The rapid takeover of Kabul by the Taliban on August 15th, and the demise of the previous internationally recognised government, have confronted Afghanistan’s new rulers with deep-seated problems. The capacity of the new regime to govern effectively while responding to endemic economic and humanitarian crises has already been called into question.
In particular, doubts have been cast about the internal coherence of the Taliban’s leadership and the strength of possible challenges to its governance. Even before the Taliban’s ascent to power, Afghanistan faced enormous humanitarian challenges, including forced displacement due to conflict, rising poverty levels, severe food insecurity, the persisting impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and a regionwide drought.
In mid-2021, there were 14 million food-insecure Afghans out of a total population of 40 million. With food supplies running out, the World Food Programme has expressed fears that millions might be on the brink of starvation. Prior to the Taliban takeover, 600,000 people were internally displaced while UNHCR reported the largest ever refugee movement across the border into Pakistan.
The humanitarian crisis and the scale of the challenge now faced by the country’s rulers have been deepened by the response of international actors to the Taliban’s accession to power.
Prior to this month’s events, 75 per cent of the Afghan government’s $11 million budget was provided by donor funding. In the meantime, the US Federal Reserve has frozen the country’s foreign exchange reserves of around $9 billion. The International Monetary Fund has suspended payments to the country, as has the Asian Development Bank, while the World Bank, together with other donors, has suspended disbursements of money for reconstruction.
Alternative resources to support the running of the country appear limited by comparison. Apart from opium production, on which many Afghans depend and which the Taliban is committed to suppressing, the country’s exports in 2019 amounted to just $870 million.
According to a recent UN report, the Taliban itself has enjoyed revenues of between $300 millon and $1.6 billion per annum, largely the result of drug trafficking, opium production, extortion and kidnapping for ransom, as well as mineral exploitation and tax collection in areas under its control, and external support from wealthy individuals and ‘charitable’ non-governmental organisations. The shortfall is likely to lead to further limits on state capacity to meet basic needs and a deepening of the economic and humanitarian crisis.
Internal divisions
The capacity of the Taliban to govern effectively is also threatened by challenge within the movement and within the country. The recent announcement of an interim government disappointed those who hoped for some reflection of recent Taliban commitments to greater inclusivity. It also appeared to reflect a concern on the part of the movement to demonstrate its unity and coherence.
The new government is composed entirely of men, entirely of senior leaders of the Taliban and almost entirely (30 out of 33 members) of representatives of Afghanistan’s Pashtun community, which comprises less than 45 per cent of the country’s total population.
However, the vocal rebuttal by Taliban spokesmen of speculation regarding internal divisions and infighting have been belied by the need in recent days to reject claims that the deputy prime minister, Abdul Ghani Baradar, had been killed in a shootout with opponents or to explain the disappearance from public view of its leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada.
Internal challenges to the capacity of the Taliban to govern may be exacerbated by economic and humanitarian challenges in another crucial way. The movement has sought to display a willingness to engage with external actors in order to attract badly needed resources. In doing so, senior Taliban figures have been at pains to demonstrate the extent to which the movement has changed since it first took power in Afghanistan in 1996.
The price of support
However, the price of support from outside may be destabilising for the movement as it invites the possibility of challenge from more extreme Islamic militant organisations, especially the so-called Islamic State Khorasan or IS-K.
The departure of the United States has created an opportunity for other powers to exert influence over the new rulers. Russian president Vladimir Putin was quick to declare that the Taliban takeover was a reality that Moscow had to deal with, while Russia’s UN representative hailed the prospects for national reconciliation and an end to violence in Afghanistan.
In more concrete terms, it has been reported that China is willing to spend vast sums of money to finance the reconstruction of Afghan infrastructure.
However, support from any of these quarters will come at a price. Russian support would be conditional on the Taliban taking action against Islamist militants in central Asia. While the Taliban maintains its practice of denying the presence of foreign fighters, the UN estimates their number at between 8,000 and 10,000, the majority from central Asia.
China, for its part, has concerns regarding the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), composed of Uighur fighters opposed to Chinese repression and its detention of nearly one million Uighurs and other Muslim minority peoples. The UN estimates that around 3,500 ETIM fighters are based in the region of Afghanistan that borders China.
Islamic State threat
The difficulty for the Taliban is that action against any of these groups could have a negative impact on internal unity and might also drive recruitment to even more militant groups that are hostile to what they see as the Taliban’s narrow nationalistic and ethnic ideology.
Most prominent among these is IS-K, an affiliate of the so-called Islamic State. IS-K emerged from elements in the Pakistan Taliban who fled major anti-terror operations carried out by the Pakistani military after 2010. After a period of fragmentation, increasing numbers of these declared their allegiance to Islamic State and their opposition to the Afghan Taliban whose commitment to operating within the country’s borders, as well as its recognition of international bodies such as the UN, stood in contrast with the asserted universal ambitions of IS-K to work for the establishment of a global caliphate.
By 2015, the two movements had declared war on one another. In the course of hostilities, IS-K suffered territorial losses and is now reduced to a core of between 1,500 and 2,200 fighters. But, it remains a significant threat to stability.
According to the UN, it has adopted a decentralised cell structure concentrated in urban areas and, despite its relatively low numbers, has carried out high casualty attacks which have targeted Western NGOs, Shia religious centres, hospitals and schools. In the first four months of this year, it carried out 77 attacks, as well as the suicide bombing on August 26th at Kabul airport that killed 13 US troops and at least 170 Afghan civilians.
The return to power of the Taliban clearly brings with it a great deal of uncertainty. What is almost certain, however, is the prospect of prolonged political instability and violence for Afghanistan and its neighbouring region.
Vincent Durac is associate professor at the School of Politics and International Relations University College Dublin