Northern Ireland. This concern would acquire a sharp political edge if, for instance, a Dublin government relied on northern deputies to implement less generous public spending in the South than in the North.
The Oireachtas would — like Westminster — retain its competence to legislate for the whole state, but when and how could it choose to legislate for Northern Ireland without destabilising the devolution settlement?
In the UK, this question is regulated by a convention that Westminster will not normally legislate for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland without the consent of their legislatures. This convention, which is not legally binding, has not prevented Brexit legislation that the devolved assemblies opposed, but it appears to be still observed on other matters.
The Irish State, however, has no experience of self-conscious reliance on constitutional conventions to constrain legislative choices, so it is difficult to see any similar practice being effective post-unification.
The Northern Ireland institutions have regularly been suspended. If suspension were necessary in a unified state, how should Dublin respond? Appointment of a government minister for Northern Ireland with the Oireachtas enacting legislation specifically for Northern Ireland as necessary is one option.
But the standing possibility that Dublin could impose “direct rule” would undermine the reassurance to northern Protestants that the devolved model is meant to provide.
London governments dependent on the political support of DUP MPs at Westminster struggled to act as effective and impartial mediators between the parties in Northern Ireland.
Poll findings lay down a challenge to advocates of unity
But a Dublin government — in which one or more Northern Ireland parties might serve while others formed the principal opposition in the Dáil — might have to mediate the sort of political disputes that in the past have led to the suspension of northern institutions.
It would be difficult to separate impartial interventions in Belfast from the political incentives that would apply in Dublin.
I suspect these challenges are insurmountable.
Nevertheless, securing “losers’ consent” for a newly unified state is a critically important objective as the Arins/Irish Times surveys suggest.
Minimising constitutional change in Northern Ireland when unification occurs may help reduce opposition to the new state from at least some of those opposed to its creation. It is important, therefore, to gauge just how important the devolved model is to northern Protestants.
The apparent inconsistency between northern Protestant support for the current suspension of the institutions and enthusiasm for their revival in a united Ireland may simply be a pragmatic assessment of which arrangements are most likely to protect their interests.
A deliberative forum, led by professors John Garry and Brendan O’Leary, suggests that the preference of northern Protestants for the devolved model declines somewhat after deliberation. One factor in this diminishing support may be the realisation that, post-unification, unionists would necessarily be a minority in Northern Ireland.
One possible resolution to this conundrum, not without its own problems, would be to establish a united Ireland on the devolved model with provision for review after, say, five years
Powersharing institutions at Stormont reduce the implications of minority status. But those unionists opposed to a united Ireland might come to prefer exercising power as a significant grouping in the Dáil rather than remain locked in a powersharing arrangement that would all but guarantee a Sinn Féin First Minister at Stormont.
One possible resolution to this conundrum, not without its own problems, would be to establish a united Ireland on the devolved model with provision for review after, say, five years. This choice would minimise political change if unification occurred while giving an opportunity to assess whether the challenges of devolution could be overcome and whether the northern Protestant preference for the devolved model continued.
Allowing the devolved institutions to function for a trial period in any unified state may provide the best chance of consensus emerging on the future model of governance for a united Ireland.
- Oran Doyle is a professor in law at Trinity College Dublin