President George Bush's preparations for a strike against those allegedly responsible for last week's crimes continue unabated. The Americans clearly want to forge a global alliance against the scourge of terrorism. But nowhere is their diplomacy more intricate and more fraught with potential dangers than in Washington's current negotiations with Russia.
Ostensibly, the recent chill in the relations between the two countries which grew worse after Mr Bush's arrival in the White House in January this year is now over: no less that two high-level US delegations will descend upon Moscow this week in order to discuss the practical methods of co-operation against international terrorism. Nor is this rapprochement confined to the governmental level alone. Ordinary Russians, hitherto still accustomed to viewing the US as either a potential enemy or, at best, a fair-weather friend, are genuinely supportive of America in its current grief. Throughout last week, the US embassy in Russia has been inundated with condolence telephone calls, and the railings of its buildings in Moscow remain strewn with bouquets of flowers. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, both the Russian government and its people now genuinely believe the threat facing their country is identical to that confronting the US. But here, in a strange way, is also the nub of the problem: the reality is that the benefits from a Russia-American strategic partnership against terrorism are outweighed by the potential drawbacks.
Russians have been subjected to terrorist attacks for years. Bombs exploded in the Moscow underground railway system, on various trains and in public housing buildings. Some of these attacks can be attributed to wars between various Russian mafia organisations, turf battles over drug dealing, prostitution and money laundering. But the most spectacular and bloody incidents have been blamed on Chechen terrorists, who have waged war on Russian forces more or less since the Soviet Union disintegrated.
For years the Russian government has demanded international action against this scourge. And, at least in part, President Putin owes his current post to the desire of ordinary Russians for a peaceful, orderly life; his pledge to eradicate terrorism and to sort out the Chechens have won him huge support at home. To all intents and purposes, therefore, President Putin can now claim to have been vindicated: a war which has begun in his country has now struck at the US as well. But, as so often in the past, what the Russians hope to get from this partnership the Americans are not prepared to grant, and what the Americans want, Moscow cannot deliver.
Western governments did very little to stop the running sore of Chechnya, mainly because all the available options were unpalatable. On the one hand, public opinion in the West rallied against the tactics of the Russian troops in the province, which included carpet bombing and scorched earth policies, resulting in thousands of innocent civilian casualties. But, at the same time, no Western government considered this as a worthwhile issue on which to pick a dispute with Moscow.
Simply put, the great strategic considerations, such as disarmament, the Americas missile defence programme and NATOs enlargement to the former communist countries of Central Europe remained too important to be overshadowed by a vicious conflict in a small, far-away country such as Chechnya. The result was a diplomatic stalemate. One moment Russia was threatened with eviction from the Council of Europe over its human rights record, and in the next President Putin was embraced by Western leaders as a strategic friend. The Russians got used to this game: they did not succeed in persuading Western governments to support their Chechen war, but they did not suffer much as a result either.
The terrorist attacks in the US last week suddenly changed the equation. Within hours after the outrage, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov rushed to point out that, Khattab, the Chechen rebel chief whom Moscow's security services have so far failed to catch, is allegedly an assistant to Osama bin Laden, the man Washington claims masterminded the strikes last week. Immediately thereafter, Gen Anatoly Kvashnin, the Russian Chief of Staff, claimed to have precise information on bin Laden's whereabouts. And the entire Russian government promptly offered full support for America's current hunt.
It is easy to see what Moscow is hoping to achieve from this co-operation. At the very least, the Russians assume the West will never bother them again about Chechnya. The Russian military has also suspected for years that Chechen fighters enjoyed some tacit Western support, which they now hope will be eliminated. More importantly, the Kremlin believes the terrorist attacks would persuade Washington to abandon its missile defence programme which, if deployed, could render Russia's own military obsolete
As the Russians strenuously argued last week, there is little point in spending tens of billions of dollars on a sophisticated missile system if the threat to the US now comes from small bands of criminals.
And, finally, a renewed Russian-American partnership could obviate the need for another round of NATO enlargement in Central Europe, which the Russians also strenuously oppose.
The US sees no need to argue publicly with this Russian view mainly because, at least for the moment, the key American objective remains that of forging an international coalition against terrorism.
But officials in Washington know full well that the disadvantages of co-operation with the Russians probably outweigh the potential benefits. Russia may have some useful intelligence material on bin Laden, yet this is unlikely to be more substantial than what the Americans already have: Moscow is years behind Washington in electronic surveillance techniques and even worse than the US in penetrating terrorist organisations.
Nor do the Americans need Russia's military assistance: the Russian armed forces are disastrous at pin-point strikes against guerrillas, precisely the skills which the US military now needs. And the political cost which Moscow will demand in return for its co-operation is simply too high.
The US cannot abandon the project of enlarging NATO because this will create huge difficulties with other European allies and frighten the Central Europeans into believing that a new division of their continent is in the offing.
In addition, the US Congress may well decide to provide money for both a sustained effort against terrorism and the continuation of the missile defence programme at the same time. For, as a US Congressman said last week, one does not give up a fire insurance policy just because one's house has been flooded.
And, finally, a link-up with Moscow will frustrate Washington's efforts to attract support from Islamic states: because of the cruelty in Chechnya countries as diverse as Turkey or Pakistan now believe the Russian view of their religion is that the only good Muslim is a dead one.
The high-level US security teams arriving in Moscow this week will carefully eschew mentioning such unpalatable facts.
But the truth remains that, when it comes to the current crisis, the partnership between Moscow and Washington is more apparent than real. Russia's terrorist threat comes from its own disaffected citizens, while America's is external.
The US has suffered terrorist attacks because it is otherwise militarily impregnable, while Russia is attacked because it is militarily weak. No amount of diplomatic talk could bridge these differences.
Jonathan Eyal ∩s Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London