Tom Clonan is given a frightening account of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Darfur.
The government of Sudan's latest threat to the UN - a warning that it would regard any UN peace-keeping intervention in Darfur as an "invasion" - has led the US administration to call for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council.
The situation in Darfur remains fraught and confused. Amid the complexity and unfolding tragedy, however, there may be room for manoeuvre at the 11th hour - perhaps an African solution for an African problem.
Limerick-born Lieut Col Jim Burke (49) is deployed to Darfur as military adviser to the European Union's special representative to Sudan, Pekka Haavisto. Working closely with the headquarters staff of the African Union's (AU) mission in Sudan, Lieut Col Burke and his EU colleagues have acquired an intimate knowledge of the main players in the Darfur crisis, including the Sudanese armed forces, the notorious Arab Janjaweed militias and the various non-Arab rebel factions active in the region.
Lieut Col Burke paints a frightening picture of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Darfur, where there are an estimated 1.8 million internally displaced persons. There are more than 200,000 refugees in camps in neighbouring Chad.
This crisis is the legacy of a bitterly contested civil war that began in 2003. The Sudanese government's reaction to this unrest led to the arming of Arab tribes - now universally referred to as the Janjaweed - in support of punitive Sudanese army operations in Darfur.
It is estimated that between 180,000 and 300,000 people were killed during these operations. It is also generally accepted that these operations led to the ethnic cleansing of non-Arab civilians in the region - many of whom are now concentrated among 65 massive refugee camps dotted throughout Darfur.
In the immediate aftermath of these atrocities, an initial ceasefire agreement was reached in Abeche, in Chad, in September 2003, followed by the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in April 2004. The latter led to the first deployment of African Union troops to Darfur in June 2004. The African Union mission was reinforced in October 2004 and in July 2005 and currently has almost 6000 personnel, 5,000 of whom are armed peacekeepers. The peacekeeping mission managed, to some extent, to contain acts of aggression between the Sudanese government and the various rebel factions during the period of the Abuja peace process, from 2004 to 2006.
Unfortunately, only one faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army, led by Minni Minnawi, signed up to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) which was concluded in May this year. The agreement is widely considered to be an equitable blue-print for the future of Darfur. It provides for the disarmament of all militias - both non-Arab and Arab - and the reintegration of all such militias into Sudanese society. It contains explicit directions for the democratic redistribution of wealth and power within Sudan.
In the rush to conclude the deal and avert further loss of life, the majority Fur tribe - from whom Darfur derives its name - became unhappy with the tempo of the negotiation process. Increasingly disillusioned by the agreement, the tribe became more suspicious when Minnawi's faction - comprised mostly of the Furs' traditional rivals, the minority Zaghawa tribe - appeared to immediately benefit from the agreement.
Minnawi himself was appointed special adviser to Sudan's president Bashir. Tensions between these two non-Arab factions came to a head in June, with clashes taking place between Fur militia and Minnawi's Zaghawa cohort of the Sudanese Liberation Army - which by this time was being referred to by their Fur neighbours as Janjaweed 2.
It would appear that the recent resurgence in violence in Darfur is as much predicated on local tensions between the Fur and Zaghawa tribes as the wider Arab/non-Arab fault-line within Sudanese society.
Lieut Col Burke points out that the African Union troops are doing their best to provide security in Darfur under these very difficult conditions.
"The two main force contributors are Nigeria and Rwanda with three battalions each. The Senegalese and South Africans have also supplied battalions. This means that there is a small force of just eight battalions deployed to secure an area roughly the size of France. Whilst much of the ground is depopulated scrub and desert, it is still an enormous challenge, particularly for a force with poor logistics and air support."
Lieut Col Burke adds that the EU, along with the US, the UN, Canada and the British, French and Irish governments, are among a large group of international partners of the AU who are continuing to provide financial and logistical support to the hard-pressed African Union force.
Ireland has made a particular contribution in the establishment of a fledgling civilian police force - some of whose positions have come under attack in recent weeks.
