Discussion on cutting public sector pay has put the spotlight on the conditions of politicians, writes Noel Whelan
RECENT CONTROVERSIES about payments and allowances to politicians and arguments about the number of Ministers of State are a sideshow and distraction from the larger decision on public expenditure which Government must make in the coming weeks.
It is in many ways inevitable, however, that while decisions on cuts and payments in the overall public sector await finalisation of consultations with the social partners, the pay and conditions of politicians themselves have come under the spotlight.
During the boom years there was a gradual but substantial increase in the range and amount of remuneration paid at the senior levels of politics. It was similar in many ways to the pattern which developed in the public sector generally and in larger private companies.
Our politicians were once underpaid for the work they did and under-resourced for the various services they provide to their constituencies. Now the opposite is the case. Over the last decade not only have the basic salaries and expenses paid to TDs and Senators increased dramatically, they have also been provided with a wider range of allowances, equipment and facilities with which to run their political operations.
There has also been an explosion in the office-holder ranks of our parliamentarians. Dozens of new positions were created to which backbenchers are appointed and, by means of which, both their salaries and constituency operations can be further enhanced.
Like many aspects of our public service, the Ministers of State system developed in an ad hoc manner, with little coherent logic governing its expansion. No consistent criteria determined to which department they would be assigned and the extent of their powers and functions varies across departments, often with no clear demarcation between them and their senior Ministers.
It is often suggested that the more than doubling of Ministers of State since the 1970s stemmed from a need to beef up the political presence in departments or better co-ordinate policy on particular issues or across certain sectors of the population. It owes more, however, to the need felt by successive taoisigh to bestow additional political patronage within their parliamentary parties or between coalition partners than to any genuine attempt to improve government.
Nowadays the ministerial workload in departments is great and political assistance is sometimes needed from Ministers of State. A larger volume of increasingly complex legislation must be steered through the Oireachtas. Public engagements here at home, EU meetings and international gatherings at which Ireland must be represented politically have grown exponentially. In reality, the job was half a job in the era when Ministers of State were known as parliamentary secretaries. Now there is more for Ministers of State to do but there is no need for so many of them to do it.
Using Minister of State appointments to reward or retain the loyalty of backbenchers is one of those luxuries we can no longer afford. The numbers should be cut and the functions of those remaining more clearly defined.
After the chief whip there is probably a need for three or four Ministers of State with cross-departmental briefs.
We certainly need a Minister of State for European Affairs, not least because it is more important than ever for Ireland to have a set of political eyes and ears at Council of Ministers meetings. The volume of law now being made at European level is such that our Minister of State for European Affairs could conceivably have his or her primary office in our permanent representation in Brussels.
The establishment of the Office of the Minister of Children in 2005 was a useful innovation. Similar offices established on a statutory basis and headed by a Minister of State could co-ordinate policy-making in a small number of other key policy areas, including older people and integration.
There should then be one Minister of State for each of the five largest departments – Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Health and Enterprise – and one Minster of State for two of each of the smaller departments.
Within their departments the Minister of State should be given one and only one specific area of delegated responsibility and otherwise should operate as a real deputy to the senior Minister.
They should, for example, be given an automatic right to attend meetings of the department’s management committees, to be circulated with Cabinet papers affecting their department and to be involved early in the preparation of legislation.
A reduction in the number of Ministers of State would save money on salaries and expenses.
It would also enable the reassignment of many of the Civil Service support staff currently allocated to them.
While this would be a very small step on the steep financial climb that the Government must make to restore order to the public finances, it would be an important symbolic gesture.
It would be even better if any reduction in the number of Ministers of State was accompanied by a radical overhaul of their role. It could illustrate how, at senior management level, fewer office-holders can prove both cheaper and more effective.
The current need to contain public expenditure presents an opportunity to introduce meaningful reform across all aspects of Government, the civil and public service. Reforming our system of Ministers of State could make an interesting case study in how to set about doing this.