The startling glimpse behind the scenes of Boris Johnson’s chaotic administration during this week’s hearings of the parliamentary inquiry into the UK government’s response to Covid 19 would put the most acerbic political satire to shame.
The testimony of Dominic Cummings, Johnson’s erstwhile chief adviser and latter-day arch-critic, paints a picture of confusion, mendacity and incompetence as Downing Street vacillated during the crucial months of February and March 2020. Cummings is hardly a reliable narrator; the aggressive, expletive-filled private messages he sent during that period reveal a man as convinced of his own rightness as he was sure of his colleagues’ failings.
This week’s proceedings, focusing on the roles of key advisors and senior public servants, illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the UK’s system of parliamentary inquiries. The adversarial, inquisitorial style serves well in uncovering the personal tensions and (in this case) character flaws of some of the key protagonists. It shines an unflattering light on those responsible for the UK’s failure to move more swiftly and effectively in the early days of the pandemic, due in part to a misguided belief that herd immunity would be a viable defence against the virus. Accounts of Johnson’s refusal to accept the gravity of the threat posed by Covid, along with his inability to concentrate on any subject for more than a few minutes, will do further damage to the former prime minister’s already threadbare reputation.
So far at least, the inquiry has been less successful at identifying the systemic lessons to be learned from what happened than it has in generating asterisk-filled column inches for an eager news media. And the focus on the early days of the crisis rather than on the highly consequential decisions made in the months that followed only provides a partial picture. These shortcomings should be borne in mind when it comes to devising Ireland’s review of its own pandemic response, a process which should not be delayed any further. Professor Philip Nolan has suggested that an “after action review” would be preferrable to the “political theatre” of a public inquiry, which by its nature tends to seek scapegoats.
He has a point. The coronavirus pandemic posed an unprecedented threat to the State and society. Inevitably, some parts of the response were less effective than others. Decisions were made, particularly in relation to nursing homes, that in hindsight were grave errors. Over the course of the crisis, tempers frayed and interpersonal conflicts flared between key protagonists. These were inevitable and are certainly of some interest. But they are much less important than the insights which can be gleaned from a rigorous, impartial review with the objective of improving how future crises are addressed.