Crisis In Kosovo

The international response to the crisis in Kosovo has been relatively swift and determined so far, compared to the Bosnian crisis…

The international response to the crisis in Kosovo has been relatively swift and determined so far, compared to the Bosnian crisis in 1992/93. With accumulating evidence of repression, ethnic cleansing and thousands of refugees, there is a clear need for a united response by all the international forces involved. Yesterday's strong declaration by the European Council at Cardiff recognises this reality commendably well. It was orchestrated with the Contact Group, NATO, and the United Nations Security Council. The Russian government, whose leader, President Yeltsin, is to meet the Serbian leader, Mr. Milosovic, today in Moscow, is closely involved in the process. Much hangs on their meeting, which has been organised to bring maximum political pressure to bear on the Serbian government.

Mr. Milosovic cannot assume that continued prevarication will work with the Russians, whose own pride and international role have been put on the line by these events. Despite Russian dissatisfaction with yesterday's NATO air manoeuvres, it will be politically and diplomatically difficult for them to tolerate continuing Serbian aggression if this puts them out in the cold with their international partners. The Serbian government faces a stark choice, as economic sanctions are applied and amid escalating talk of military moves to stop their repression in Kosovo. Either their action is continued in which case the military escalation in response seems very likely, or political dialogue is re-opened.

To be credible, such dialogue must encompass the four demands made in yesterday's EU declaration. Operations by the Security Forces against civilian populations must be stopped and the responsible security forces withdrawn. Effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo must be put in place. There must be a full return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes; with unimpeded access for humanitarian organisations. And rapid progress must be made in the political dialogue with the Kosovan/Albanian leadership, based on substantial autonomy.

Having put forward such demands, it is very important now that the EU be seen to support them whole heartedly and with determination. This will certainly test the Union's international credibility and that of the leading member states which have pledged themselves to take a response of a qualitatively different order if these terms are not met. Having said that another Bosnian war must not be allowed to happen, the pace of events will rapidly pose the question of means to prevent that as well as ends. The EU does not have the means to enforce militarily the demands it has made on the Serbian government. But undoubtedly its leader enjoy popular support for the firm stand they have taken, against Serbian aggression. It will take political skills of a high order to reconcile their demands with Russian reluctance to use military force against Mr Milosovic and their possible use of a veto at the Security Council.