IT IS more important to get it right than to get it carry. The phrase has been used on a number of occasions during the peace process to explain the decision to cancel a summit, defer a decision, delay a statement.
The announcement that the international body on the decommissioning of illegal weapons has postponed its report until next week has inevitably sparked rumours that the operation is in difficulties. In fact, what has been remarkable about George Mitchell and his colleagues has been the sense of urgency and discretion that has characterised their inquiry.
Since their appointment the three men seem to have generated respect across the board. This has been achieved, at least in part, by their willingness to see and listen to everybody who wanted to meet them, not once but several times. The result has been that expectations have been raised to a" very high, perhaps unrealistic, level.
Can the group come up with recommendations which will allow the British government quietly to consign Washington 3 to oblivion and at the same time extract from the IRA a commitment to getting rid of its weapons? Even more problematical, will the formula satisfy the unionists and bring about the political talks which Sinn Fein urgently needs?
It's relatively easy to see the shape of a compromise that would get around the decommissioning impasse, at least if the British sincerely want to advance. This would involve a solemn declaration by the IRA of its commitment to non violent methods, accompanied by a pledge to destroy its own weapons over an agreed period. The process would be verified by an outside body, probably Mr Mitchell and his two colleagues. The possibility of this working has been enhanced by the presence of the Canadian, Gen John de Chastelain, whose sharp and practical interventions have impressed everybody.
But even if this works, how and when will it lead on to talks? The great conundrum now is whether Mr Mitchell's report will endorse the idea of an elected body, put forward by both David Trimble and the British government. If it does, the Irish Government will be put in a difficult position, particularly if it is seen as a quid pro quo for a compromise on the arms issue.
THE assembly argument now seems set to present the next major obstacle on the way to a settlement. It exposes, more clearly than any other issue that has emerged since the IRA ceasefire, the gulf between the North's two political communities.
The proposal for an 80 member elected assembly was first floated by David Trimble, soon after he became leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, and later refined by the Northern Ireland Office to a body of 45 seats. The Unionist leader has emphasised that the assembly would have no legislative powers and that there would be no question of its being a return to Stormont". It would, Mr Trimble argues, test the electoral strength of the various parties and, crucially, would provide a forum in which unionists could sit down with Sinn Fein as the parties do in council chambers, to greater or lesser effect, across the North.
That sounds reasonable and the proposal has already attracted support from impeccably moderate politicians like John Alderdice. So why are the nationalist parties in the North firmly opposed to the idea of an assembly, to the extent that both Sinn Fein and the SDLP would almost certainly boycott it?
The most important reason is that they see it as a retrograde step, not necessarily another Stormont, but a move designed to place the whole problem of divided political allegiances back in a six county context. It isn't simply that unionists, having the majority of members, would dominate proceedings and control the agenda or, as Bertie Ahern shrewdly pointed out in a speech in Belfast last week, that the adversarial style of most parliamentary debate is not the best way to reach the compromises necessary in negotiations. It's that the problem which the Northern Ireland state has constituted since its formation would be put squarely back into a British setting, and the requirement to give recognition to conflicting sets of loyalties, first enshrined in the Anglo Irish Agreement, could be fatally undermined.
Unionist leaders, even the most enlightened of them, have failed either to recognise or grapple with this problem of dual political allegiances and conflicting aspirations. Intelligent, pragmatic politicians like Bob McCartney and John Taylor have argued cogently, even courageously, that Catholics must be guaranteed equality within the Northern state and that this can include valuing their cultural identity, but they have always stopped short of recognising the political legitimacy of nationalism and nationalist aspirations.
There might have been a time, before the Civil Rights movement exploded onto the streets, when such guarantees from the unionist establishment might have been enough to secure the acquiescence, if not the loyalty, of Northern nationalists to the state. But the decades of violent conflict have changed that. As one nationalist leader told me recently: "If it had been possible to solve this within the North we'd have done it years ago. It's taken 25 years to move it onto a broader stage, [and] get the British to admit that there is an Irish dimension to it."
Sinn Fein at least will not settle for anything less than a full recognition of its political identity and its right to work for a united Ireland. The IRA was only persuaded to give up the violence by the argument that it could achieve its objectives through an alternative political strategy. If that is seen to fail, it will bring the danger of a return to violence much closer.
Sinn Fein is desperate for serious political recognition. More than any other issue, the demand for "inclusive talks now" dominates the thinking of the party's leadership. Gerry Adams has to demonstrate to the dissidents within the IRA, who are already losing patience, that he can deliver what they believe they were promised, and that the unarmed strategy can bring tangible political results.
BUT there is also an onus on Sinn Fein to accept the reality of its opponents' fears and move to reassure them. One of the reasons why the assembly proposal is attractive to unionists is precisely because it seems to offer them some security and control over their future. It is not enough for Sinn Fein to keep repeating that it is the responsibility of the British to put pressure on the unionists to enter talks. There are steps which the party could take to move the situation forward. It is time for the Sinn Fein leadership to give a more generous and unequivocal commitment to the principle of consent, to show that it accepts there will be no change in the North's constitutional status without the consent of the majority. That would be an honest acceptance of reality and a brave step forward.