Diplomatic attempts to square the Kosovo circle continue amid fresh hopes and signs that a settlement is possible in the next 48 hours without resort to NATO air strikes on Serbian targets. It is an unenviable, perhaps an impossible task of negotiation but an essential one. Neither the Serb nor the Kosovar sides will get all they want. They must decide whether the balance of compromises and forces is favourable, in the knowledge that the passing of time will help to relieve some of the pressure. The same applies to the powers involved in the Contact Group, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and Germany, which are divided on methods but surprisingly united on objectives.
The Serbs are reported to have accepted the political terms set out by the Contact Group, but not the presence of a NATO force in Kosovo to implement and police an autonomy agreement; the Kosovar delegation insists there must be provision to reopen the question of independence in three years' time, probably by a referendum. For the Serbs a NATO presence would signal an end to their sovereignty over Kosovo and would be tantamount to an occupation force; for the Kosovars an agreement to disarm and demobilise without some commitment to independence would be an acceptance of defeat.
The Serbs may be more willing to accept an international force if it is more flexibly defined, with a United Nations Security Council mandate and Russian participation, and if the agreement is larded with new loan facilities from the International Monetary Fund, which their economy desperately needs. This would allow Mr Slobodan Milosevic to claim a victory of sorts against his international and domestic opponents. Many close observers of his strategy and tactics believe that is what he has been seeking all along in this latest crisis, following his loss of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. He may be holding out for a high-level visit to Belgrade led by the US Secretary of State, Ms Albright, to deliver on it.
For their part the Kosovar delegation is willing to accept a NATO presence and the prospect of NATO armed force against Serbia. But they understandably at the demand that their independence objective be effectively abandoned. They cannot accept Serb sovereignty over Kosovo after the experience of brutal occupation and repression. The independence movement is relatively young, well-supported and financed. Its leaders do not see why strategic fears of a longterm regional escalation should be used to deprive them of their independence.
Such are the elements at play in the Rambouillet talks endgame. As always there are deep ambiguities involved. Russia, for example, is willing to endorse a NATO-led implementation force, but not unilateral military action by that alliance against Serbia. It makes good sense to seek a Security Council mandate for the force, but were the issue of NATO military action to go there Russia would probably veto it - despite the fact that Mr Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary Gemeral, accepts the threat of force is necessary to reach a settlement. Such ambiguities can still be creatively orchestrated to reach a settlement if there is sufficient commitment from all concerned.