Pragmatism, flexibility and diplomacy are not readily associated with Iran's foreign policy, but they each featured as the British naval personnel crisis was resolved last week. Release of the 15 sailors and marines has greatly eased a confrontation that could have been leveraged into growing escalation by either side. It has revealed wider lessons on how best to conduct relations with Iran's rulers as they adjust to a much more influential role in the Middle East region.
On both sides there has been much speculation about the timing and motivation of this crisis. Ever since five Iranians were arrested in Iraq by US forces three months ago it has been expected that Iran would stage a reciprocal action. That the seizure of the 15 naval personnel coincided with a United Nations Security Council decision to tighten sanction against Iran over its nuclear programme was seen as a gesture towards nationalist opinion there. This manifested itself in demonstrations, alleged confessions and calls for the Britions to be put on trial for violating Iranian sovereignty.
Such a logic of escalation was, however, not followed by Iran's rulers. Knowledgeable observers detect here clear direction from the real centre of power in Iran around the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Kamenei, rather than from the radical but more marginal President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The crisis was steered towards a diplomatic solution emphasising Iran's readiness to be flexible if treated as an equal. It is to Britain's credit that these signals were responded to so readily, even as it sought international support - deservedly so - from the European Union, the UN and the United States, telling Tehran there would be a price to pay for any escalation. Mr Blair emphasised both elements in his statement welcoming the release, along with a warning that elements of Iran's regime support and promote terrorism in Iraq.
Conspicuously absent from this episode has been the escalatory policy towards Iran pursued by the Bush administration involving widening sanctions and a large-scale build-up of aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. Neoconservative ideologues anxious to build up such pressure have been denied it by the release of the British personnel. The case for engaging directly with Tehran is thereby strengthened.
The opportunity to explore this path should now be taken up. If Iran's flexibility is reciprocated over its disputed nuclear programme and its extensive regional influence, progress on a wider front could follow. This can be explored without sacrificing the need to curtail any aggressive intent on Iran's part.