There are several reasons for the strong negative reaction internationally - and now also in the US - to President Bush's wish to act on what he believes may be the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and to remove Saddam Hussein from power, if necessary through an invasion of that country.
First, "evidence" of the existence of such weapons in Iraq is so inadequate that, some time ago, the British government - despite its concern to appear supportive of the US - felt it necessary to countermand an earlier decision to publish such information as it possessed.
Moreover, Dr Hans Blix, the UN's chief weapons inspector, recently said that his team "do not have manifest or solid evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction". And, presumably, if the US government had evidence that would have stood up to expert scrutiny, the administration would have passed it on to the UN, whose support for action against Iraq would help its cause.
To launch a war against Iraq in the absence of convincing evidence of this kind seems indefensible.
Second, as recent statements by the British Foreign Secretary have implied, the intention to remove Saddam Hussein by force conflicts with a strategy designed to persuade the Iraqi President to permit the re-entry of weapons inspectors. Why would he allow the inspectors to return if, despite making such a concession, the US still sought to remove him?
Third, it has come to be widely accepted that if Saddam did have weapons of mass destruction, the most likely - and perhaps only - circumstance in which he might use them would be if a war were launched to remove him from office.
Fourth, a war launched by the US against Iraq might - and, according to many, would likely - destabilise the whole Middle East, in particular Saudi Arabia. The irrationality of the US administration's stated aim of overthrowing Saddam by force, apparently regardless of the possible consequences, gives credibility to speculations that there is a more devious US motivation at work with regard to Middle East oil - speculations that may, in fact, be groundless.
Despite the absence of evidence of a link between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorists - the story about a pre-September 11th meeting between an Iraqi intelligence operative and an al-Qaeda member in Prague having apparently been discredited - it seems more likely that the intention to overthrow Saddam derives not from some simply Machiavellian plot about oil, but rather from a Pavlovian reaction by hawks in the US administration to the events of one year ago in New York.
No European country is showing much sympathy with the US approach to Iraq. Even within the British government, opposition has been growing, with Foreign Secretary Jack Straw sounding a warning note this week. The private feelings of the British government, as distinct from their diplomatic public expression, are reflected in the disclosure on this page yesterday by former US ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, that a senior adviser to Tony Blair had told him "bitterly" that Washington "was giving nothing" in return for the British Prime Minister's "unstinting support".
The German government, usually a staunch ally of the US, is vocally opposed to George Bush's macho unilateralist approach, and the German opposition leader has now endorsed his stance, saying that "the monopoly on the decision and action on this question lies with the United Nations".
France is even more strongly opposed to the US policy. It has even been suggested that France might join Russia and China in vetoing any UN resolution supporting an invasion of Iraq. However, in yesterday's article, Richard Holbrooke cast doubt on this, saying that Russia - anxious to strengthen its relationship with the US - has, in fact, privately indicated "readiness to support a tough regime"; that China, "whatever its qualms" will not use the veto "against the international community"; and that France, in the end, will not "stop the concerted will of America and Britain".
Holbrooke may well be right in this analysis - he is extremely well-informed - although his view might be influenced by his deep concern to persuade the US administration not to act without first seeking UN Security Council endorsement.
His view that even a failure at the Security Council would place the US administration "in a much stronger position to garner international support for action" is less convincing. Whilst more support would be likely in the US itself, the opposite could well be the case with much international opinion. Even an American as well-informed as Holbrooke may underestimate the attachment of many Europeans and their governments to the rule of law in international affairs.
A recent statement by President Bush has sought to reassure international opinion and some worried sectors of domestic US opinion by promising "consultation" before action. While "consultation" by large powers can mean simply listening and then ignoring what has been said, it is at least possible that President Bush, perhaps after belatedly taking on board advice from his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, may be getting worried about the increasing isolation of his administration abroad and, to some degree, at home.
Influential Republican voices from his father's time as president - such as Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and Larry Eagleburger - recently started to criticise publicly his Iraq policy. Whether current pressures will lead him to seek UN endorsement for action against Iraq - as his father's administration did with such remarkable success before the Gulf War 12 years ago - is another question. If he were to do so before the end of this year, our Government would be faced with an awkward choice between deciding to help the US to get such endorsement or voting against.
For small countries, membership of the Security Council can sometimes carry a heavy price in terms of choosing between principle and expediency.
That is why I was never enthusiastic about seeking election to that body, although when we did so two years ago, like everyone else I was absolutely delighted at the extraordinary support that our candidature evoked from every part of the world - a remarkable tribute to our foreign policy record.
In last week's article I referred to the "absence of economic expertise at the assistant principal level in the Department of Finance". This should have read the "almost total absence of qualified economists in the assistant principal grade of the Department".
gfitzgerald@irish-times.ie