The summer has been a busy one for Michael McElgunn, the assistant commissioner in charge of the Garda national crime and security intelligence service.
On August 15th, Fr Paul Murphy was repeatedly stabbed and seriously injured with a large, “hunting style” knife at the entrance to Renmore Barracks in Galway. A 16-year-old boy was subsequently charged with assault causing harm to the Defence Forces chaplain and remanded in detention. Judge Gerard Furlong was told during a bail hearing last month that more serious charges may follow and that it is believed “the accused holds a radical Islamist mindset”.
Meanwhile, gardaí issued warnings about an increase in far-right violence, including possible plots to kill leading politicians. McElgunn took the rare step of taking to the national airwaves to warn that Russian spies are attempting to steal intellectual property from Irish companies and multinationals as well as “seeking to support extremists groups”.
Shortly after McElgunn’s media appearance, Richard Browne, the director of the national cybersecurity centre (NCSC), issued a warning that Ireland has never been more exposed to a significant cyberattack and that there is a big risk that one will take place in the next two years.
McElgunn, Browne and the agencies they run do a lot with very little. McElgunn has the difficult job of leading operations (and securing convictions) against organised crime networks. He is also simultaneously in charge of security intelligence. Identifying, analysing and countering threats to the State, including espionage and terrorism, requires capabilities distinctive to those of criminal investigation. Detecting threats and gauging levels of risk over a sustained period is a primary task of an intelligence service. For example, a diplomat’s accreditation may be refused, due to evidence that he or she is an undeclared intelligence officer intent on running spy networks. Visas may be rejected because of intelligence linking an individual to an extremist organisation. Such actions will rarely make headlines.
Crime statistics and incidents are the subject of discussion between the Government and An Garda Síochána
Convictions for terrorism may be low, but that does not mean that intelligence officers can be complacent or under-resourced if extremists continue to pose a demonstrable threat to life. A single undetected plot, such as that in 2019 in the city of Christchurch in New Zealand, can self-evidently result in mass casualties. It is no secret that Ireland, relative to similarly sized European countries, is stretched when it comes to resources for counterterrorism and espionage.
Crime statistics and incidents are the subject of discussion between the Government and An Garda Síochána. McElgunn has somehow to carve out enough time and resources — in addition to winning the attention of the commissioner and the Government — to ensure that security intelligence remains a priority. Browne suffers from high expectations but few powers to proactively defend Ireland from cyberattacks. The NCSC is not a signals intelligence service. While warning of risks and working to respond to cyber incidents, it lacks the legislation and resources to systematically intercept communications by individuals deemed to be a security risk. The overall annual budget of the NCSC is just under €11 million. New Zealand, with a smaller population and economy — and arguably a less threatening regional environment — spends nearly 20 times that amount funding its communications security bureau.
Whereas the NCSC publishes its budget, there is little transparency when it comes to measuring the annual spend on security intelligence of the Garda. There is, consequently, scant public oversight or awareness — in contrast to many other democracies — when it comes to measuring whether investment is keeping pace with the rise in complex and diverse national security threats. Oireachtas committees rarely, if ever, receive confidential briefings on national security threats; there is no intelligence and security committee to oversee agencies.
In July of this year, Mr Justice Tony O’Connor, the judge appointed to review the use of communications interception legislation, urged the Government to give gardaí the legal powers to access encrypted online messages, including on WhatsApp and social media, where there was a reasonable suspicion that a person or group may be involved in a violent, extremist plot or pose another serious threat to national security. The European Commission has warned the Government that a lack of such powers is a big security weakness, with implications for the EU as a whole.
The Defence Forces’ directorate of intelligence (J2) role extends beyond supporting military deployments and includes covert surveillance to support domestic counterterrorism operations. But military intelligence’s place in the national security of the State suffers from a striking lack of legislation and oversight (a gap which the Government says it will now address).
If State agencies need more powers, then they will also need more oversight
The increased scale of the threats to our security — so clearly recently articulated by McElgunn and Browne — means that the Government should commission an independent review of security intelligence with two key aims. First, it should establish whether the structural and legislative frameworks of the State’s intelligence services are well-placed to serve national security while protecting the rights of citizens. Second, a review should report on whether current oversight mechanisms at an operational, judicial and political level are sufficient to ensure that the intelligence services act lawfully and retain public confidence.
If State agencies need more powers, then they will also need more oversight. The appointment of an independent examiner charged with ensuring that the fundamental rights of citizens are respected in the drafting and use of security legislation is welcome. The examiner should also warn of threats to privacy and property from malign state and non-state actors.
Ireland will have to grapple with what the 2022 independent review of New Zealand’s security legislation called, “the democratic paradox, namely that people in liberal democracies accept the need for intelligence and security agencies to protect their political institutions and processes, as well as the democratic values, rights and freedoms they cherish; but they also fear the agencies they set up to do this”. If the State is to successfully navigate its “democratic paradox” and increased threats to national security, then a sustained engagement with citizens is vital. Discussions of intelligence should not always be in the shadows.
Dr Edward Burke is assistant professor in the History of War at UCD
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