However, the African Union force has proved incapable of preventing, or even adequately reporting on, the recent escalation of violence.
Lieut Col Burke emphasises that many violations of ceasefire agreements and of international humanitarian law are being committed by all armed factions - not just the Janjaweed and Sudanese government forces.
The Sudanese armed forces have been observed mounting crude air attacks - with free-fall bombs dropped from Antonov cargo planes - at targets in or near populated villages. The government has also substantially reinforced its troop numbers within Darfur, contrary to previously signed agreements.
Arab militias have become increasingly active over the past month, raising fears the government may be tempted to use them once again as auxiliaries in attacks on rebel-held areas. In a possible portent of a wider civil war based on ethnicity, in one incident alone in the last fortnight Arab militia destroyed five villages close to Greida in south Darfur, killing 59 and wounding 30.
The non-Arab militias - portrayed in some western media accounts as the "good guys" - have also been breaking international law. In July the Sudanese Liberation Army/Minnawi faction undertook what international observers have described as offensives in the Korma area "involving many unacceptable acts against the civilian population including murder, rape and village expulsions amounting to ethnic cleansing".
This 14-day campaign "cleansed" 20 villages and created 10,000 new refugees. Minnawi's fighters have also been guilty of racketeering and intimidation, robbery and assault of humanitarian workers and obstructing African Union troops.
The other main faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army - the non-signatory Wahid/Shaafi faction - is charged with similar violations of international law over the past three months. They are strongly suspected to have been involved in the deaths of up to 12 local non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers: some were apparently lynched on the basis of tribal identity. They have also attacked and disarmed large numbers of African Union troops, killing two Rwandan soldiers in one ambush.
As the warring factions require vehicles, satellite phones and large amounts of fuel to sustain their military operations, local and international NGOs have fallen prey to attacks from the various militias. This deterioration in the general security environment is inhibiting the work of organisations such as Goal and Concern, and puts the civilian population at further risk from ongoing violence.
Amid this crisis - and calls for an extension of the AU peacekeeping mission and the transition of the force to UN control - Lieut Col Burke and his colleagues are very concerned about the immediate future in Darfur and the prospects for stability throughout Sudan.
"Ideally, in the best interests of Sudan and Darfur, the UN should take control of the peacekeeping force in Darfur from January 1st, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
"However, even if transition of authority takes place on January 1st . . . the same challenges will confront the new force. It is vital that this transition is complemented by a parallel political process to create wider agreement to the DPA . . . a political agreement that has broad acceptance amongst all parties to the conflict, including the government of Sudan."
Both the EU and the Irish Government support transition to UN authority and support the DPA as the best basis for an enduring peace process.
For now, the government of Sudan has escalated its opposition to a UN force in Darfur. Pressure is mounting, though, from a broad coalition of western, African and even some Arab countries. China, which abstained along with Russia and Qatar in the recent UN Security Council vote, has also begun to apply pressure on Sudan to accept UN control.
However, even if such a UN force were accepted by the Sudanese, it might prove impossible for the UN to raise up to 20,000 troops: many key donor countries are unable or unwilling to contribute meaningful numbers of troops for Lebanon or Afghanistan. There is also the growing risk that an international UN force - not composed in the main by African troops - will be seen by radical Islamic or Arab factions as a new "crusade" or western "invasion force" in Sudan.
Among some strategists on the ground in Darfur there is growing support for a more pragmatic Plan B based on the realpolitik of the current situation. This would see a maintenance of control by the AU under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, but with significantly enhanced military, logistical and financial assets provided by the UN.
International criticism of the Sudanese government seems only to have deepened its resistance to a UN deployment. It might ultimately transpire that the solution to Darfur's problems do not reside in the hands of European, American or Asian UN forces.
Unfortunately, in this escalating war of words, the way forward for Darfur might well be paved by African Union troops supported by the international community and deployed with the reluctant agreement of a belligerent Sudanese government.
• Tom Clonan is the Irish Times Security Analyst. He lectures at the School of Media, DIT.