ANALYSIS:Ireland and the EU must use their leverage to force political reform and avoid more conflict, writes Kurt Bassuener
FOR YEARS, Bosnia has been off the international radar, allowing many to assume that it was a situation essentially solved, or at the very least stable. But events of recent years have clearly shown that Bosnia is far from a finished product.
Much of the effort to construct a functioning state from Bosnia's two constituent entities - the ethnic Serb Republika Srpska and the ethnic Muslim and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - has stalled and begun to unravel, as political rhetoric has become more heated. The legitimacy of the state and of Republika Srpska has been questioned by political leaders. This has led average Bosnians of all constituent peoples - Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, and those who do not choose these labels - to fear increasingly for their security.
Conflict on the scale of the 1992-1995 war seems unlikely. There is no popular will for conflict. But a trajectory toward dysfunction that could lead to break-up and violence is clear. A minor incident could spiral into something far more serious. There is a distinct possibility that Bosnia could again become a failed state on the EU's doorstep. It would be a primarily European failure, and could cripple the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.
After years on the back-burner, EU foreign ministers discussed Bosnia this month, and the group of countries charged with overseeing the Dayton Peace Agreement's implementation, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), expressed concern at lack of progress. But neither the EU nor the PIC grasp the problem. The international community seems keen on maintaining a faith-based policy on Bosnia: hoping the EU's Stabilisation and Association Process will drive Bosnia's politicians to building a functioning state. Prior to these meetings, Bosnia's top politicians scrambled to develop a statement that they have found common ground on all the outstanding benchmarks demanded by the PIC as prerequisites to close the international Office of the High Representative (OHR). Then, the international role will "transition" from the executive OHR to a "facilitating" EU Special Representative role.
The three leaders of the main ethnic parties promise to complete these reforms. But it's not really a deal - it's a deal to make a deal. Despite having seen many such commitments, the EU and PIC wanted to believe it would bear fruit. It has not.
There are differences in the EU. Britain and the Netherlands are for adherence to the benchmarks set this year. Sweden, Spain, Italy and others believe the accession process itself will solve Bosnia's problems, and that transition is overdue.
Germany, the swing vote, is in between. While these differences in posture are wide, none qualifies as a strategy. None of the current approaches here defines success.
By now this ought to be obvious: EU success in Bosnia means ensuring a constitutional order allowing a single political centre. The Dayton constitution creates three centres, each rewarding nationalist candidates who generate inter-ethnic fears. This has enabled Bosnian politicians to promise to protect "their" traumatised electorates, gaining a lack of accountability unimaginable in other European states. Until a constitution forces responsive politics, Bosnia will continue to gravitate towards violent dissolution.
The EU's greatest leverage is as EU gatekeeper. Transformations requiring major political will from applicants must be accomplished before EU entry. Brussels should articulate guidelines for a Bosnian constitutional order that it could accept: one promoting a political centre. This constitutional development process will require EU assistance, and should be the new EU Special Representative's primary role. No other reforms have any durability without that foundation. A proven politician must lead this effort for the EU.
The EU must recognise that its capacity to deter violence through its military force, Eufor, has sunk below credibility. This raises the fear of renewed conflict among the population, making it more open to exploitation by politicians.
Ireland has invested to prevent a return to war in Bosnia. Ireland can now fill the leadership vacuum among EU member states by promoting a radical policy redirection as outlined above, building a consensus, and applying the Union's leverage.
Doing so will confirm its support for a credible Common Foreign and Security Policy and secure Bosnia's European future. When EU foreign ministers meet next month, Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin should pull them out of bureaucratic autopilot by advocating a strategy for Bosnia that can succeed.
Kurt Bassuener is a senior associate of the Democratisation Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion. He lives in Sarajevo