It is difficult to dispute the stark assertion of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy that Russia’s war on his country will become an “endless bloodbath”. While he and his people will continue to be applauded for their courage and spirit, they will not get what they want: international intervention on a scale that will halt the barbarity of Vladimir Putin. Neither will Putin get the imperialist vindication he craves, a frustration that has already hardened his resolve to settle down for an exhaustive war of attrition.
Historians of the future will devote considerable effort to defining the essence of Putinism, and they will find that, prior to the war on Ukraine, there were plenty of signals as to what drove his project. In many ways Putin is firmly on the path to what Andrei Kovalev, who served during the final years of the Soviet Union in the USSR ministry of foreign affairs, described in his 2017 book Russia’s Dead End. Billed as an “insider’s testimony from Gorbachev to Putin”, Kovalev’s book depicts a Putin’s Russia dragged backwards: corrupt, authoritarian and with increasing unpredictability and antipathy towards the West and its allies. But Kovalev holds out the possibility that eventually Russia will be rebuilt from within, from the bottom up, a task that will take at least three generations. Kovalev also chastises the West for its self-interest and naivete in appeasing Putin.
Embezzlement and remilitarisation
Kovalev focuses on how “a rather narrow but powerful circle of ideologues vanquished history and established a monopoly over historical ‘truth’ or, more accurately, ‘pseudo truth’.” Russia’s 21st century czars simply kept the Soviet methods and apparatchiks in place, with Kovalev suggesting the West’s indulgence allowed Putin the space and wealth to exploit Russian citizens in a manner indicating a distressing degree of continuity. He quotes the poet Nikolai Nekrasov from 1875 who observed in the midst of the 19th century imperialism that Russians had endured tough times historically but none that were morally more despicable. Kovalev argues that verdict is even more applicable to recent times with the added ingredient of an unprecedented rise in world prices for oil and gas, enabling vast sums to be embezzled and spent on remilitarisation, an essential ingredient in the overall project of “restoring Russia’s greatness” and which also involves the promotion of a “national ideology” to make it easier to target internal enemies and “inconvenient people”.
Historians of the future will devote considerable effort to defining the essence of Putinism and they will find, prior to the war on Ukraine, there were plenty of signals
But some of the analysis of Putin also held out hope; that because Russian oligarchs deposited so much of their wealth in the West they would only tolerate Putin going so far. And that due to Putin and his circle’s reliance on targeted terror, according to Kovalev, “they simply won’t be capable of engaging in mass repressions” an inability that would ultimately prompt internal upheaval.
Putin’s bloodlust is also born of an insecurity, described in Robert Nalbandov’s 2016 study of Russian foreign policy, Not By Bread Alone, as necessitating “a vision of a significant external threat to ensure that domestic institutional actors would rally around his rule. This was accomplished by exploiting Russia’s own identity crisis.” In aspiring to superpower status “it needs to construct a superpower nemesis on the other side of the international relations field”.
Economic elite
The annexation of Crimea in 2014 prompted external, self-serving suggestions that it was an illustration of weakness and the limits of expansionism rather than a revival of Russian imperialism, which explained the pitiful sanctions in response; the Moscow stock market even lifted after those sanctions were announced. At that time, it was widely held that given its trading patterns and economic elite, Russia could not afford to be ostracised: in the words of John Cassidy in the New Yorker, “logic and Putin’s own history suggest he will push the West as far as he can without causing real damage to Russia’s economy, but no further”.
There has been much focus on how Putin's actions have solidified a Ukrainian unity of identity, purpose and resolve, but the price exacted is appalling
For all the attempts to excavate the layers of history and social, political and cultural currents, the psychology of Putin seems horribly simple, revolving around a reverence of strength above all else, no matter what the human toll. There has been much focus on how his actions have solidified a Ukrainian unity of identity, purpose and resolve, but the price exacted is appalling. The bravery and dignity of those who face the gravest consequences will continue to be lauded, and Putin will go down in history as a war criminal. But it seems too optimistic to hope the war might prompt the beginning of what Kovalev argued would be a challenge from within Russia, something Zelenskiy hoped for too when he spoke directly to the Russian people hours before the invasion, imploring them to “Hear us”.
International relations professor Nina Khrushcheva, great granddaughter of former Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, has no doubt that Putin believes “blood will be forgotten and his legacy as the uniter of ‘Russian lands’ no matter what the cost, will remain”.